Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

Lot 56D527

The Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles) to the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Forces (MacArthur)

secret
personal and confidential

[Washington,] November 15, 1950.

My Dear General MacArthur: I assume you get official reports as to what is going on, but perhaps at this juncture a few personal impressions might be acceptable.

We have completed here, at the United Nations General Assembly, private conversations with all of the other members of the F.E.C. Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and Burma have all raised objections to the absence of military restrictions. However, I think that Australia and New Zealand will give way if we can find some formula for assuring them of U.S. protection in the event of attack. We talked this over with Spender before he returned.¹ The State Department is studying the problem, and I think it ought to be possible to find a formula—perhaps a Presidential Declaration—which would be mutually acceptable to our three countries and clear the way, as far as Australia and New Zealand are concerned, for the type of Treaty that you, and we, want.

The Philippines, China, Burma, Australia and New Zealand have all raised the question of reparations. They would, of course, like some. But I think they realize that they are up against a practical impossibility. We have in mind using our GARIOA obligations as a bargaining point in this connection, but have not yet felt it necessary to raise this point.

The U.K. has not made any particular comment on our suggestions, but we judge that their principal concern is with the impact of Japanese commercial competition during the post-Treaty period.

I had a most interesting talk with Jacob Malik (USSR). He came up to my house in the evening and we talked for a couple of hours. You may have gotten the Memorandum of Conversation² prepared by Colonel Babcock, who accompanied me. He was guarded in his comments, but made clear that the Soviet Union would strongly object to any treaty language which cast doubt upon the present Soviet title to South Sakhalin and the Kuriles and China’s title to Formosa. Also, he questioned the U.S. right to “trustee” the Ryukyus in our favor, saying that, whereas the Yalta agreement had dealt with the Kuriles, nothing had been said about the Ryukyus. He suggested that the Ryukyus were the “small islands” which would be left with Japan. Also, he said that if we continued on at Okinawa and had the right to garrison forces in Japan that would “leave the situation no different from what exists at present”. I have no doubt but what Communist propaganda in Japan will emphasize the Soviet desire to restore the Ryukyus to Japan.

I don’t know whether the Russians will continue to talk with us about the Japanese Treaty. That procedural question has been referred back to Moscow. My guess is that they will probably keep in touch with us for a time, if only to get information. They might even attend a preliminary peace conference if one were called. I think it most unlikely, however, that they would ever agree with the kind of a peace treaty that we want.

Our own ideas about future procedure are not yet firm. I am rather inclined to favor carrying on with further bilateral talks and not risk a conference where the allies are divided about substance and where they would be almost equally divided as between Communist and Nationalist Chinese participation, and where the Russians might foment increasing discord. I think we can probably get into pretty close agreement, as between most of us, by continuing bilateral talks.³

However, one thing that I think should be done soon is for me to go to Japan and have a thorough talk with you. I thing it extremely important to get your judgment first as to whether in the light of the new Korean and Chinese Communist developments, we should push on steadily for the Japanese Peace Treaty. If so, I think we should quite soon, chiefly through you, ascertain that the Japanese political leaders would, on a non-partisan basis, accept the kind of a Treaty we have in mind. If we can get as a fixed and solid point, U.S.-Japanese agreement, then I think that the others, except for the Soviet Union and Communist China, will come into line if we combine firmness with some placating modifications which will be of form rather than of substance.

There is also, I think, need now of a small bi-partisan Congressional group that will concern itself with the Japanese Treaty problem and with which our negotiators can keep close contact with a view to assuring harmony with Congress.

I flew out to Grand Rapids last Sunday and had a good long talk with Arthur Vandenberg. He is still rather frail, but I had the impression that he is somewhat better than when he left Washington. We talked together quite a bit about you and the Far Eastern situation. I hope that the viewpoint you represent will be more heeded as a result of the Republican shift in Congress. There is, however, a rather noisy newspaper group which supported the Republicans and which is beating the drums for reckless action which would involve us deeply in war on the mainland of Asia. You produced a miracle on the land in Korea, but I doubt whether you would feel that that proves that we should make the Asian mainland the area for the testing of the relative strength of the free and Communist world. My view, and my impression of yours, is that sea and air power must in the Far East be our main reliance.

We are all deeply concerned with the new burdens that the North Korean situation puts upon you after you had done the job of wiping out the North Korean armies. I think, however, you can be confident that the nation is prepared to accept what you feel to be the answer to this new problem.

If you have time, now or later, I hope you will let me know of any thoughts you have on the Treaty or other matters, as I want the benefit of that.

With very kind regards to Mrs. MacArthur, in which Janet joins, I am

Faithfully yours,

John Foster Dulles

1. Possibly a reference to a conversation held between Messrs. Spender, Rusk, and Dulles at the Plaza Hotel in New York City on October 30. No memorandum of this conversation has been found in State Department files. For Spender’s account, see Exercises in Diplomacy, pp. 63–67.
2. Of October 26–27, p. 1332.

3. In his memorandum of a conversation held with the President, November 16, the Secretary stated in part:

   “At this point, Mr. Dulles joined the President and me. He gave the President a 20-minute report on his discussions in New York regarding the Japanese peace treaty.

   “The President listened closely; expressed his approval of what Mr. Dulles had done, and he authorized us to continue the discussions after the representatives in New York had received instructions from their governments, and then come back to the President sometime in December for a full discussion of the next step to be taken and a list of the decisions to be made.” (Lot 65D238)