Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

694.001/6–750

Memorandum by the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles)¹ to the Secretary of State

secret

[Washington,] June 7, 1950.

I attach memorandum² which I have prepared with the help of Messrs. Allison, Hamilton, Howard and Fearey, which could, I think, be made the basis of our talk planned for Friday at 2:30.

[Attachment]

June 6, 1950.

In the case of Japan the long-range, overall objective is:

A Japanese people who will be peacefully inclined;

effectively respect fundamental human rights;

be part of the free world;

be friendly to the United States;

be capable of developing their own well-being and self-respect without dependence on outside charity;

be able by their conduct and example to exhibit to the peoples of Asia and the Pacific Islands the advantages of the free way of life and thereby help in the effort to resist and throw back communism in this part of the world.

Appended hereto as Tab 1 are notes indicating certain of the fundamental difficulties which must be overcome and the methods by which they might perhaps be overcome.

Attached hereto as Tab 2 is a statement of specific steps which might now be taken by SCAP in aid of the foregoing objectives.

Attached hereto as Tab 3 is a statement of terms which might be incorporated in a treaty between Japan and all or some of the nations, including the United States, that have been at war with Japan.

Attached hereto as Tab 4 is a statement of the procedures that might be followed if it were determined to seek such a treaty.

Tab 1

Broad Aspects of the Japanese Problem

1. Geography. There is physical propinquity to the China mainland, Manchuria and North Korea, now under communist domination. The Soviet Union now controls all of adjacent Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. Formosa is in immediate jeopardy and South Korea is in long-term jeopardy.

2. Economics. There is natural and historical economic interdependence between Japan and the now communized parts of Asia. These are the natural sources of raw material for Japan.

3. Politics. The people have a tendency to totalitarian forms and to authoritarian rule.

4. Ethics. There is no strong religious faith which, like Christianity, tends to develop a sense of individual worth as against enforced conformity.

5. Social. Extreme density of population, paucity of natural resources, and religious influences have resulted in social institutions which minimize frictions by discouraging individualism in favor of family, group, and national interests.

6. Racial. There is a certain barrier with the West in the face of the assumed Western sense of white superiority. But there is a sense of superiority too and, in some respects, to the Chinese and a desire to be treated as social equals by the West.

7. Military. There is a present emotional tendency to pacifism which, however, could easily shift to a revival of militarism.

The problem of attaining our objective regarding Japan presents great difficulties and will require strong efforts along several fronts. The following questions are raised in connection with the foregoing points:

1. Since Japan from a geographical standpoint is closely encircled (North, West and South) by areas controlled by Communists of dynamic and aggressive tendencies, can Japan be saved from Communism if the Free World merely adopts, in this area, a defensive policy and does not undertake there some counter-offensives of a propaganda and covert character designed to prevent the easy and quick consolidation by Soviet-inspired Communists of these recently won areas and which will require Communist efforts to be expended more in the task of consolidation rather than in the task of further expansion and aggression? If defense can only succeed as supplemented by offense, what are the practical offensive possibilities?

2. Can there be found, outside of the Communized areas, adequate sources of raw materials and markets for Japanese industry so that Japan’s economy can be reasonably and progressively prosperous without dangerous dependence either on Communist-controlled areas or large United States grants in aid? Should there be permanent restrictions on Japanese trade with Communist areas designed either a) to prevent the strengthening of the Soviet war potential or b) a dangerous dependence by Japan on Communist trade, a dependence which would expose Japan to successful Communist blackmail at a subsequent date?

3. What can be done to help develop and maintain representative government as against the tendency toward dictatorial forms and practices? Would it be useful to make available some sort of an Advisory Commission, perhaps headed by MacArthur, which would visit Japan from time to time, perhaps annually, on the invitation and initiative of their government, to help in realizing the new concepts embodied in their present constitution?

4. Will it not be necessary to do more to break down barriers now created by the West’s attitude toward the yellow race? Is there not need for affirmative measures to promote cultural exchanges and to permit immigration in the United States at least on an equality with the Chinese and Indians? Should any effort be made to get the Australians and New Zealanders to change their attitudes toward this problem?

5. The Japanese Constitution contains good provisions with respect to human rights and fundamental freedoms. However these, or corresponding Treaty provisions, will not alone suffice. Will there not be need to encourage religious and social activities, publications, movies, etc., which constantly and increasingly impress the Japanese people with the desirability of greater individualism as against their tendency to extreme conformity and convention in all aspects of life. Perhaps, having regard to the nature of Japanese problems, some of the Scandinavian efforts at cooperative action would be more helpful than our greater individualism. Extreme Japanese conformity has a close affinity with the conformity idea which is fundamental in Soviet Communism and only if this conformity idea is diluted in Japan will there be an effective barrier to the regrowth there of totalitarianism. What practically can be done along these lines?

6. Should there not be now developed some sense of governmental responsibility to resist indirect aggression in Japan? Will it not be necessary to have some force with which to do this, such as a police force, constabulary and coast guard? Should not this be begun at once while it can be done under the auspices of SCAP?

conclusion

Must not the question of a Japanese treaty be considered as merely one aspect of the total problem? A Japanese treaty, whatever its words, cannot in itself guarantee the results we want. It can perhaps contribute to these results if it is wise in content and in timing. But a treaty alone will be inadequate unless there are important parallel efforts along other fronts. It may be that the principal attraction to hold Japan in the Free World will be a capitalizing on their desire to be an equal member of the family of free nations, a concept obviously not consistent with the subservience to the Kremlin inherent in the Communist world.

