357.AD/12–1050: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received December 10—4:45 p. m.]
Delga 404. Re Asian draft Korean peace plan. Below is text of letter and memorandum received by Ross from Eban (Israel) this [Page 1500] morning. Eban was immediately informed of our basic position as set forth by Gross to Rau and Menon yesterday (Delga 400) and to Lopez (Gadel 1741 and Delga 402). Eban will take no further action without prior consultation. Said he would so inform others to whom he sent memorandum. We are covering these also.
Text of letter:
“I enclose the copy of a memorandum which we have sent to the Delegations of the United Kingdom, India, Sweden, Canada and Australia. Its purpose is to explore the possibility of a resolution on Korea which all members of the UN might find it possible to support.
Our object at this stage is only to clarify our thoughts on the matter and to test whether or not this line of thinking might be of assistance in realization of UN objectives in Korea. I need hardly say that we are keenly desirous of learning United States views on the utility of this approach.
This memorandum is entirely confidential.”
Text of memorandum:
“1. The Israel Delegation suggests that it might be constructive for a group of states to propose a resolution in the GA containing the following elements in the hope of reaching a general UN agreement on Korea.
- (I)
- An order for a cease-fire.
- (II)
- The affirmation that the UN seeks to establish a united and independent Korea by free elections.
- (III)
- The establishment of a UN Korean commission with the participation of the Central People’s Government of China, and the USSR.
- (IV)
- An agreement for the progressive withdrawal of non-Korean forces by June 1951, after the implementation of (III) above.
- (V)
- A pledge by all states of strict nonintervention in the affairs of the reconstituted Korean state.
- (VI)
- A programme for the rehabilitation of Korea under UN auspices.
- (VII)
- An indication that the implementation of the present resolution would justify favourable action on the admission of the Central People’s Government’s representatives to the UN.
- (VIII)
- A pledge to give consideration to claims and interests of the Central People’s Government of China with reference to all outstanding questions (including the future of Formosa and Chinese interests in the frontier zone).
2. The recent turn of military fortunes in Korea raises issues of far wider import than the political future of that country. Nevertheless, it remains true that the military struggle originated in a conflict [Page 1501] of views and interests amongst the great powers with reference to the destiny of Korea. The formulation of a political solution for Korea, which the UN can accept and in which the Central People’s Government of China can both acquiesce, now appears as the only alternative to the continuing and progressive extension of the military struggle. It is clear that neither the UN nor the Central People’s Republic of China will voluntarily abandon Korea and disinterest themselves permanently in the question of its future government. The prospect of terminating or even suspending the fighting without a new political departure by the UN appears remote.
3. During the closing stages of the Korean debate in the Political Committee of the GA, the Indian Delegation proposed that the Western Powers and the Soviet Union be brought together in an effort to obtain a resolution commanding unanimous support. 24 representatives supported this proposal.1
It is reasonable to suppose that but for the apparent prospect that the issue would soon be resolved by military action alone, an even greater number of representatives would have supported this attempt to reach an agreed solution.
4. On the assumption that the states associated with Soviet policy, including China, still adhere to the objectives set forth in the USSR resolution (A/C.1/567) tabled on 2 October, 1950,2 it may be fruitful to examine whether these objectives can be reconciled with the policy outlined in the majority resolution adopted on 7 October, 1950 (A/C.1/558).3
5. The provisions outlined in paragraph 1 above, are those on which it might be possible to approach such an agreement, in the light of the declared policies of the majority of UN members on the one hand, and of the Communist states on the other. There follows a more detailed consideration of these possible points of agreement.
