357.AD/12–1650: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received December 16—3:04 p. m.]
Delga 444. From Gross. Re Korea—cease-fire: On Thursday night I had a brief conversation with Younger in which I outlined to him in very general terms our thinking re a cease-fire and in particular our ideas re machinery for supervising such a cease-fire; arrangements for a demilitarized zone; and arrangements for withdrawal of the forces behind the zone.
Jebb called on me today to give certain comments which Bevin wished to make re certain points. Bevin agrees to the principle of the demilitarized zone which in his view should be patrolled by UN observers.
With regard to a supervisory commission, Bevin thought it should include representatives of the UC, the Chinese Commies and the NK and ROK. He felt it was particularly important that the Chinese Communists should be represented on the commission and on any other machinery set up for observing the cease-fire. I told Jebb that in our meeting with the cease-fire group we had already stated that we accepted the principle that representatives of the opposing forces would participate in the cease-fire machinery at the observer level.
Bevin had also commented that the Chinese Communists might oppose the principle of unrestricted access of the cease-fire commission to the whole of Korea. He suggested that I might be wise not to press this point at this stage and suggested language along the following lines: “The commission is appointed to supervise the cease-fire and shall be given such powers as the commission considers necessary to secure this objective.”
I pointed out that this principle was an indispensable one because it was essential to the security of our forces that the Chinese Communists should not be permitted to bring in reinforcements across the Yalu River. Jebb suggested as a compromise that perhaps the commission could have access to the territory 110–150 miles north of the line but not all the way to the Yalu.
Bevin had also commented that the Chinese might regard a provision that there should be no reinforcement on either side as being favorable to the Unified Command because of the fact that they had large forces nearby.
[Page 1560]I told Jebb that I had not given any text to the cease-fire group but had simply gone over with them the problems involved in the cease-fire and given them our views. I understand that the group did not propose to give the Chinese Communists any proposals as from the US, but, on the contrary, planned to attempt to discuss with them general problems; if they put forward any suggestions they would put them forward as their own.
Jebb reported that Younger’s conference with General Wu yesterday had been most unsatisfactory. Younger had opened with a conciliatory statement and expressed the hope that the Chinese would consider a cease-fire. General Wu had stated very bluntly that the Chinese would not give consideration to any cease-fire proposal except on the terms set forth by Malik; and stated bluntly that all foreign troops must get out of Korea; that the US must withdraw the Seventh Fleet from Formosa; and that his government was entitled to China’s seat in the UN. He stated that the GA cease-fire resolution was illegal and that he would not discuss a cease-fire with the three-man committee which the Assembly had set up under the resolution. [Gross.]