Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

694.001/9–450

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) to the Secretary of State

top secret

[Washington,] September 4, 1950.

Subject: Japanese Peace Treaty

As indicated in my memorandum to the Secretary of August 29, General Magruder agreed to discuss with me further on September 1 the question of a Japanese peace treaty. As a result of the discussion on September l,¹ practically complete agreement was achieved and it was decided that I would prepare a joint memorandum to the President from the Secretaries of State and Defense, setting forth their agreement as to the desirability of proceeding with negotiations for a Japaness treaty and outlining in general terms what such a treaty would include together with other points of agreement on general problems connected with the Japanese peace treaty.

There is attached hereto a draft of such a memorandum. Certain portions of this draft memorandum to the President, namely paragraphs 2c, d, f, h, and i, are taken verbatim from the memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense on a proposed Japanese peace treaty, dated 22 August 1950. The general description of an acceptable treaty contained in Tab A is based on Mr. Dulles’ memorandum of August 18 to Mr. Jessup² on a Japanese peace treaty, with certain phrases added to meet points raised by General Magruder in our discussions. These points are found in paragraph 3 of Tab A where the words “or other satisfactory arrangements” were added with a view to making it possible for the United States to withdraw its forces should suitable Japanese defense forces come into being. The last sentence of paragraph 3 was also added in order to bring this paragraph more specifically in line with Defense criteria. In paragraph 6 of Tab A the phrase “with the exception of those arising out of the security arrangements” and the last sentence of the paragraph have been added to meet a point raised by General Magruder.

It is believed that this memorandum will receive the approval of the Joint Chiefs and it is hoped that it may receive prompt approval in the Department so that it may be sent formally to the Secretary of Defense as soon as possible. I am making an informal copy of this draft available to General Magruder with the understanding that it has not yet had approval in the Department, but that he may use it in an effort to expedite a decision as to its general acceptability.

During my discussion with General Magruder on September 1, he was accompanied by Colonel Stanton Babcock, who has just recently returned from Japan and who has from time to time been associated with the problems connected with a treaty in General MacArthur’s Headquarters. General Magruder stated that, if possible, the Department of Defense would like to have Colonel Babcock sit in on the preliminary negotiations contemplated in the attached memorandum. I strongly recommend that Colonel Babcock be invited to do so. He is a broad-gauge military officer with long experience in Japan both before and after the recent war. I have known him personally for the past 10 years and I am convinced of his ability and cooperative spirit. I believe it would be of real advantage to the State Department to have Colonel Babcock associated with the preliminary negotiations and that his presence would make possible expeditious handling of the various problems between our two Departments.

The only matter raised by General Magruder not specifically dealt with in the attached memorandum is his suggestion that the treaty be written in such a way as to make clear that the GARIOA obligation³ will not be eliminated. Both Colonel Babcock and I pointed out to the General that it would be inadvisable to have such a provision in the treaty as our effort to get other powers to agree to taking no reparations from Japan would be made much easier if no specific demand for repayment of GARIOA expenses is made. In connection with the Department’s tentative belief that at least in the initial phases there should not be full “pay-as-you-go”, but that Japan should contribute at least a portion of the expenses of garrison forces, it should be possible to reach an agreement with the Defense Department whereby such contributions by Japan could be counted as an offset to the GARIOA expenditures. I believe there will be no real difficulty with this point and that it should not cause a delay in reaching a decision on the attached memorandum.

[Here follows the September 4 draft joint State–Defense memorandum to the President. It differs only in one sentence from the final draft of September 7, page 1293. The second sentence of numbered paragraph 4 originally read: “In carrying out these negotiations the Department of State will use as a guide the general description of an acceptable treaty as contained in Tab A.”]

Tab A²

The United States proposes a treaty with Japan which would end the state of war, restore Japanese sovereignty and bring Japan back as an equal in the society of free peoples. The treaty would deal with the following specific topics:

1. United Nations. Membership by Japan would be contemplated.

2. Territory. Japan would (a) recognize the independence of Korea; (b) recognize the United States strategic trusteeship of the Marianas, Caroline and Marshall Islands; (c) accept the control by the United States of the Ryukyu Islands south of 29° north latitude, the Bonin Islands, including Rosario Island, the Volcano Islands, Parace Vela and Marcus Islands; (d) renounce all claims to Formosa, Pescadores, South Sakhalin and the Kuriles and accept the future decision regarding their disposition of the Treaty Powers or the United Nations; (e) renounce all special rights and interests in China.

3. Security. The treaty would contemplate that, pending U.N. assumption of responsibility or other satisfactory arrangements, there would, at Japan’s request, be continuing cooperative responsibility between Japanese facilities and United States forces for the defense of Japan and maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area. Forces of other Treaty Powers might also cooperate by agreement with the United States.

4. Political Clauses. Japan would be expected to adhere to multilateral treaties dealing with narcotics and fishing and bilateral treaties could be revived by mutual agreement. Pending the conclusion of new commercial treaties, Japan would extend most-favored-nation treatment, subject to normal exceptions.

5. Claims. All parties would waive war claims, except that (a) the Allied Powers would hold Japanese property within their territory, and (b) Japan would restore allied property or, if not restorable intact, provide yen to compensate for an agreed percentage of lost value.

6. Disputes. Treaty disputes, if any, with the exception of those arising out of the security arrangements, would be referred to the International Court of Justice. There could be special tribunals to deal with claims. Disputes arising as a result of the security provisions would be settled by Japan and those Treaty Powers maintaining forces in Japan, through the diplomatic channel.

1. No full memorandum or other summary of this discussion has been found in Department of State files.
2. Not printed. In the covering note Mr. Dulles had said: “At luncheon we considered the possibility of a textual discussion with the British Commonwealth group while at the same time giving others initially something less. I have drafted the annexed to illustrate what could be given to the others.” (611.941/8–1850)
3. The obligation of Japan to repay a portion of the advances made under the heading “Government Assistance and Relief in Occupied Areas.”
2. This document was not included with the final memorandum to the President.