357.AD/12–1050: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received December 10—11:16 p. m.]
Delga 411. Re Asian draft Korean peace plan. Following is account of Gross–Ross conversation with Ran, Dayal and Menon at Rau’s apartment for better than an hour this afternoon.
Gross, after indicating that the military situation seemed to be improving and was such that it would be inappropriate to leave with Rau any impression that we were encouraging any initiative with regard to a cease-fire proposal, and that in discussing the matter with Rau we did not imply any encouragement, initiated discussion by referring to Jebb’s report of the latter’s conversation with Ran this morning. In order to avoid any risk of misunderstanding or lack of clarity, Gross summarized his understanding of previous discussion with Rau concerning possible cease-fire proposal. As Gross understood earlier conversation with Rau, proposal involved (a) a call for immediate cessation of hostilities (cease-fire), (b) arrangements to effectuate the cease-fire and (c) provision that negotiations concerning Korean question might be undertaken after the cease-fire had been effectuated.
Gross indicated that in conversation with Jebb and Younger earlier in the afternoon, it was not clear from Jebb’s report of his conversation with Rau whether Rau contemplated making provision in the proposal for a demilitarized zone. Rau indicated that as he had undertood earlier conversations with Gross, he had referred to the possibility of establishing, in connection with the establishment of a cease-fire line, a “buffer zone” perhaps five kilometers wide.
Gross indicated that while he saw no reason to believe that we would oppose establishment of such a buffer zone, this was nevertheless a military decision and we had not yet received instructions concerning [Page 1506] this and similar questions. In any event, Gross went on, he questioned whether it was necessary or desirable to refer to the question of a demilitarized or buffer zone in a resolution.
Rau replied that he did not contemplate such reference in a resolution. Establishment of a demilitarized or buffer zone is, as in the case of establishment of a cease-fire line, a matter which should be determined in military negotiations.
In a further endeavor to clarify understanding by Rau, Gross restated his understanding of what Rau said the draft cease-fire would contain as follows: (a) A call for the immediate cessation of hostilities, (b) provision for truce machinery to assist and supervise the making and execution of arrangements to effectuate the cease-fire and (c) some provision for negotiations on the Korean questions after the cease-fire had been effectuated.
Gross emphasized that regarding, in particular, the second two parts of the proposal, he was speaking personally, since we were without instruction. As a matter of timing, consideration had been given to these matters, but our government did not see how it would be possible to give our views even informally with regard to a draft proposal before Tuesday.1 He wondered, therefore, whether introduction of the draft proposal might not be postponed until Tuesday. Rau said he appreciated our problem of time and doubted whether in any event he would be ready to table a draft proposal before Monday afternoon. (At a later point in the conversation Rau indicated that it is the Asian group as a whole which is considering sponsoring the draft proposal. This would not include Turkey, which has forces in Korea and is not willing to be in a position of appearing to plead for ceasefire).
Rau, although apparently anxious to table proposal as soon as possible, did not demur to slight delay (British earlier had indicated they would not object to delay until Tuesday) since he said that our views would be of very great assistance to him. He would like to know what we would consider a feasible plan; what in other words we would be prepared to accept; what we would view as the proper content of a resolution. He added that after all if the agreement of the Chinese Communists on the one hand and of the US and the UK on the other was not obtained, a cease-fire proposal would be a futility.
Gross indicated that our military had not asked us to seek a ceasefire and that we are not soliciting one. It was therefore a little difficult for us to advance suggestions of our own. On the other hand, if we knew somewhat more precisely his own views, we would of course transmit those views to the Department and comment to the best of our ability.
[Page 1507]Rau indicated that his views had not yet crystallized. In the first place with regard to a cease-fire (and thinking of the Charter) the GA can do nothing but recommend to member states or to the SC or to both. He had been thinking with regard to the first operative clause of a resolution concerning a cease-fire that it might read somewhat as follows: “1. Recommends that there shall be an immediate cessation of hostilities.” Rau supposed that the Chinese Communists and the NK’s as well as the Unified Command would take this as a recommendation and he hoped act in accordance therewith. He had not decided whether a definite date should be set for the cease-fire in the resolution or whether the call should simply be for an immediate cease-fire or a cease-fire at the earliest possible date. He agreed with Gross’ comment that the term immediate would seem to cover the situation. It was obvious that Rau was very much concerned about the peculiar relationship of the UN in the Korean affair. At this point Rau showed us the text of a preamble he had drafted. This viewed with grave concern the situation in the Far East, declared that steps should be taken to prevent the spread of the conflict and to end the fighting in Korea in order that further steps might be taken to deal with outstanding issues in the area. Commenting that this appeared to be in line with our thinking, but suggesting that the word “and” might be substituted for the phrase “in order that,” Gross brought the discussion back to the first operative paragraph of a possible resolution by mentioning a possible formula we had discussed among ourselves in an effort to find a way to get over the difficulty which seemed to be bothering Rau and some others concerning the particular status of the UN. We had thought, said Gross, that the first operative paragraph might, in two parts, first, call upon or provide that the forces in action against the UN in Korea should immediately cease hostilities and, second, decide (determine, recommend) that UN forces in Korea should thereupon (at the same time) cease fire. Rau seemed to feel that this might meet the difficulty.
