694.001/5–2550
The Acting United States Political Adviser for Japan (Sebald) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Butterworth)
Dear Walt: Last night I had an opportunity to have a lengthy conversation with General MacArthur regarding the various documents brought to me by John Muccio1 and, specifically, the two “position” papers representing the present thinking of the Department of Defense and Department of State respectively.2
General MacArthur said that his initial reaction to the two papers was one of wonderment at the apparently small differences between the thinking of the two Departments. In consequence, he had felt that it should be a relatively simple matter to find some middle ground of agreement. The more he thought about the differences, however, the more complex the problem had appeared, especially as there seems to be a certain amount of intractability on the part of the Defense people. He has an impression that the Defense representatives with whom Dean Rusk discussed these matters are not of the caliber one would expect of persons charged with such important negotiations. The General said that he has thought long and often of this problem and has come to the tentative conclusion that an alternative proposal, which might be acceptable to both sides, can be found. The General made it clear that his solution stems from the two position papers and that he is taking up the problem as from the present area of disagreement. He does not feel it worth while to cling to his own previous proposals, as apparently the thinking in Washington has now proceeded far beyond any proposals of the past. He said that in his view it is important to bring the two Departments together so that some position can be found to enable the United States Government to chart its course of action. Even if such solution should not be perfect, he feels that the important thing is to find a common meeting ground—subsequent events and time will, in due course, nevertheless dictate the successive steps to be taken.
[Page 1206]The proposal which General MacArthur said he would make to Secretary Johnson, if the latter should raise this question, is the following:
The Japanese Government should be given the following alternatives:
- (A)
- The Japanese should be offered a treaty of peace based on the concepts previously explored but containing a provision that certain specified bases in Japan will be reserved to United States troops for the purpose of securing the achievement of the basic objectives set forth in the Potsdam Proclamation, provided, however, that the treaty herein envisaged shall be subject to a nationwide plebiscite by the Japanese people. If the results of the plebiscite are in the affirmative, i.e., are in favor of the treaty of peace containing the base provision, the treaty shall become effective. In the event that the plebiscite should result in a negative vote, then alternative (B) is accepted.
- (B)
- There shall be a continuation, without change, of the present regime of control, with no treaty of peace.
We discussed this proposed solution at considerable length, and General MacArthur is fully aware of some of the attendant difficulties which might arise should this proposal be adopted as the United States position. For example, it is presently unknown what the reaction of other parties to the treaty might be. There is also the danger of a hard crystallization of Japanese sentiment on the question of bases, with a strongly divided public opinion and consequent political restiveness that might result from widespread discussion of this problem. Finally, there are inherent practical difficulties of holding a plebiscite in Japan.
General MacArthur, however, feels that some midway proposition is preferable to none at all, with a continuation of the present dilemma in which the United States finds itself; his only objective in making the above proposal is to get on with the treaty. He said, in effect, that he has no pride of authorship and if a better solution can be developed, he would welcome it. This new proposal of the General’s, in my opinion, does not represent his last word and may have been “thinking out loud”. If adopted, it would of course represent a sharp veering from his previous views, which, as you know, were simple, direct, and fully in accord with our own.
In connection with Mr. Johnson’s visit, General MacArthur said that he has no intention of raising the peace treaty problem and will not discuss it unless Mr. Johnson asks for his advice or views. I reminded the General that any knowledge which he has of the present differences of views between the two Departments ought, of necessity, to come from the Department of the Army. He said that he is [Page 1207] fully aware of this but assumed that the DA would, in due course, and prior to Mr. Johnson’s visit, brief him on the situation.
Sincerely yours,