It seems to us however, that certain portions of the document may be
unnecessarily peremptory and demanding in tone, and consequently not
best calculated to promote that attitude of friendly cooperation between
the United States and Japan which will be essential to the successful
implementation of the agreement and the hoped for enduring association
of Japan with the free world. Preparation of a draft conducive to this
purpose will be difficult at best, due to the sweeping nature of the
military rights which it has been decided that the United States should
seek in post-treaty Japan. It is nevertheless hoped that through a
re-phrasing of the draft agreement, designed to transform it into a
mutually desired undertaking between equals, resting as much on common
interest and good faith as on legally binding rights and obligations,
the document’s immediate and long-range acceptability to the Japanese
can be significantly increased. The last sentence of your covering
letter suggests that you also believe that revisions of this nature will
be required.
The attached memorandum gives specific suggestions made by responsible
officers in the State Department.
[Attachment]
Memorandum
Page 1, second paragraph—The statement that
“both Governments have agreed in the Treaty of Peace that security
forces of the United States shall remain in the Japan area for this
purpose until Japan possesses the means to discharge this
responsibility alone” goes farther than the language of the security
chapter of the Department’s treaty draft.5 One of the “alternative security
arrangements” envisaged in Article 10 of that draft whose
effectuation would permit the withdrawal of the United States forces
might be the creation of adequate Japanese defense forces, in
conjunction with necessary United Nations or other guarantees. It
would seem advisable, however, to suggest this as the principal
possibility, for the same reasons that it has been thought
inadvisable to do so in the peace treaty. Even though no Allied
nation except the United States might be called on to sign the
agreement, a provision therein specifically envisaging the
reactivation of Japanese defense forces would make it more difficult
for some Allies to sign the peace treaty, since it would then be
clear that in so doing they would be approving the establishment of
Japanese defense forces. It is accordingly believed that the
paragraph should follow more closely the language of Article 10 of
the treaty draft.
[Page 1369]
Page 1, third paragraph—It is suggested that
the latter part of this paragraph, referring to the further purpose
of the U.S. security forces to assist in the maintenance of internal
law and order upon the invitation of the Japanese Government, be
omitted. It would seem that the obligation of Japan to develop and
maintain internal security forces adequate to meet all foreseeable
needs should be clear cut, and that the Japanese should not gain the
impression that they may freely call on the U.S. security forces for
internal police action.
Partly in light of the above comments a Preamble along the following
lines is suggested for consideration:
“Whereas conditions of international
peace and security to which the peoples of the world have so
long aspired have not been achieved in the postwar
period;
Whereas the Governments of the United
States of America, and of Japan are desirous of cooperating
to establish and maintain in the Japan area conditions
conducive to international peace and security in accordance
with the principles of the Charter of the United
Nations;
Whereas the Government of Japan has
accordingly requested in the Treaty of Peace just concluded
that the Government of the United States of America provide
armed forces on behalf of the Treaty Powers, the Government
of Japan undertaking on its part to furnish assistance and
facilities to these forces;
Whereas it is desired that this
Agreement shall be fulfilled in a spirit of good
neighbourliness between the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of Japan, and that the details
of its practical application shall be arranged by friendly
cooperation;
Therefore the Governments of the
United States of America and of Japan agree upon the
following provisions governing the stationing of United
States security forces in Japan:”
Page 2, first paragraph—It is suggested that
the words “until the withdrawal from Japan of United States security
forces or” be deleted. It seems preferable to avoid the impression
that the U.S. forces may be withdrawn without the adoption of some
overall, superseding security arrangement to ensure the security of
the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand and other smaller Pacific
nations from a possible resurgence of Japanese aggression, as well
as to ensure Japanese security. The best procedure would seem to be
to follow the language of Article 10 of the treaty draft, as
follows:
“…6 and will remain in effect until the coming
into force of such United Nations arrangements or such
alternative security arrangements as in the opinion of the
United States will satisfactorily provide for the
maintenance by the United Nations or otherwise of
international peace and security in the Japan area.”
Page 2, second paragraph—It is suggested that
this rather sweeping provision be omitted and reliance placed
instead on subsequent more
[Page 1370]
precisely phrased portions of the agreement which should ensure
United States requirements without causing the Japanese the concern
and alarm which this paragraph might occasion. If it is decided that
the paragraph must be retained in some form it is suggested that it
indicate the reason why the entire area of Japan is required for
maneuver, as follows:
“The Governments of the United States and of Japan agree
that, in consequence of the accelerated speed and power of
modern war, the entire land mass of the Japan area shall be
regarded as a potential area of defensive disposition and
maneuver of military forces.”
