I am attaching a memorandum on Japan prepared with the concurrence of Mr.
Allison and Colonel Babcock.
[Attachment]
Japan
top secret
[Washington,] December 8,
1950.
Japan is, with Germany, one of the two great assets that the Soviet
power seeks for exploitation in aid of its aggressive policies. It
is important, if practicable, to prevent that. However, recent
developments in Korea make it doubtful whether Japan can be relied
upon to form a dependable part of the non-communist world. It is
important to seek to resolve that doubt in our favor.
Accepting this as a premise, the following course of action is
suggested:
1. There should be a prompt effort definitely to commit Japan,
spiritually and politically, to the cause of the free world. In this
respect, time is of the essence. The United States still possesses
prestige in Japan and the full political and military implications
of the Korean defeat are not yet apparent. There is probably more
chance of mobilizing Japanese public opinion and getting a Japanese
commitment now than in a month or two. Delay and inaction may count
heavily against us.
2. It cannot be known now what precise pattern of action is best
calculated to achieve the desired result. That can only be
determined by survey on the spot.
Such a survey may disclose that there is no reasonable chance of
success. If so, the quicker this is known, the better, as it will
have an important bearing upon our policy and our dispositions
elsewhere.
If Japan is willing on certain terms to accept commitment to our
cause, then these terms should be ascertained to see whether the
price is practical and worth paying.
Any such commitment by Japan would probably involve, in general, a
basic decision by the U.S. to seek to maintain and defend the island
chain of Japan, Ryukyus, Formosa, and the Philippines and, in
particular, a certain commitment to Japan in terms of sea and air
power; certain economic assurances and a prompt restoration of
Japanese sovereignty through a treaty of peace or a declaration of
peace.
The question of whether Japan would deal alone with the United States
in respect to peace or would insist upon other of the Allies
[Page 1360]
coming along and if so,
which, and their attitude toward Chinese Communist participation
would have to be ascertained.
It may be necessary to have a Pacific Pact, initially of Japan,
Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the United States, and
perhaps Indonesia.
3. It is no longer practical to work out from here what is, to us,
the best arrangement and to take the time that would be necessary to
clear this with the various departments concerned, State, Defense,
Attorney-General, Commerce, Treasury, etc., before dealing with
Japan. The only practical procedure is to send to Japan a mission,
which, bearing in mind U.S. capabilities and objectives, legal,
economic, and military, would ascertain what, if any, arrangement
were feasible.
Such a mission should, of course, to the extent practical, first
exchange views here with the representatives of other friendly
governments, so that their viewpoint would also be in the mind of
the mission. But just as it is impractical now to reach an advance
agreement among our different U.S. departments, so it is impractical
now to reach a full advance agreement with our Allies.
4. The mission should have broad Presidential authority, with the
cooperation of General MacArthur, to negotiate ad
referendum the broad lines of an arrangement, if it seemed
to it that something acceptable was possible. The mission should
include persons who are familiar with, and would responsibly take
into account the attitudes of, the different departments of
government, particularly State and Defense, and also the attitudes
of our Allies, so as to afford a good chance that any arrangement
made would be finally accepted.