Moving on to the second operative paragraph of a possible resolution (machinery for cease-fire arrangements) Gross said that speaking personally (Washington might have something entirely different in mind) we had been thinking about four alternative possibilities as follows: (a) UNCURK, (b) POC, (c) a special commission perhaps composed, for example, of the Indian and Swedish chiefs of staff, (d) a single individual or (e) some combination of the foregoing, for example, an individual who might have the benefit of the advice and assistance of the POC or a subcommittee of the POC.
Ross observed that an examination of the precedents in UN as well as sound administrative doctrine would seem to indicate that for the type of job in hand a single individual would be more effective in [Page 1508] bringing about the necessary arrangements than a commission. Rau and his colleagues seemed to feel that this was probably the case.
Moving on to the third element in a possible draft resolution, Gross emphasized very strongly that we wanted to avoid any implication whatever that an indication of willingness to consider other questions after establishment of the cease-fire constituted a price paid for a cease-fire or a condition of a cease-fire. In other words, a cease-fire would have to stand on its own legs. Therefore any provision concerning future discussions would have to be drawn most carefully in order to avoid any implication that agreement to discuss other matters after a cease-fire was a price or condition. Rau said that he was very anxious to avoid any undermining of the authority of the UN. He said that his appraisal of present situation is that it is the result of misunderstanding. He said it had of course never been contemplated that the UN would launch a war against China. He also feels that the Chinese Communists have never contemplated launching a war against the UN. However, events, the results of which we did not foresee, have brought the Chinese Communists to the view that the rest of the world wants war with it. Previous resolutions, Rau said, have perhaps not been sufficiently explicit. We have never said explicitly that the UN should not or would not go beyond a certain point. He felt that this situation of misunderstanding could and should be put right without any suggestion of surrender or appeasement.
Gross responded that as a practical matter it was impossible for any discussions to take place while hostilities were going on. The preamble of a resolution might therefore make explicit that the continuance of hostilities made it impossible for discussions relating to the other issues to take place.
Gross expressed view that the third operative section of the resolution could be pitched to this key. It might, for example, provide that although the continuation of hostilities against the UN made it impossible to discuss the Korean question, the UN would resume discussion of the Korean question after the termination of hostilities, including in such discussions authorities or governments concerned or interested. He pointed out this approach would not merely avoid any implication that a political price was being paid for the obtaining of a cease-fire, but also it would avoid the unfounded implication that the UN had not in fact been considering the Korean question. He added that, after all, it was of the essence of the UN that it was a standing forum in which all issues affecting international relations and peace were under constant discussions and that the tone of the third section of a draft resolution should not undermine this proposition.
Gross questioned whether consideration should not be given to separating the element of future discussion from a cease-fire proposal in [Page 1509] order to avoid confusion or any risk that the question of future discussions might be linked by implication as a condition for a cease-fire. Rau explained that in order to make any resolution acceptable to the Chinese Communists it would be necessary to show them in the same resolution what would come next. Gross felt that if the third operative paragraph of a resolution were pitched to the thought he had just outlined, this objective could be met without impairing the prestige of the UN. At the same time such an approach would show the Chinese Communists that a cease-fire did not lead to a blank wall.
Rau inquired whether we had any thoughts about the composition of the body which might conduct negotiations after cessation of hostilities had been effectuated. Gross replied that this question seemed to us to be an important one but premature, and to become involved in that question would very likely color and confuse the cease-fire discussion. We are prepared in principle to discuss any questions if a cease-fire is effected. For the moment, however, we are not prepared to discuss such suggestions as that made by Nehru concerning great power discussions.
Rau indicated that he had not received any word from Delhi concerning Panikkar’s activities nor had he been able to get in touch with the Chinese Communists today. He indicated that he would communicate with us anything of interest after the Asian group meeting this afternoon, in particular that he would communicate to us as soon as possible any draft resolution bearing in mind our time problem.
Later this evening Rau advised Gross that the Asian group had agreed not to table a cease-fire proposal until Tuesday. Rau said that he did not think it safe to wait until after Tuesday because of the gravity of the situation. He also said he had agreed to meet with the Asian group Monday, 11:30 a. m., to discuss a draft resolution. Gross asked him whether he Would make the draft available to him before the meeting, on as confidential a basis as he wished. Rau seemed somewhat reluctant to do this, but said he would confer with his colleagues. Gross told him that he thought this would help him meet his own timetable.
- December 12.↩