Page 2, third paragraph—It is believed that
in the first, as in the third, sentence of this paragraph the
procedure of consultation with the Japanese Government should be
provided, in accordance with Article 8 of the treaty draft, rather
than mere notice to that Government of the desired dispositions. The
same suggestion is made in regard to the third paragraph on page
3.
Page 3, first incomplete paragraph—It would
seem advisable specifically to provide here and in the fifth line of
the second paragraph on page 4 that the consultations preceding
major changes of a permanent nature in the disposition of the
security forces during peacetime shall be between the United States
Ambassador to Japan and the Foreign Minister.
Page 4, first paragraph—The Department of
State of course has no objection to the continued use by American
combat forces of installations now occupied by such forces, if those
installations best meet U.S. military needs, but desires that the
facilities retained be located to the largest possible extent out of
direct contact with the Japanese people, and that every effort be
made to reduce to a minimum the intrusion of our forces in Japanese
normal life.
It is assumed that the provision in the latter part of this paragraph
that all facilities or areas required by the security forces shall
remain under the “exclusive control” of those forces is to be
interpreted in the light of sections 4, 6 and other subsequent
sections of the draft. It would seem advisable to avoid the use of
the phrase “exclusive control” and to rely on these subsequent
sections to indicate exactly what the extent of the controls is to
be.
Page 4, second to last line—Presumably the
“other assistance” referred to might include labor services. It is
not clear whether it might also include military service, and, if
so, of what types. The question of whether payment should be made
for equipment, supplies and other assistance provided by Japan in
the event of hostilities or imminently threatened hostilities will,
it is assumed, be dealt with in the studies mentioned in section 16,
at the top of page 14.
[Page 1371]
Page 5, first paragraph—It is noted that no
provision is made in this paragraph for payment of compensation to
owners of private property when such property is condemned or
expropriated within defense areas or installations. Provision for
payment of compensation by the United States in such circumstances
is made in the agreements with Great Britain for the lease of bases
in Newfoundland and the Caribbean7 and in the Philippines Base Agreement.
Page 8, second paragraph—The Department has
no objection in principle to the exercise of jurisdiction in the
manner indicated. It believes that the drafting of the section can
be improved in some respects, however.
Page 12, third paragraph—This paragraph is
considered unnecessary. The only Allied documents binding on Japan
after the coming into force of the peace treaty will be the treaty
itself.
Page 12, fourth paragraph—The concept
presented in this paragraph, that the Japanese should be forbidden
to establish armed forces without the consent of the United States,
whose approval would also be required in determinations of the
strength, type, composition and armament of such forces, has been
discussed on various occasions but has not to my knowledge been
anticipated in earlier papers.
The advantages of the proposal, of course, are that it would enable
the U.S. to ensure that reactivated Japanese armed forces were well
adapted to Japan’s special defense problems but not for offensive
purposes, and that Allied countries, while probably desiring to
share the controls with the U.S., would doubtless welcome
supervision over Japanese rearmament. The disadvantages are that the
provision would point up the prospect of Japanese rearmament and
would impair the underlying principle of the Department’s treaty
draft, namely, that the settlement should restore Japan to fully
sovereign status with a minimum of special restrictions and
disabilities. In view of Japan’s straitened economic position and
the influence which the United States may expect to continue to
exert in Japan after the treaty, it seems probable that the desired
supervision could be exercised without the right being stipulated in
the bilateral agreement. A provision in the agreement might cease to
be effective, moreover, just when it might be considered most
important when our forces are withdrawn—unless the restrictions were
continued as a feature of a general Pacific security arrangement to
which Japan was a party. The Department wishes to study the proposal
further before stating its position on it.
[Page 1372]
Page 13, second full paragraph—It is
suggested that this paragraph, which might be alarming to our Allies
and whose purpose would seem to be ensured by the previous
paragraph, be deleted.
It is believed that the agreement should contain provisions, now
absent, obligating the U.S. to pay just compensation for damage to
private property or for injury to Japanese nationals caused by the
U.S. forces or individual members thereof incident to non-combat
activities.
As a matter of general policy it is believed that the terms of the
agreement should be based as far as possible on comparable
agreements with Britain, France and other major Allies, with
citations to these agreements rather than to those concluded with
smaller countries such as the Philippines or Liberia having a
special, formerly dependent relationship to the United States.
