[Attachment]
Subject: Discussion of Japanese Peace Treaty with
Mr. Ikeda, Finance Minister of Japan
Mr. Ikeda reported that there has been continued discussion of a
Japanese Peace Treaty in the Diet. In the Prime Minister’s State of
the Union Message to the Diet, it was described as being closer of
realization than has since been apparent. The Prime Minister’s
statement was somewhat over optimistic and the situation has since
become discouraging.
The political opposition have centered their attack on the point that
a one-party treaty is being discussed as against an over-all treaty
and that the publicity about treaty discussions indicates the
possible exclusion of the interests of certain other countries.
[Page 1195]
This point of attack originated with the Communists but reportedly
has been joined by the Socialists and Democrats who apparently have
grouped themselves into a council or front opposing a U.S. treaty
and opposing continued military bases for the United States.
Two resolutions on this are reported to have been submitted to the
Diet, one by the United Front and one by the Communist Party, which
differed in some respects but were voted down by the House about two
to one.
Actually, the United Front appeared to be aiming at a coalition that
would carry a non-confidence vote against the Government, but this
coalition ended in aiming their efforts at the Peace Treaty
situation.
The present government party prefers the earliest possible treaty
with all interested governments included, but, if this is not
possible, wants the other kind of a treaty as early as possible.
Essentially, they want the best they can get under the circumstances
and as quickly as possible.
The political question for the party now in power in Japan is whether
or not to carry the treaty question and their position on it as part
of the party platform in the approaching elections for the House of
Councillors, and what this position should be.
The opposition against continuing U.S. military bases in Japan is met
by the Prime Minister as a hypothetical question to be considered
when and if such a proposal is made.
The opposition moves are construed as an internal political effort
directed against the government in power, except, of course, for the
Communist attitude which is traditional and expected.
While it cannot be proved, the majority of the public are believed to
favor the earlier treaty on any reasonable terms.
The United Front opposition is being strengthened by contentions that
their democratic privileges are not actual in relatively minor
matters of policy affecting the day to day life of the Japanese and
in the actions of the Diet with respect to these. They have been
looking for more latitude in these matters which they claim in some
cases has been denied them. They object to interference in matters
below the level of basic policy, such as the implementation of the
Stabilization Program.3 The
opposition contends that the freedoms and decontrols resultant from
the Stabilization Program have been negatived by other and
continuing interference at lower levels. The opposition does not
believe that this is with the approval of SCAP, but that nevertheless it exists.
Mr. Ikeda conveyed a personal message from Prime Minister Yoshida to
Mr. Dodge to the effect that the Government desires the
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earliest possible
treaty. As such a treaty probably would require the maintenance of
U.S. forces to secure the treaty terms and for other purposes, if
the U.S. Government hesitates to make these conditions, the Japanese
Government will try to find a way to offer them.
A study of the constitutional angle has led to the conclusion that if
continuing U.S. bases was made a requirement of a treaty it would
make such a treaty easier to establish; also, that even volunteering
the continuance of these bases would not be a violation of the
Japanese Constitution. This provision could be in the treaty itself
or by separate agreement.
Mr. Ikeda said that they were always aware that the present economic
aid given Japan could be terminated by the unilateral action of the
United States Government, but that if and when private capital from
the United States could be introduced into Japan it would not only
act as a most desirable substitute to the present grants of aid but
indicate even to a greater extent the tie between the two countries.
The introduction of substantial amounts of private capital
investment from the United States would tend to make the Japanese
people less skeptical about their own future.
In reviewing the attitudes of the Japanese people, Mr. Ikeda stated
that they had not forgotten the statement of Secretary of the
Department of Army Royall4
in February 1949 to the effect that Japan was not necessary to the
United States. Emphasis had been given this by later public
statements of the United States Government in writing off Formosa.
It was further colored by the Communist gains in Indo-China, the
fact that South Korea is not strong and could, perhaps, easily be
abandoned, and that India’s position is not altogether clear.
The Japanese people are desperately looking for firm ground.
There is also the possibility that the Soviets may offer a peace
treaty in advance of the United States and might include in that
offer the return of Sakhalin and the Kuriles.
The people were aware of the situation in Berlin and the apparent
concessions and retreats by the United States Government in meeting
the Soviet advances in Europe.
They were skeptical on just what and when and where the United States
would stand firm, and particularly with respect to Japan.
Mr. Ikeda emphasized that if this should prove to be no time for a
Japanese peace treaty that it would be very discouraging for the
present Japanese Government and the Japanese people. He believed it
only could be offset by the Japanese being allowed more freedom
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in the conduct of their
own domestic economic and political affairs. In other words, to give
as much as possible of the effect of a treaty with the U.S. and
create a de facto treaty situation. He added
that what had been expected from the Yoshida Government and Cabinet
was substantially more freedom in conducting their own affairs than
had proved to be the case and that as a result there was
considerable disappointment and some declining popularity of the
present Government. However, this did not mean that other parties
were gaining in popularity. If the present Government should fall,
no other party could gain the security majority that for the first
time had been carried by the Yoshida Government.
Mr. Ikeda suggested that what was needed was some greater
demonstration of interest in Japan than dollar aid as it was well
known the United States was providing similar aid to other
countries.
Mr. Dodge pointed out, completely unofficially and informally, that
as the general international situation between the Soviet Union and
the United States Government deteriorated, and particularly as this
appeared to exist in the Far East, it was certain to raise serious
questions as to the advisability of an effort to establish a peace
treaty with Japan under these conditions and at this time. This in
no way denied the general desire and objective of a peace treaty at
the earliest possible and feasible moment. He suggested the
possibility which must be taken into account that, as the general
situation deteriorated, the military and strategic position of the
United States rose in importance as a consideration. This, if true,
would lead to a natural conclusion that the United States position
in Japan should probably be maintained at its strongest.
It was also pointed out that the matter of a Japanese peace treaty
had been and was under continuous discussion within the U.S.
Government; that so far as he knew the Government position had not
been completely clarified or determined as of the present. However,
there was to be a discussion of the Japanese peace treaty at the
Council of Foreign Ministers Meeting to be held shortly in London,
and at that time there was a possibility that the United States
position would be publicly exposed.
In any event, it did not appear either practical or possible to give
Mr. Ikeda any definite assurance at this time other than the
continuing interest of the U.S. Government in establishing a treaty
as soon as practicable.
Mr. Ikeda was informed that his views and the views of his Government
would be summarized, as they have been above, that this summary
would be subject to his review and approval, and would then
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be placed in the hands
of the proper officials of the Department of State and the
Department of the Army.5
