790.5/12–1250
Memorandum by the Regional Planning Adviser in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Emmerson)
Pacific Declaration
problem
1. To obtain the agreement of Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and possibly Canada and Indonesia, to the issuance by these powers and the United States of a Pacific Declaration along the lines of the draft text attached.
analysis
2. Recent developments in Korea have increased the urgency of developing Japan’s resistance to Communism and Japan’s ability to assume a responsible and secure position in the non-Communist Pacific community. In progressing to this end, the cooperation of other off-shore Pacific nations is highly important. The proposed Pacific Declaration would encourage Japan to align herself with the non-Communist nations since it would offer an early peace settlement [Page 1361] and would imply later acceptance of Japan as an equal participant in the Pacific community.
3. Australia and the Philippines have frequently expressed interest in a “Pacific Pact” which would set forth the mutual security interests of the nations in the area. It has been made clear that such a “pact” would go far to win their acceptance of a liberal Japanese peace treaty. The proposed Declaration would meet this desire and might therefore be expected to hasten the conclusion of a general peace settlement with Japan.
4. Participants in the Declaration would not include countries on the mainland of Asia and therefore the problems of a choice of membership produced by an “Asian Association” would not arise.
5. At the same time, since the Declaration would provide for consultation with other Pacific nations and members of the United Nations, nonparticipating countries in the area would not feel excluded from the benefits of the Declaration and would therefore not likely be antagonistic to its issuance.
6. The participation of Nationalist China would be inadvisable due to the policy of the neutralization of Formosa, the fact that the “Question of Formosa” is before the United Nations, the certain opposition of the UK arid other UN members, and the provocative effect upon Communist China and the USSR.
7. The Declaration does not commit the United States to the defense of the countries participating. However, the United States already has commitments in Japan and the Philippines and the general area encompassed by the Declaration represents a primary defense interest of the United States. Consequently, adherence to such a Declaration by the United States would represent, even by implication, no extension of U.S. military commitments.
8. The psychological impact in Asia of a Pacific Declaration would be particularly important at the present time. It would tend to strengthen the non-Communist nations of Asia, to counteract the loss of prestige suffered through events in Korea, and to encourage resistance in Communist-controlled areas. The Declaration and events surrounding its inception would provide valuable opportunities for exploitation through all information media.
9. So long as Formosa is not included among the participants, the Declaration cannot be considered as provocative of further aggressive moves by Communist China or the Soviet Union. The Communist threat to Japan will exist in any case and it is unlikely that a Declaration would materially increase that threat.
10. The proposed Pacific Declaration could be expected to produce a salutary effect within the participating countries. In the case of Australia, the Declaration would respond to an often expressed desire for a Pacific Pact which the Australian Prime Minister and Foreign [Page 1362] Minister have stated is highly important to public opinion and to support of the government’s foreign policies. The stability and prestige of the Philippine government would unquestionably be enhanced by such a Declaration. In the United States, the Declaration would probably be welcome as a constructive step in foreign policy toward the Far East and might be calculated to receive general support in Congress and in the country at large.
11. Since the Declaration would provide for consultations among the participants and among other Pacific nations and members of the United Nations, it might be desirable to establish flexible consultative machinery for this purpose. Such machinery might take the form, for example, of an Australian-New Zealand Military Mission in Washington and a U.S.-Philippine Defense Mission in Manila. Should Indonesia participate, its representatives might participate in a Mission to be established in Manila.
conclusions
12. The United States should propose the issuance of a Declaration by Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the United States, and possibly Canada and Indonesia, along the general lines of the draft text attached. Consultations to this end should be initiated immediately with representatives of the countries named above and with the United Kingdom and other powers whose sympathetic approval is deemed of importance.
13. After general agreement on the advisability of issuing a Pacific Declaration has been reached among the participating governments, a meeting of the foreign ministers of the countries involved should be convened at the earliest possible date at a convenient place such as San Francisco or Honolulu.
14. Following discussions by the foreign ministers and agreement on a text, the Declaration should be publicly issued by the participating governments.
15. The United States should at the same time explore the possibilities of establishing flexible consultative machinery to facilitate consultations among the participating countries, and among other nations as provided for in the Declaration.
- The text printed here is identical to that of a draft of December 7 with two exceptions. After the word “arms” in the second sentence, the phrase “against Japanese aggression” has been deleted. The word “Charter” has been inserted in the last sentence. (Lot 56D424)↩
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In a memorandum of December 12 to Mr. Emmerson, Mr. Fearey stated: “The idea of a Pacific Declaration seems a good one. However, its terms do not meet what Australia, N.Z. and the P.I. want as a condition of going ahead with a ‘liberal’ peace treaty, namely a formal US commitment to come to their aid if attacked. A declaration merely providing for consultation would not seem adequate to get them to agree to hasten the conclusion of the type of treaty we want. Also I cannot help but feel that the commitment to consult with ‘other nations of the Pacific area’ will be inadequate to prevent the Southeast Asia mainland countries from feeling discouraged at their exclusion. I personally believe we would be warranted in overlooking the latter factor and that the declaration would be a net gain (indeed essential to a multilateral treaty with Japan) if it contains a formal commitment of each party to come to the aid of the other.
“In respect to your conclusions, it is not clear whether a Japanese peace treaty is to await completion of all the procedural steps leading up to issuance of the declaration. This might be a long wait. Could we not make the declaration a real one-for-all and all-for-one proposition and use it as an aid to get quick agreement on a treaty from those requiring such a declaration.” (790.5/12–1250)
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