Lot 56D527
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast
Asian Affairs (Allison) to the Consultant to
the Secretary (Dulles)
top secret
[Washington,] December 7, 1950.
Subject: Japanese Peace Treaty1
There is attached a rather hastily dictated memorandum setting forth some
of the more urgent matters I believe we should consider in connection
with our next step toward a Japanese peace settlement. The attached
memorandum is not in any sense a complete statement of all factors to be
taken into account, and as I read it over I can see obvious omissions.
However, I am forwarding it in the hope that it will be suggestive and
that it may elicit comments which will help us to make progress.
[Attachment]
Japanese Peace Treaty
top secret
[Washington,] December 7,
1950.
The following factors must be considered in making a decision as to
whether or not to proceed in some manner with bringing about an end
of the state of war with Japan:
[Page 1357]
i assumptions
- A.
- It is vital to the security interest of the United States to
keep Japan out of the Communist camp and on the side of the
United States and the West.
- B.
- This can only be done by convincing the Japanese that it is in
their interest to be on our side and that we have the ability
and willingness to protect them from the obvious risks they take
in aligning themselves with the United States.
- C.
- United States military commitments in Asia should, in so far
as possible, be limited to air and naval power plus supply of
equipment and munitions.
ii to be determined
- A.
- Is the United States, with or without allies, going to
maintain its stand that aggression cannot be allowed to succeed
and therefore;
- 1.
- Formosa will not be allowed to fall to Chinese
Communists?
- 2.
- Chinese Communists will not be seated in the
UN”?
- 3.
- We will not leave Korea, unless driven out militarily,
before UN objectives are accomplished?
- B.
- If answers to above questions are in the affirmative, can and
will the United States take the necessary steps to:
- 1.
- Increase air and naval power in the Far East
sufficient to assure keeping Formosa out of Communist
hands?
- 2.
- Proceed to go on a war footing domestically in order
to regain in as short a time as possible the relative
power position we had in 1945?
- 3.
- Create some sort of mutual assistance pact among the
Pacific nations (Australia, New Zealand, Philippines and
U.S.) which Japan could join at a suitable time and
which would have the dual purpose of defending Japan
from Communist aggression and assuring our friends that
Japan would be on their side and not a menace to
them?
iii action to be taken
- A.
-
Policy Decisions to be Made.
Consideration must be given to the effect of positive action
restoring Japan to the family of nations on prior United States
commitments under such instruments as the Potsdam Declaration
and the Basic Post-Surrender Policy which was approved by the
Far Eastern Commission in terms which imply that it was more in
the nature of a governmental agreement than an ordinary FEC policy decision. Determination
of how far we can go and the direction to go must be made at the
earliest possible moment so that we can proceed with the steps
outlined below.
- B.
-
Congressional Consultations. These should
be undertaken at once with a view to obtaining Congressional
approval for whatever action is necessary to enable the United
States to take a stand in Asia and with Japan which will assure
Japan’s being on our side. Such action
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might include going ahead with a peace
treaty in the conventional sense or having the Congress by joint
resolution declare the ending of the state of war with Japan.
The latter possibility under present conditions seems to have
much to recommend it and should be thoroughly explored.
- C.
-
FEC Consultations.
Consultations should be held at an early date with friendly
members of the FEC, perhaps in a
body, to tell them of our thinking and to endeavor to gain at a
minimum their passive acquiescence and at a maximum their active
support.
- D.
-
Consultations with Japanese. At an early
date high level representatives of the United States Government
should proceed to Japan for consultations with Japanese leaders
to determine how far they are prepared to go in cooperating with
the United States.
- E.
-
Relaxation of SCAP Controls. Concurrently with taking
the above steps, the United States should take steps to reduce
the impact of SCAP
GHQ on Japanese political,
economic and social life.
- F.
-
Increase of Internal Security in Japan.
Concurrently with the above two steps, the United States should
take active steps to increase the size and power of Japanese
Police and Coast Guard.2
- G.
-
Increasing Japan’s Industrial Potential to
Fight Aggression. All necessary steps should be taken
to make it possible for Japan’s industrial power to be used by
the United States and its allies, as well as Japan, for the
building up of the forces necessary to resist Communism. This
will require consideration of FEC restrictions on production for military
purposes.
iv staff necessary
In order to accomplish the above, there should be set up a small,
high-level staff under Mr. Dulles which will be given authority from
the White House to make all necessary studies and submit
recommendations for final action. During the process of formulating
final recommendations, this staff should consult all offices.,
departments and agencies concerned but should not be required to
obtain clearances at each step. Within the broad framework of the
Acheson-Johnson Memorandum to the President of September 7, 1950,
and NSC 133 the staff should be given complete freedom
of action. There should be a representative of the Defense
Department on the staff.
