Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

694.001/9–750

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)¹

top secret

[Washington,] September 7, 1950.

Dear Mr. Secretary: You will recall that on August 28 during our telephone conversation regarding a Japanese Peace Treaty you suggested, and I agreed, that a detailed discussion of this problem be taken up in the first instance by General Magruder and Mr. Allison. Such discussions have taken place and I am enclosing a memorandum prepared after consultation with General Magruder recommending to the President how we should proceed. I have signed this memorandum and if you agree with it will you please also sign and forward it to the President at the earliest possible opportunity. I am particularly anxious to get the President’s decision before I meet in New York next week with Foreign Ministers Bevin and Schuman. It will be appreciated if you will let me know when the memorandum has been sent forward.

Sincerely yours,

Dean Acheson

[Enclosure]

Memorandum for the President

top secret

September 7, 1950.

The Secretaries of State and Defense have agreed on the following points with respect to a Peace Treaty with Japan.

1. The United States should now proceed with preliminary negotiations for a Japanese Peace Treaty.

2. In conducting these negotiations the following security requirements should be regarded as vital and any Treaty must take account of the following:

a. The Treaty shall not become effective until such time as the interests of the United States dictate and in no event until after favorable resolution of the present United States military situation in Korea;

b. In so far as possible in a Treaty there must be assurance that access to the natural, industrial and manpower resources of Japan shall be denied to the USSR;

c. It must provide that initially Japan will be garrisoned by forces acceptable to the United States under a United States military command;

d. It must provide that foreign forces unacceptable to the United States not be permitted in any of the Japanese islands to the southward of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands;

e. The security arrangements, while protecting the United States from being forced out of Japan without its consent, should also make it possible for the United States to withdraw its forces whenever satisfactory alternative security arrangements are concluded;

f. It must not contain any prohibition, direct or implicit, now or in the future, of Japan’s inalienable right to self-defense in case of external attack, and to possess the means to exercise that right;

g. The Treaty must give the United States the right to maintain armed forces in Japan, wherever, for so long, and to such extent as it deems necessary. Questions regarding the relationship of the armed forces to the Japanese Government, the extent to which Japan will be required to contribute to the cost of maintaining those forces, and similar questions regarding the detailed implementation of the security arrangements will be the subject of a supplementary bilateral agreement between the United States and Japan to come into effect simultaneously with the coming into effect of the Treaty. The terms of this agreement will be worked out cooperatively by the State and Defense Departments;

h. It must not disturb the United States strategic trusteeship over the Marianas, Caroline and Marshall Islands;

i. Its terms must secure to the United States exclusive strategic control of the Ryukyu Islands south of latitude 29° north, Marcus Island, and the Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan;

j. There should be nothing in the Treaty which prohibits the United States garrison forces’ acting at the request of the Japanese Government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances.

3. The Departments of State and Defense agree that provision must be made at an early date for Japan to begin to assume some of the burden of its own defense and in step with the Treaty negotiations the two Departments will consult and agree on measures to be taken to achieve the desired ends in a manner consistent with the overall political interests of the United States.

4. It is agreed that the Department of State should undertake confidential preliminary discussion through the diplomatic channel with friendly powers on the Far Eastern Commission² with a view to ascertaining whether they would generally favor the type of Treaty desired by the United States and how they would propose to proceed.³ In carrying out these negotiations the Department of State will be guided by the security desiderata outlined in paragraph 2 above. If, during the course of discussion with friendly powers, the Department of State finds it helpful to submit the actual draft of a Treaty or portion thereof, it will be made clear that such draft is only suggestive and does not commit the United States Government with regard to the detailed content or language of the draft.

5. After the initial discussions with the friendly powers and at a time to be determined by the Secretary of State in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, a United States political representative will go to Japan to discuss confidentially with General MacArthur the proposed Treaty and by arrangements through and in cooperation with General MacArthur will discuss the proposed Treaty with the Japanese Government and also seek a procedure for Japanese participation in the Treaty-making process which will assure genuine acceptance by the representatives of all important non-Communist political groups in Japan.

6. During the course of the discussions envisioned in paragraph 4 above the Treaty should be discussed informally with members of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees.⁴

7. After preliminary discussions have been completed in accordance with the above procedures the Departments of State and Defense will consult with a view to making detailed recommendations to the President and the National Security Council as to the next steps to be taken.

8. At an appropriate time to be determined by the Department of State a public announcement will be made designed to make clear the agreement of the United States Government on the necessity of proceeding with preparations for a Treaty and the fact that discussions through the diplomatic channel are underway. The text of this announcement will be agreed with the Department of Defense.

It is recommended that the President give his approval to the above and that the Secretary of State immediately take the necessary steps to carry out these recommendations.⁵

Dean Acheson

Secretary of State
Louis Johnson
Secretary of Defense

1. In a memorandum of September 5, not printed, Mr. Allison had reviewed for Mr. Dulles those developments regarding a Japanese peace treaty which had occurred during the latter’s absence. Although Mr. Allison did not indicate the exact day of Mr. Dulles’ departure or return, he summarized events, and enclosed documents, of August 22 through September 4. (694.001/9–550)

   In a memorandum of September 6 Mr. Battle had said in part: “Mr. Dulles called me this morning and asked if the Secretary concurred in the draft memorandum to the President. Mr. Dulles said that the only changes were one or two small verbal ones in the memorandum itself and the deletion of Tab A … I spoke to the Secretary about this and told him, what Mr. Dulles had told me, that the memorandum was generally cleared in the Department in FE [sic], with Mr. Matthews and with Mr. Dulles, and asked him if he agreed with the memorandum as drafted. The Secretary said that he did agree.…” (694.001/–650)

2. An unsigned paper of September 22 on Japan, part of a briefing series for high officers of the Department, read in part: “We are disposed to discuss the [Japanese peace settlement] situation with the Soviets at the GA if they are willing, although we expect to talk first with friendly members of the FEC.” (“Policy Record Guide,” 611.00/9–2250 Bulky)
3. For President Truman’s statement released September 14, announcing the intention of the United States to initiate such discussions, see Department of State Bulletin, September 25, 1950, p. 513. For Mr. Truman’s news conference of the 14th, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965), pp. 637–640.
4. In a memorandum of a conversation held September 13, Mr. Merchant stated that he, Mr. Dulles, and Jack K. McFall, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, had discussed a Japanese peace treaty with Senator Tom Connally of Texas, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Senators Walter George of Georgia and Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin, also of that Committee. Mr. Merchant reported in part that after a briefing by Mr. Dulles on the treaty, its security aspects, and the proposed plan of discussions with FEC powers, each of the three Senators individually stated his support of the general line and the planned procedure. “Mr. Dulles then pointed out the importance of making the Japanese believe that they are in fact full members of what they tend to regard as the ‘Club of the Western Nations’. In this connection, he emphasized the importance of amending our immigration laws to remove the present discrimination against the Japanese as compared to the Indians and the Chinese.” (694.001/9–1350)

5. The following is handwritten in the margin: “Approved Sept 8, 1950 Harry S Truman.”

   In a memorandum of September 8 to the NSC, James S. Lay, Jr., its Executive Secretary, stated in part that the President had approved the joint memorandum (now NSC 60/1) after it had been concurred in by the other members of the NSC and the Acting Secretary of the Treasury and that the President had directed the Secretary of State immediately to take the necessary steps to implement it. (Lot 63D35: Folder “NSC 60 Memoranda”)