357.AD/12–1050: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received December 10—11:43 p. m.]
Delga 412. Re Asian draft Korean peace plan. Initial reaction Canadian delegation (Holmes and Riddell) to Israeli proposals [Page 1510] (reported Delga 4041) is similar to ours. Canadian representatives accept idea of not attaching any political or other conditions to any cease-fire proposal. They raised question as to negotiation of cease-fire arrangements in view of Chinese Communist insistence that the only Chinese Communist soldiers in Korea are volunteers and said Norwegians worried about same problem. US representative expressed view that it would obviously be necessary for some UN representative to discuss details military arrangements for cease-fire, including possible regroupment of separated sectors of UN troops (about whom Canadian delegation seemed especially concerned); that these discussions would probably have to be held on spot with whatever military commanders were in charge of enemy operations (whatever their nationality) and had authority to commit enemy on such military matters. Canadian representatives indicated that Pearson had not seen Israeli proposal and they were somewhat out of touch with his thinking for last two days. He is expected to return New York early Monday morning and they will communicate further with us.
General US position on cease-fire discussed with Pakistan representatives (Mohammed Ali and Ayub) prior to their meeting with rest of Asian group this p. m. They took view that there are really two practical alternatives: (1) simple cease-fire, unencumbered with political considerations or implications of any sort. They appreciated reasons why this would be only acceptable position of US at present time; or (2) a resolution which, in addition to cease-fire, made provision for “complete settlement” of Korean problem, including time tables for withdrawal various forces, elections, et cetera. Pakistan representatives characterized Rau’s approach as being composed of three elements (a) cease-fire, (b) demilitarized zone, and (c) some “machinery or steps for resolving the existing conflict on all questions in the Far East.” In terms of the two, clear-cut alternatives as Pakistanis see them, Rau’s idea for demilitarized zone in connection with a cease-fire is unnecessary and impractical for following reasons:
- 1.
- Rau’s original idea that this zone should be “buffer” area along North Korea boundary has been made anachronistic by events;
- 2.
- Concept of a demilitarized zone as a narrow strip of neutral territory between the two armies is unnecessary. As shown by Kashmir experience, opposing armies are not arrayed in solid lines; a certain “no man’s land” naturally comes about through the disposition of opposing units by respective military commanders and the consequent minimization of possibilities of dangerous contact is thus worked out in process of demarcating lines, without necessity of specification of neutral zone;
- 3.
- Rau’s idea that demilitarized zone should comprise all of North Korea and that Chinese Communist forces should withdraw completely [Page 1511] contravenes purity of concept of simple cease-fire and interjects one of the series of steps necessarily involved in working out the complete politico-military solution of Korean problem. This should not be done unless we are prepared to embark on the second alternative of working out now in one package the complete settlement. To bring up question of complete Chinese Communist withdrawal as part of cease-fire would thus bring in its train the concomitant and consequential problems of disbandment of North Korean forces, governance of North Korea in interim, withdrawal of UN troops from South Korea, et cetera which US is understandably opposed to considering at moment.
According to Pakistani representatives, Rau’s third point, on which he has been to date equally vague, was to provide some machinery for resolving Korean and all related Far East problems. They accepted US position that if and after satisfactory cease-fire arrangements had been concluded, we would be prepared discuss other questions re Korea in or through UN, but were concerned at what UN machinery might be used for this purpose since at same time US maintained that willingness discuss such questions did not imply any change in our opposition to seating Chinese Communists. Pakistani representatives felt that simply to permit latter to participate in discussions in Committee 1 would not be sufficient and suggested that, among other alternatives, Committee 1 might appoint small subcommittee of US, UK, and USSR which would consult with Chinese Communists on methods of working out political solution of a free and independent Korea, following cease-fire.
From Australian representatives (Tange, MacIntyre and Shann) US representative learned that Colonel Katzin had drafted and discussed with at least Australian, Canadian and Philippine delegations, proposals which closely parallel those of Lopez (Delga 3972). It thus seems clear that Katzin is real author of Lopez proposals. According to Australians, Pearson replied that the Katzin-Lopez proposals have no merit at all; Romulo reportedly liked them; and Australian delegation was completely noncommittal to Katzin.
Although Australian representatives stressed that Australian Government had not received or considered either the Israeli or the Katzin-Lopez proposals, the Australian representatives were inclined agree that former was unacceptable because they involved problems of political settlement in Korea, as well as a cease-fire. They felt that latter were even more difficult to accept because in addition they interjected Formosa and Chinese representation problems as well. On other hand, Australian representatives felt that unless military commanders were certain they could stabilize the situation at or near the 38th parallel by military action, acceptance of a cease-fire was probably [Page 1512] necessary. They were convinced, however, that any simple cease-fire resolution would at least have also to include a reiteration by the UN of its political objectives of a free, unified, and independent Korea, etc. and probably also a declaration of the willingness of the UN to discuss, in the light of the changed situation, the best methods of achieving those objectives, permitting the Chinese Communist representatives to participate in such discussions. They stressed importance of UN standing firm on its declared political objectives, but clearly distinguishing between those and the military objectives which had always been limited to repelling the aggression and not, as a military objective per se, to unifying Korea by military force.