694.001/12–1350
The Secretary of State to
the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)
top secret
[Washington,] December 13, 1950.
Dear Mr. Secretary: There is enclosed for your
comment a memorandum setting forth the ideas of the Department of State
on steps which should be taken with regard to Japan in view of the
urgency of that situation.
In general the policies outlined in the attached memorandum are merely a
further implementation of the policy approved by the President and
contained in the joint memorandum of September 7, 1950,
[Page 1364]
signed by former Secretary Johnson and
myself. However, there are four specific departures or additions upon
which it is desired to receive the opinion of the Department of Defense.
From the military point of view, are there any objections to: (1)
seeking an early conclusion of a peace settlement with Japan without
awaiting a favorable outcome of the situation in Korea? (2) discussing
this peace settlement with assumption that the United States intends to
commit substantial armed force to the defense of the island chain of
which Japan forms part? (3) leaving the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands under
Japanese sovereignty, subject to the provisions of the contemplated
military security agreement which would presumably take special account
of the position in Okinawa? (4) exploration at this time of a possible
Pacific Pact along the lines outlined in paragraph 4 of the attached
memorandum?
Subject to receiving the views of the Department of Defense, the
Department of State contemplates recommending to the President that Mr.
John Foster Dulles be appointed to head a Presidential Mission to Japan
which would be, expected to depart in the very near future and to which
mission we consider that a representative of the Department of Defense
should be attached.1 The
enclosed memorandum would form the general terms of reference of the
Mission. The Mission itself would have no authority to make any
commitments on behalf of the United States.
Should you consider it helpful, Mr. Dulles is available to discuss the
enclosed memorandum with you, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or anyone you
may wish to designate and he would welcome the opportunity to do so.
Sincerely yours,
[Enclosure]
Japan
top secret
[Washington,] December 13,
1950.
Recent developments in Asia, and particularly in Korea, indicate that
the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communist regime and the North Korean
regime are moving to dominate Asia; that they are prepared in this
respect to use force and to risk general war, and that they have at
least on the mainland, capabilities which the United Nations cannot
[Page 1365]
match. It is
probable that a principal objective is Japan, the industrial and
human resources of which nation have for many years been dominant in
Asia, and which, if added to the resources now possessed by the
Soviet Union would greatly alter the balance of power in the world
to the disadvantage of the United States and its allies. Under these
circumstances, the task of preventing Japan from falling under
Communist influence is increasingly great, and it must be
anticipated that there will be a reluctance on the part of Japan to
commit itself to be part of the free world unless it can be assured
that, from a military and economic standpoint, Japan can, through
her own efforts and in combination with those of the United States,
defend herself militarily and survive economically. To meet this
situation, the following program is recommended:
- 1.
- A basic strategic decision on the part of the United
States to commit substantial sea and air power to the
defense of the island chain of which Japan forms part. It
will probably be necessary, at some stage of the
proceedings, to indicate to the Japanese with some precision
our military intentions in this respect.
- Subversive activities against the Communists on the
mainland may be an essential ingredient in any extended
defense of the islands against mainland attack. But this
phase of the matter would not call for discussion with, or
participation by, the Japanese.
- 2.
- A basic economic decision on the part of the United States
to assure the economic survival of Japan without dependence
upon Communist mainland areas. This would require access by
Japan to food and raw materials and the foreign exchange
Wherewith to pay for them. To this end the United States
should be prepared, if necessary, to put our military
garrisons in Japan on a “pay-as-you-go” basis and,
presumably, substantial orders for military equipment would
be placed in Japan under MDAP. This again might have to be developed
with some precision in the course of negotiations.
- 3.
- Assuming that the foregoing decisions are in the
affirmative, then there should at once be sent to Japan a
Presidential mission with authority to explore and
ascertain, in cooperation with General MacArthur, the terms
upon which Japan could be brought into the orbit of the free
world. The mission should have authority to discuss and
develop ad referendum arrangements
with Japan which would include the following features:
- (a)
- The quick restoration of peace to Japan either
through a simplified peace treaty which would cover
the points indicated in Annex A or a restoration of
peace through joint action of the Congress and Diet,
coupled with an exchange of notes and declarations
of intention on the part of the Japanese which would
cover most of the points dealt with in Annex A.