Tab 2

1. The impact of the military occupation should be progressively diminished as now contemplated by NSC policy (13/3).

2. The Japanese government should be encouraged now to develop a police force, constabulary and coast guard adequate to detect and repress indirect aggression. This development should be done under the supervision of SCAP and with its cooperation. It would share in a screening of the enlisted personnel and their officers to be sure, so far as possible, that they will not be the nucleus of a militaristic and repressive organ of government.

Tab 3

A treaty to be presently negotiated would:

a) provide for a progressive reduction or ending of military occupation;

b) provide full opportunity for peaceful economic development, without reparation and with a minimum of, or no, special economic restrictions; (This does not exclude the possibility of bi-lateral arrangements restricting 1A and 1B goods, which may be made in connection with an economic aid program or security guarantee.)

c) avoid post-treaty control machinery in Japan to supervise execution of the treaty, except perhaps in regard to methods of mass destruction;

d) provide that Japan will apply for admission to the UN and that other parties will seek prompt favorable action on such application.

The following security arrangements would either be included in the general treaty or in a more restricted agreement between the parties participating in the preliminary conference (see Tab 4) which wished to join:

a) take note of, but not embody contractually, the military renunciations of the Japanese Constitution;

b) take note of the possibility of delay in Japan’s admission to the UN, and also that the Security Council is not yet in a position to exercise responsibility under Article 42 of the Charter, accordingly the parties agree that Japan will act in accordance with the principles of Article 2 of the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security and will have the corresponding benefits and protections of those principles;

c) provide that the undertakings of paragraph b) above will be operative for a period of _____ years, subject to renewal, but in any event will end with the admission of Japan to the United Nations and the assumption by the Security Council of the responsibilities of Article 42;

d) provide that the present Allied occupation forces in Japan shall begin a phased withdrawal from Japan to be completed within a period of _____ years, except that certain agreed points will be held by combined forces of the parties to assure the result contemplated by b) above, as well as to assure the consummation of the surrender terms as regards any parties to those terms who have not merged their rights as belligerents into the new arrangements.

(a) to d) above are subject to further clarification of the views of the Defense Department.)

Tab 4

The procedures in relation to treaty making could be:

a) a preliminary confidential communication to the non-Communist governments of the Far Eastern Commission of U.S. substantive ideas;

b) modification of U.S. substantive ideas to degree preliminary reactions to a make such modification seem meritorious; but this does not imply any pre-Conference formal or complete agreement on detailed texts;

c) calling of a Preliminary Peace Conference of Members of the FEC plus Indonesia, Ceylon, South Korea and Indo-China (one vote); the Japanese Government would have available a representative to be called upon when the conference so desired;

d) both the Nationalist and Communist Chinese Regimes to be invited, with one vote each when they disagree, and a single vote when they agree;

e) the Preliminary Conference to act by majority vote on procedural matters; two-thirds vote on treaty terms;

f) the Preliminary Conference to be held in Hawaii in late summer or fall of 1950 (Query re U.N. Assembly.);

g) calling of a Plenary Conference in Tokyo of all nations at war with Japan;

h) the U.S. Delegation to both conferences will be bipartisan and, if divided, to accept Presidential direction. At least two Senators to be on the Delegation and SCAP and Pentagon to have advisory status. MacArthur to have signatory status at the Plenary Conference.

Tab 5

Economics

Due to the decline in market for silk and the higher cost of cotton, and the fact that it comes from dollar areas, it seems that Japanese exports will have to be more in capital goods than consumer goods.

This will require greater industrial development and increased use of iron ore and coking coal, which must be imported. These would naturally come principally from China, although, by effort, 50% of Japan’s iron ore requirements might be filled by Malaya and the Philippines. Coking coal would have to come from the United States, as is now the case. There could be a greater use of Japan’s own poor quality coal, but this would require a long term adaptation of the Japanese iron and steel industry to new processes:

Trade with China would be mutually advantageous, but would probably to a large extent be in terms of 1B goods.³

Calculations are that, given normal trade between China and Japan, the U.S. aid required can be reduced from the present $270,000,000 to about $25,000,000 in 1955. Without such China trade the figure would probably have to be about $75,000,000 more. This assumes only a slight increase in the standard of living.

It is assumed that Japan will be allowed to build ships for carrying its own trade. Otherwise, the cost of sustaining Japan would be increased by between $75,000,000 to $100,000,000.

It is also assumed that there will not be level-of-industry restrictions or discriminatory trade provisions against Japan by the Pacific and Southeast Asian countries.

1. In a memorandum of his conversation held with the President May 22, Acting Secretary Webb stated: “I spoke to the President about the possibility of having Mr. Dulles visit both Japan and Korea, and he agreed that this was desirable.” (694.001/5–2250) For Mr. Acheson’s announcement of the trip, released to the press June 7, see Department of State Bulletin, June 19, 1950, p. 998. Mr. Dulles’ statement at the time of his departure for the Far East June 14 is ibid., June 26, p. 1061. Mr. Dulles and Mr. Allison were in Japan June 17 and June 21–27.
2. Previous drafts of this memorandum dated May 25 and June 5 are not printed (694.001/5–2550 and 694.001/6–550).
3. For information on this terminology, see pp. 619 ff.