794.001/5–2450
The Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) to the Acting United States Political Adviser for Japan (Sebald)
Dear Bill: In your letter of March 241 you raised the question whether SCAP should be encouraged to “crack down” on the Japanese Communist Party which you believed was getting out of hand. You recognized that such a move might not be an unmixed blessing, but you were prone to recommend it as opposed to the present policy described as one of drift.
I have hesitated to reply to your letter for many weeks now, primarily because of the difficulty of appraising from this distance the many factors that must necessarily come to bear on a decision of this complexity and importance. I also realize that any reply at this juncture may not prove consequential inasmuch as General MacArthur has already issued a statement2 on the occasion of the third anniversary [Page 1203] of the Constitution,3 which would indicate quite clearly that the decision has already been taken in Headquarters to encourage the Japanese Government to move against the Japanese Communist Party, presumably by outlawing that party.
I think it is fair to say that everyone in the Department who has been connected with Japanese affairs has been impressed by the way General MacArthur has handled the Communist problem, particularly over the past year. We believe that the manner in which the Japanese Communists were allowed to show up their true colors last summer through militant excesses, only to have SCAP move in firmly at the precise opportune moment, dealt a severe blow to the Communist cause in Japan not only by promoting popular resentment against the Communists but by bringing about the elimination of Communist leadership in Government unions. Likewise the repatriation issue brought home forcibly to the Japanese people the perfidy of the Soviet Union and the treachery and subservience of their JCP minions, I have particularly in mind the spectacle of the JCP summoning the homecoming POWs to rallies and parades rather than allowing them to join their awaiting families and friends. We have been led to believe that it has been this type of Japanese Communist Party activity and this type of handling of the Japanese Communist Party that has brought that Party to the nadir of its post-war fortunes. It may well be argued that this is a transitory phase and the JCP power is now on the ascendancy, but the history of the past year nevertheless demonstrates that the Communist Party, given a certain amount of rope, can be its own hangman.
Another development of the past year which has had a direct bearing on the fortunes of the Japanese Communist Party has been the issue underlying the Cominform criticism of Nosaka4 and subsequent development. Because of the international overtones of this controversy the Department has followed related developments with close interest and has come to the following conclusions:
- (1)
- The Cominform attack was originally directed toward forcing a basic change in the JCP line. The new philosophy and strategy advocated by the Cominform had as its concomitant the reduction of the JCP to a hard core of militants dedicated to the class struggle.
- (2)
- In the face of strong JCP desire to pursue existing theories and strategy, a compromise with Moscow was reached which allowed the Japanese Communists to confess that their theory was wrong, but which did not require them to alter fundamental practices.
- (3)
- Available evidence here indicates the likelihood that the Chinese Communist Party interceded with Moscow on behalf of the JCP leaders.
- (4)
- Bitter controversy over future strategy continues within the ranks of the Party’s top leaders.
If the general character of these assumptions is correct, it would seem to follow that the suppression (e.g. outlawing) of the JCP at this time would bring about many of the results which the Cominform was seeking when it leveled its open blast at Nosaka. Supression would direct JCP efforts toward class struggle tactics carried out by subversive means. It would create strong pressures toward consolidation of the Party and toward resolution of disagreements among its leaders. It would tend to bring the party into closer relationship with, and dependence on, the Kremlin, thus undermining exceptionalist tendencies already apparent.
Experience in Turkey, Spain and certain other countries has clearly demonstrated that if the banning of the Communist Party is to be successful it must be rigorously prosecuted by a well-equipped, well-organized police system, including a police intelligence system, which is prepared to function ruthlessly when the circumstances so require. To ban the Communist Party without having this enforcement machinery is to open a veritable Pandora Box of troubles. For the Communists, proliferating into all sorts of concealed, fronts, would then be difficult to identify and in a position to continue to spread their poison perhaps even more effectively. They would be under no compunction to observe press codes, libel laws, etc. They would be in a position to attack the U.S. and occupation officials by name and to spread leaflets and rumors exposing so-called scandals involving occupation officials.
The ability of the present police establishment to handle this type of situation is open to serious question; and yet to fail to redress the situation would bring discredit to civil authority and law. The temptation for the occupation forces to move against the Communists would be great indeed, but to succumb to that temptation would be precisely what the Communists desire. The Communists would then become martyrs of Japan who dared to oppose the occupation authority. Cast in this role, the Communists would indeed appeal to the patriotic susceptibilities of the Japanese people. I am sure you appreciate that this has been an important factor underlying our Government’s policy recommendation in NSC 13 for strengthening the Japanese police establishment—a recommendation which has not been carried out to the extent we envisaged for reasons best known to Headquarters.
Contingent with the foregoing possibilities is the danger that the Japanese Government will be under considerable temptation to label opposition elements as Communists or Communist fronts and to move against them accordingly.
Please do not regard the observations made in this letter as denoting a position opposing the outlawing of the Communist Party, for I [Page 1205] have made no attempt to weigh the pro’s with the con’s. I have gone to this length in answering your letter merely in the hope that certain lines of thought, which may be more discernible to the detached observer, are given due consideration in any Headquarters deliberations on this subject.
Sincerely yours,