Action taken in this respect should as far as
possible be coordinated with similar action of
friendly allies in the Japanese war.
- (b)
- A bilateral agreement between the United States
and Japanese Governments, dealing with the
garrisoning of United States forces in and about
Japan, including the Ryukyus and
[Page 1366]
Bonin Islands. The
terms of this agreement would be along the lines of
the draft agreement already discussed between the
State and Defense Departments subject to such
modifications acceptable to the United States
Government as may be necessary to secure Japanese
agreement. The possibility should be explored of
making this agreement more acceptable to the
Japanese and friendly Governments by bringing it
within the purview of the United Nations Charter and
of such United Nations machinery as envisioned in
the Uniting for Peace Resolution.
- 4.
- A willingness on the part of the United States to make a
mutual assistance arrangement among the Pacific island
nations (Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Japan and
the United States, and perhaps Indonesia) which would have
the dual purpose of assuring combined action as between the
members to resist aggression from without and also to resist
attack by one of the members, e.g. Japan, if Japan should
again become aggressive.
- In order to expedite progress toward agreement among the
above nations and to obtain the earliest and greatest
psychological advantage, such a mutual assistance
arrangement might be accomplished in two stages. The first
would consist of a meeting of the foreign ministers of the
countries concerned, to take place as soon as possible, at
which a declaration of intent to make peace with Japan and
to consult regarding mutual security interests would be
issued. The second would consist of a more formal
arrangement, to be announced simultaneously with the
conclusion of peace with Japan, and to which Japan would be
a party. The United States should agree to the above courses
of action only on the express acceptance by the other
nations concerned of the essential features of the Japanese
treaty as outlined in Annex A.
- 5.
- If, and as soon as, the foregoing steps are approved,
there should be confidential discussions to inform the
representatives in Washington of friendly members of the
FEC and similar
discussions with members of the Foreign Relations and
Foreign Affairs Committees.
- 6.
- From the standpoint of public relations, the departure of
the mission to Japan should not be considered as anything
abnormal or spectacular, but merely the normal development
which was foreseen following the President’s statement of
September, 1950. It was then taken for granted that
following the exchange of views on Japanese Peace Treaty
which have taken place at the United Nations, the
negotiating representatives of our Government would go to
Japan. Any public announcement should stress that the
principal purpose of the mission would be to consult with
General MacArthur and, through him, informally with Japanese
leaders, but that formal negotiations with the Japanese
Government are not contemplated. Therefore, a trip to Japan
at this time would not of itself be evidence of any new
decisions or any panicky mood.
Annex A
The United States proposes a treaty with Japan which would end the
state of war, restore Japanese sovereignty and bring back Japan
[Page 1367]
as an equal in the
society of free peoples. As regards specific matters, the treaty
would reflect the principles indicated below:
- 1.
-
Parties. Any or all nations at war
with Japan which are willing to make peace on the basis
proposed and as may be agreed.
- 2.
-
United Nations. Membership by Japan
would be contemplated.
- 3.
-
Territory, (a)
Independence of Korea would be recognized; (b) the Ryukyus and Bonin Islands
would be returned to Japan provided that the provisions of
any military security agreement apply to these territories
in the same manner as to Japan proper; (c) the de facto status of
Formosa would be recognized pending the development of such
conditions of peace and stability in the area as make
possible a de jure settlement.
- 4.
-
Security. The Treaty would
contemplate that, pending satisfactory alternative security
arrangements such as U.S. assumption of effective
responsibility, there would be continuing cooperative
responsibility between Japanese facilities and U.S. and
perhaps other forces for the maintenance of international
peace and security in the Japan area, and that Japan’s
participation would be exclusively of a character which
would permit her to exercise the inherent right of
individual and collective self-defense (see U.N. Charter,
Art. 51). (This might be contained in a separate Treaty or
agreement not necessarily signed by all the Treaty
Powers.)
[Here follow numbered paragraphs 5, 6, and 7, identical to those in
the seven-point memorandum of September 11.]