(I) Cease-fire:
The withdrawal of the Chinese forces would certainly be a more desirable objective than a cease-fire on present positions or at the 38th parallel. It must, however, be recognized that there is little tangible prospect that the Chinese army will halt in its tracks at a moment of victory and surrender its ground to the UN. The frame of mind which could now render this action possible would have precluded Chinese intervention in the first place. Moreover, there are many precedents in UN jurisprudence for the adoption of a cease-fire order as a provisional measure to be followed by full withdrawal, or by reductions and partial withdrawals of forces at a later stage. Thus the [Page 1502] Security Council at various times adopted cease-fire resolutions which did not seek to restore the military status quo before attempting to facilitate a political settlement (e.g., entry of Arab armies into Palestine; the hostilities in Indonesia and Kashmir). In the Korean conflict a cease-fire was proposed by the majority of the Security Council on 25 June, 1950. In the Political Committee of the GA the USSR proposed a cease-fire resolution on 2 October, 1950. There is no refusal which any government can find more difficult to justify in the eyes of the world than a refusal to cease fire.
(II) Independent and unified Korea:
It should be possible for all members of the UN to reaffirm this objective. The UN commission for Korea is directed in the GA resolution to consult “both the North Korean and South Korean representative bodies” in establishing the elected organs of government in Korea. The USSR draft recommended that a national assembly be formed by “representatives of North and South Korea” in order to conduct Korean elections to the National Assembly.
(III) A UN commission for Korea:
Agreement should be sought on the constitution of a UN organ for Korea and its terms of reference. The UN resolution established a Korean commission to supervise the elections in Korea. The USSR draft proposed a UN committee “with indispensable participation of the representatives of the states bordering on Korea”. In the light of recent developments, the representation of the USSR and of the Central People’s Republic of China on that commission would appear to be inevitable, if it is proposed to influence the activity of Communist forces. It should be recalled that the USSR was offered membership on the original UN commission for Korea in 1947, and is a member of the peace observation group recently established by the GA. No change of principle is involved in the suggested extension of the Korean commission.
(IV) Progressive withdrawal of foreign armies:
The GA resolution on Korea declares that UN forces should “not remain in any part of Korea longer than is necessary for establishment of a unified democratic government” in Korea. The USSR draft recommended the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops to enable the Korean people to settle their political future. It should therefore be possible for both parties, in accepting the cease-fire, to reaffirm their understanding that all non-Korean forces, including Chinese forces, shall be withdrawn from Korea as soon as possible. The USSR proposal for the immediate withdrawal is however obviously unacceptable. The solution might be to set a date, about six months hence, by which all Chinese and UN forces shall be withdrawn. Such agreements for mutual withdrawal by a fixed time-table were often discussed and effected in the sequel of World War II, e.g., Iran.
(V) Non-intervention:
If all the above provisions were adopted it should be possible for all member states and other states not to intervene in Korea in any way or to impede the work of the UN commission. The unified state of Korea should be established in such a manner as to preclude any fear [Page 1503] that it may be used as a base for endangering the security of any neighbouring state. A special reference should be made to the inadmissibility of so-called mass “volunteering” in Korea.
(VI) Rehabilitation:
The GA resolution and the USSR draft contain almost identical provisions for the rehabilitation of Korea under UN auspices.
(VII) Status of the Central People’s Government of China:
The implementation by the Central People’s Government of China of these provisions including especially the cease-fire, the progressive withdrawal of forces and a pledge of nonintervention should be regarded by the majority of UN members as convincing evidence of its responsiveness to UN opinion, and as justification for the admission of its representatives.
(VIII) Negotiation of outstanding questions:
Simultaneously with the adoption of the above provisions the GA could offer to examine sympathetically other questions affecting Chinese relations with the UN including the interests and claims of the Central People’s Republic in regard to Formosa and to the Manchurian–Korean frontier zone. This examination may cover all questions liable to endanger the peace and security of the Far East.
6. The Israel delegation suggests that this memorandum be read in the spirit of the following statement issued jointly by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain on December 8th:
‘Every effort must be made to achieve the purposes of the UN in Korea by peaceful means and to find a solution to the Korean problem on the basis of a free and independent Korea. If the Chinese on their side show any evidence of a similar attitude, we are hopeful that the cause of peace can be upheld. If they do not, then it will be for the peoples of the world, acting through the UN, to decide how the principles of the Charter can best be maintained.’
7. The Israel delegation adheres to its previously stated position on Korean question. This memorandum should be regarded as a working paper seeking to explore ways of reconciling a conflict whose proportions and consequences endanger the peace of the world.”