357.AD/12–950: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received December 10—12:36 a. m.]
403. For Hickerson, UNA, from Gross. Re UK–US talks. Report of conversation of Gross and Ross with Younger and Jebb, at lunch Saturday, December 9.
Younger, UK, and I matched our recollections of separate talks held this a. m. with Rau and nothing emerged from Younger’s version which requires amendment of my report sent earlier today. According to Younger, when Rau asked Wu when latter thought Peking might reply to the Asiatic declaration, Wu answered that “the UK would be able to judge by the conduct of my government.” I gave Younger fill-in on our talk with Rau at lunch on Friday (reported to Department same day).1
[Page 1497]We exchanged views on present situation as follows:
1. Cease-fire proposals. I stated our position in same sense as I had given it to Rau on Friday. I said that while Rau appeared to have no fixed or considered view on the question of the “demilitarized zone,” he was still thinking of Chinese Communist withdrawal beyond Yalu and I had encouraged the idea. However, Ross and I agreed with Younger and Jebb it was almost unlikely that Chinese Communists would now agree to withdraw from North Korea merely in consideration of UN agreement withdraw to south of 38th parallel. I said that it was good to keep encouraging Rau to think in these terms, however unrealistic, at least until we studied Peking reply, if any.
On a wholly tentative and personal basis, I made following analysis, stressing it was not only ad referendum to Department but subject to careful analysis from military viewpoint. It seemed possible to envisage 3 phase cease-fire operation, all within purely military context. (1) Fix time for cease-fire, with concomitant military arrangements for relieving isolated units, regrouping separated units, feeding, medical aid, and other essential requirements: (2) fixing cease-fire line, for purpose of accomplishing troop movements on both sides of line. This, for example, might be a “military fix” on or near the 38th parallel, and would be without prejudice to political issues of any sort. This would involve negotiation and might indeed be agreed upon at same time as (1).The Asiatic appeal, in effect, seemed to me to fix this type of line in principle. Buffer zone might be considered in this context. (3) Question of Chinese Communist withdrawal from North Korea (assuming, of course, they do not agree to this step prior to (1) and (2)). Since this is likely to raise question of UN withdrawal from South Korea, the problem arises in form discussed by President and Prime Minister and, I thought, settled on basis that UN evacuation from Korea would not be on a voluntary basis.
Younger and Jebb expressed personal agreement with this analysis. We discussed the following two points and agreed that we both required urgent advice:
- (a)
- What would be our position with regard to the problem presented by a demand by the Chinese Communists that we withdraw UN forces from Korea in return for their agreement to withdraw Chinese forces from the north? (In this connection we referred to the draft resolution tabled by Vishinsky in the 1st Committee this a. m. which, among other things, called for a “withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea.”)2
- (b)
- What is our fixed position re a cease-fire line? If we have something in mind other than a military line running on or close to the 38th parallel we should make this fact known promptly, since the inference is being drawn by the UN membership that our expression of “no objection” to the Asian declaration implies agreement on our part to the 38th parallel as a cease-fire line.
We concluded this phase of the discussion by agreeing that it would be better for the British to attempt to ascertain from Rau his views concerning specifics re a cease-fire, on the basis that for us to do [so ran?] the risk of giving Rau the impression we were soliciting his initiative despite any express reservations on our part to the contrary. (We will ride the British coattails very hard on this, because experience has shown they are not always aggressive in pursuing an initiative of this sort.)
2. Six-Power resolution. We had lengthy discussion re relationship between cease-fire proposal, if tabled early next week, and action on Six-Power resolution. We agreed priority for discussion and action on cease-fire proposal, both in Political Committee and in plenary.
Differences of opinion developed re action on Six-Power resolution following GA adoption of cease-fire proposal. I expressed view that, within a very short time, possibly two or three days, after the adoption of a cease-fire resolution the 1st Committee should resume consideration of the Six-Power resolution unless, of course, the cease-fire proposal were accepted by Peiping within that time. However, Jebb expressed the opinion that following adoption of cease-fire resolution “we should shut up shop for about a fortnight.” Younger said that he had not been thinking of this long a period, but thought that a week or so would be an appropriate lapse in order to give Peiping opportunity to consider the matter after receipt of the information that the GA had acted. I urged the view that such a delay would be inconsistent with our analysis, that action upon the Six-Power resolution would aid, rather than hinder, the effort to obtain a cease-fire. Our analysis was based upon the feeling that a demonstration of unity of action in support of the Six-Power resolution would be more apt to result in moral pressures upon the Peiping regime than would a period of UN inactivity. Younger and Jebb, on the other hand, believed that efforts to expedite action on the Six-Power resolution would only reflect disunity in the UN and Younger ventured the opinion that if we attempted “to force action” on the Six-Power resolution we would find that about half the members would abstain. He said he was sure this was true of the Commonwealth group and undoubtedly almost everyone else except the Latins. Although we think this an exaggeration, it is our estimate that there would be a damaging number of abstentions, including India.
Department’s opinion urgently requested on question of timing.
3. UK delegation reactions to Truman–Attlee conversations and discussion of next steps. I said I would appreciate Younger’s reactions to the Washington talks. Specifically, I asked him re next steps in the UN assuming no cease-fire and no compliance with Six-Power resolution. [Page 1499] Referring to earlier conversation, Ross and I had had with Younger (reported to Hickerson by ’phone December 7)3 I outlined on a tentative basis possible “second step resolution” in three main parts: naming the aggressor; calling upon UN members to assist UN in repelling the aggression; calling upon collective measures committee to make recommendations concerning steps to be taken. I expressed understanding that Younger had question of timing uppermost in mind but that I had derived the impression that in principle Younger’s initial reaction had been favorable, subject always to agreement on timing. Younger replied that the reason he considered timing such a vital element was that the UK regarded this step as of decisive consequence, with vital implications for the future. Jebb commented that this step meant “the declaration of limited war” upon the Chinese Communists. Younger said that much consultation and long and hard thought would be necessary before this step was taken. He added that up to this point nothing but “amateurish consideration had been given to the means of conducting limited warfare” and that so far as he could see no one had sat down and thought out either the methods of doing so or the possible consequences of such action.
Younger said that he himself could not envisage taking the step of introducing a resolution along the lines I had described before the middle of January.
This led to a discussion of the conversations between the President and the Prime Minister. I attempted to summarize the points of view expressed by the President and the Secretary at the first meeting with Attlee on the basis of my knowledge derived from a reading of the minutes. Younger replied that the Prime Minister had expressed some differing opinions and that no agreement had been reached concerning the subsequent steps in the event of noncompliance with a cease-fire proposal or Six-Power resolution.
Apropos our view that Peking regime is willing satellite of Moscow, Younger commented there was “rather a difference of opinion about this” and that UK feeling was that Chinese had genuine fear (“however unwarranted”) of US aggressive intentions against China. [Gross.]
- See Delga 394 from New York, received at 9:33 p. m. on December 8, p. 1482.↩
-
The test of the Soviet draft resolution (U.N. document A/C.1/640) read as follows:
“The General Assembly,
Calling attention to the grave threat to the peace and security of the peoples represented by the continued intervention in Korea of the armed forces of the United States of America and of the armed forces of the other States taking part in that intervention,
Seeking a peaceful settlement of the Korean question and the operation of peace and security in the Far East,
Recommends,
1. That all foreign troops be withdrawn immediately from Korea;
2. That the decision on the Korean question be entrusted to the Korean people themselves.”
↩ - See telegram Delga 384 from New York, received at 12:26 a. m. on December 7, p. 1432.↩