Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

694.001/10–2650

Memorandum by Mr. Robert A. Fearey of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs to the Deputy Director of that Office (Johnson)

secret

[Washington,] November 14, 1950.

Subject: Territorial Provisions of a Japanese Peace Treaty.

PolAd’s attached despatch¹ confirms information from other sources that the Japanese public is attaching extraordinary importance to the disposition of the Ryukyu and Kurile Islands, and to a lesser extent the Bonins and Volcanos, in the treaty. The Socialist and Democratic Parties have placed themselves formally on record as opposing any treaty provisions surrendering Japanese sovereignty over territories “historically and racially Japanese.” The Liberals have been more cautious, aware that a Liberal Party administration may be called upon to sign a treaty containing distasteful territorial pro-, visions. However, Government spokesmen members of the party have on several occasions asserted Japan’s claim to continued sovereignty over the Ryukyus and Kuriles.

The growing popular sentiment is attributed by PolAd to spontaneous emotional feeling, fanned by such organized groups as the Association for Reversion of Okinawa to Japan and the Bonin Island Repatriates Revival League. Another factor which might be cited is that the Japanese, crowded back into the main islands, are instinctively reluctant to lose additional territory even though that territory already be already over-populated (the Ryukyus) or, except for the Lesser Kuriles, largely worthless. Probably also the imputation that the islands, long ago acquired by predominantly peaceful processes, were unjustly seized by “force or violence” rankles. PolAd goes so far as to say

“While there are those who believe that the (Liberal) Party would be able to survive, at least as one of the dominant parties, if not as the party in power (if it accepted a treaty detaching these territories), there are others who believe that such an eventuality would lead to its virtual collapse as a political force. . . . In taking political advantage of the irredentist sentiment of the Japanese people, the political groups seeking to succeed the Liberals in power would, whatever their original feelings toward the United States, adopt policies with marked anti-American overtones. Such a situation, by fanning the sparks of anti-American feeling already latent among the people as a result of a prolonged military occupation and a distasteful treaty, could not but be productive of hazards to continued friendly relations between Japan and the United States.”

In the circumstances PolAd believes that the territorial provisions of the treaty should be most carefully considered. Specifically he believes that the Allies should “explore the feasibility … of territorial provisions which, while allowing the retention of effective control over such areas as may be dictated by security considerations, would avoid the appearance of an outright alienation of sovereignty from Japan, with a consequent rise of irredentism of considerable and possibly dangerous proportions.” In advancing this suggestion he appears to have in mind the statement of a Foreign Office official to a member of the Mission that while the Liberals’ preference would of course be that the Ryukyus be returned to Japanese sovereignty, the U.S. retaining strategic control and military bases there in the same manner that it will have bases in Japan proper, the Party might as a bare minimum risk signing a treaty which recognized in principle Japan’s right to sovereignty, even though some such arrangement as a trusteeship might temporarily replace sovereignty.

As you know, Mr. Dulles when he first assumed primary responsibility for the treaty expressed doubts about the advisability of detaching the Ryukyus from Japan, and said that he planned to reexplore the necessity for so doing with the military. He later indicated, however, that the earlier position was unchanged, and it was further confirmed, along with the Bonins and Volcanos, in the State–Defense joint memorandum signed by the President on September 8.² The suggestion that the U.S. keep bases in the Ryukyus under the same arrangement as in the main islands has always been met by the military reply that we must be able to count on holding the Okinawa base permanently. Even accepting this position, however, it has never as far as I know been satisfactorily explained why we must control the whole land area south of 29° N. Lat permanently. Admitting the need.-’ for radar stations and the like some distance from the main base, why do we have to control the land and people in between? At most why should we require greater rights than the very broad military rights we will be acquiring in the main islands, where we have nevertheless not considered it necessary to take over the government of the country? In spite of all that has transpired, and that the military would charge, us with reopening an issue already decided by the President, I believe we should insist that the military give us convincing reasons why we should not either (1) seek the same military rights in the Ryukyus as in the main islands, but on a permanent basis, or (2) seek a 99 year lease of the particular areas in the Ryukyus that we require, leaving the rest under Japanese ownership and administration.

If you ‘have time I suggest that you read the marked passages in the second to last enclosure to the despatch, containing an unusually pointed and well reasoned petition by Okinawan residents in Japan, and of the last enclosure, a pathetic petition by former residents of the Bonins.³

1. No. 628, October 26, 1950, not printed (694.001/10–2650).
2. See memorandum for the President, September 7, p. 1293.

3. Neither printed.

   Mr. Johnson forwarded this memorandum and despatch No. 628 to Mr. Rusk with his own memorandum of November 17, in which he said in part:

   “As you know, in spite of the Secretary’s Press Club statement and the “Treaty Memo” approved by the President, I strongly feel that we should not consider the Ryukyus trusteeship question as entirely closed, but, when the bilateral military agreement with Japan is firmed up, raise with the Pentagon the question as to whether its extension to the Ryukyus would not give them everything that they require. The bilateral military agreement is going to be a heavy shock to the Japanese, and this combined with the loss of the Ryukyus may well eventually constitute too heavy a strain on the present overwhelming pro-American sentiment in Japan.” (694.001/10–2650)