694.001/8–2950
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) to the Secretary of State
Subject: Japanese Peace Treaty.
In accordance with instructions,1 I called on General Carter Magruder this morning to discuss with him in detail the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the Japanese peace treaty. I left with him an original and two copies of my memorandum of August 232 commenting on the Joint Chiefs’ memorandum,3 and General Magruder and I discussed these comments in detail.
There was found to be general agreement in almost every case. The section of the treaty which seemed to give General Magruder most alarm was Article 104 which he interpreted to mean that as soon as Japan is admitted to the United Nations, the security provisions of the treaty would be relinquished. When it was explained to him that this was not so, he raised additional objections, most of which were [Page 1289] apparently based upon a lack of understanding of the UN Charter and, particularly, of the meaning of Chapter VII of the Charter. After some discussion, General Magruder seemed to agree that the State Department was not conceding too much, but he continued to maintain that the language of Article 10 was obscure. He suggested minor changes in phraseology which I told him would be given consideration by the Department. The other chief cause for concern was the last sentence in Article 85 of the treaty which General Magruder feared would make it impossible for the United States Forces in Japan to take action against large-scale internal Communist riots. It was agreed that this language could be improved, and I undertook to study the matter with a view to coming up with more acceptable language. I made it clear that the State Department agreed with Defense that there might be the necessity for action against internal riots and that it was not our desire to prevent such action, but only to obtain agreement to the general principle that after a treaty the Japanese Government would have responsibility for internal affairs in Japan.
General Magruder said that it would be necessary to discuss with his associates as well as with the Joint Chiefs the State Department comments, and it would be necessary to show these persons the August 18 draft of the treaty as a whole which was left with him. General Magruder also stated that in his opinion it would be necessary to cable the text of the treaty to General MacArthur for his comments before agreeing to go ahead with preliminary negotiations with other countries. I said that it was my understanding that Mr. Harriman had showed the text of the security clauses to General MacArthur and that the latter had expressed concurrence therein, but I added that I agreed that General MacArthur should have an opportunity to look at the whole treaty. At this point I endeavored to make clear that any text would have to be a tentative one until after negotiations had actually been undertaken, and that the important thing was for State and Defense to agree on a set of objectives which the treaty should bring about and on certain minimum conditions which would have to be included in a treaty. It should then be left to State to negotiate with the other powers on the basis of this agreement, and State should have the responsibility for devising language which would not only meet the necessary Defense conditions, but also be acceptable to our Allies and to the Japanese. I pointed out that there would be many changes of language during the course of negotiations but made clear that before final commitments were made we would again discuss the matter with responsible officials in the Defense Department.
I explained to General Magruder the background thinking of the August 18 draft and he agreed that a short general treaty was desirable. I also explained the necessity for speed in considering this [Page 1290] matter in view of our desire to discuss the treaty with our friendly Allies during the early part of the coming session of the General Assembly. General Magruder agreed to work urgently on the matter but emphasized that it would be necessary for him to clear with the Joint Chiefs as well as his other colleagues. He, at first, stated that he thought it would be two weeks before any decision could be reached but finally agreed to come and see me on Friday, September 1, and said he hoped that we would be in such close agreement at that time that we would be able to progress speedily from then on. In parting I reemphasized that what we wanted was agreement on general principles and minimum conditions which should be included in a treaty and not agreement to a certain set of words which probably would have to be changed later as a result of negotiations with other countries. General Magruder was noncommittal about this but implied agreement.
Unless instructions to the contrary are received, I shall make no further attempt to see General Magruder until 11 a. m., September 1, when he has agreed to come to my office.
- See Mr. Acheson’s letter of September 7 to Secretary Johnson, p. 1293.↩
- Ante, p. 1284.↩
- Of August 22, p. 1278.↩
- Of the treaty draft of August 18. Articles 8 and 10 of this draft are identical to Articles II and IV of the draft security articles of July 25 as modified July 28, p. 1260.↩
- See footnote 4 above.↩