Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

694.001/11–1550

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

confidential

London, November 15, 1950—4 p. m.

2835. Department’s A–568, October 19.¹ Yesterday afternoon we reviewed with Bevin general question of need for increased Japanese participation international relationships. In presenting Department’s views mention was made of previous US efforts obtain British coordination along these lines. Point was stressed that if we are to hope that Japan become democratic bulwark in Asia we should foster maximum political and economic stability in Japan and draw it into closer contact with western nations. Bevin was asked whether he would agree in principle to desirability of extending MFN treatment to Japan and if so whether he would instruct his experts discuss details with US delegation Torquay.

In rambling reply Bevin said he would of course give matter thorough consideration although there were many obstacles in way. Referring to MFN agreement with Germany he pointed out UK had representation there and was in position exert pressure if Germany misbehaved. In Japan things were different; UK was without authority in Japan and there had been built up in popular mind a belief that SCAP was a law unto himself² and furthermore as a manufacturing nation UK could not but view with concern resurgence of Japanese competition and Lancashire was becoming alarmed over indications that preference was being shown Japan with respect to allocations of US raw cotton, a tendency which if not checked might result in Lancashire not being given sufficient for its needs (Embassy understands that there may have been some basis for such a reaction a month ago but it is obvious he was not in possession of latest information this subject), Bevin said he realized necessity of doing something for Japan but he felt UK would not be willing pay too high a price. Before considering MFN for Japan he would like fuller information present status this question.

Embassy is undertaking in consultation with US delegation Torquay supply Bevin with desired background information.

Sent Department 2835, repeated information Torquay 80.

Douglas

1. In this airgram the Department had said in part: “While it is recognized that the prospect of Japanese commercial competition presents at least in the short run a problem for the British, the British must face the realities of the situation and be prepared to meet Japanese competition if Japan is to be kept oriented toward the West and free from Communist pressures.” The Department had instructed the Embassy to speak with Mr. Bevin and urge British acceptance of most-favored-nation treatment for Japan on a reciprocal basis, eventual British support of Japan’s admission to GATT, British approval of Japanese overseas agencies in the United Kingdom and its colonies, and British acceptance of Japanese participation in international conferences and agreements of a technical character. (694.001/10–1950)

2. In a memorandum, handed by Mr. Tomlinson to Mr. Allison in New York on November 3, the British Embassy had stated in part the United Kingdom desired an acceleration of the treaty-making process and viewed as tactically unwise any relaxation of controls then imposed on the Japanese Government. In the United Kingdom’s view “… it would be undesirable for Japan to have reached such a measure of freedom from controls that the signing of a Peace Treaty would amount to no more than a legal recognition of a state of affairs already existing, and it is accordingly the hope of His Majesty’s Government that the United States Government will use its authority to dissuade General MacArthur from unilateral acts which would bring about any further removal, or loosening, of the remaining controls.” (694.001/11–350)

   In its reply of December 20, the Department stated that, since at best final consummation of a treaty might take some time, Japan should be encouraged (to an extent consistent with FEC decisions) to take more responsibility in its own affairs and to participate in constructive bodies such as WHO, FAO, and UNESCO. Controls which had been placed upon the Japanese by the occupation authorities themselves, and not as the result of specific FEC policy decisions, should be relaxed. (694.001/11–350)

   No comment was made on the reference to General MacArthur.