357.AD/12–1050: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received December 10—9:38 p. m.]
Delga 409. Re Asian draft Korean peace plan. Following account of very brief and inconclusive conversation Gross and Ross with [Page 1504] Younger and Jebb at 3:30 this afternoon. Jebb said he had seen Rau this morning. Rau said he was thinking of a cease-fire resolution which, after a preamble, would in the first operative clause call for immediate cease-fire. The second operative clause would be concerned with negotiations for the establishment of a cease-fire line. In this connection Jebb reported Rau seemed to be thinking that each “side” would nominate someone as its representative. Jebb seemed to be very-fuzzy about whether an attempt would be made to establish a ceasefire line in the resolution. The third operative clause, according to Jebb, involved consideration of a demilitarized zone. The fourth operative clause would be concerned with negotiations of outstanding problems related to the Korean question after the establishment of a cease-fire line. According to Jebb, Rau had the impression that a proposal along the foregoing lines had been agreed to by Gross in conversation with Rau.
Gross clarified that the discussion with Rau had been on the basis of a proposal which would (a) call for immediate cessation of hostilities, (b) provision of machinery for making cease-fire arrangements and (c) following establishment of cease-fire, provision for negotiations of outstanding problems regarding Korea.
Although Jebb seemed to understand that it would be difficult to establish a cease-fire line in a GA resolution, he commented that a cease-fire meant only that shooting would stop and that movement of troops would not be inhibited. For example, Chinese Communist troops might, even after cease-fire, flow down the east coast. Gross observed he had indicated to the Department, because of reference to 38th Parallel in Asian appeal, most members of UN would probably think of 38th Parallel as cease-fire line. He indicated we hoped to have instructions soon concerning cease-fire line that would be acceptable from military viewpoint. It was agreed tentatively that questions such as definition of cease-fire line and establishment demilitarized zone or buffer zone should be dealt With by machinery which would make arrangements for effectuating cease-fire.
Concerning such machinery, Gross speculated personally whether the most effective machinery might not be an individual (such as Swedish chief of staff), possibly assisted by a sub-committee of the POC or a separately constituted advisory commission. British seemed agree that an individual rather than a group would be best suited to deal with the effectuation of the cease-fire. They thought it might be a good idea to have some sort of advisory commission, Younger observing, however, that he thought POC was perhaps too large.
Younger wondered whether the designation of an individual (or a commission) would be complicated in view of the fact that MacArthur is the UN commander in the field. (The British, as well as the French [Page 1505] and others, seem to be bothered by fact that UN is one of antagonists in this situation.) Gross observed that he did not view this as a complicating factor, adding however, that we might be receiving quite definite views from the Department concerning preferred arrangements.
We had the impression in this conversation which, though brief, was revealing, that British are not very effectively following up with Indians.