694.001/5–550
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State
Subject: Forthcoming Discussions in London with Respect to a Peace Treaty with Japan
There are attached herewith the following papers: a memorandum of Dean Rusk’s final conversation with General Burns and General Magruder concerning the nature and scope of your discussions in London on the Japanese peace treaty problem;1 Tab A to this memorandum of conversation is the final counter draft of the Department of Defense;2 Tab B1 is the draft of the Department of State which we had vainly hoped, by reason of certain compromises contained therein, would be acceptable to the Department of Defense, and this is annotated to indicate, for your convenient reference, the unresolved points of difference. The fundamental nature of these differences indicate that the U.S. Government still has made no firm decision about any important aspect of the Japanese peace treaty problem and will not do so until after Mr. Johnson’s return from Tokyo.
The question, therefore, arises as to how far you would wish to go in discussing the Japanese peace treaty problem in London and with whom.
We recommend that the tri-partite discussions be centered, insofar as possible, around the problems involved in a peace treaty rather than on the proposed solutions. For this purpose, there is also attached a copy of the memorandum which you handed the British Ambassador on December 24, 1949,3 for the purpose of informing Mr. Bevin, on the eve of his departure for the Colombo Conference of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers, about the general nature of the security difficulties with which the United States and like-minded powers in the Pacific are faced in the effort to conclude a peace treaty with Japan. [Page 1192] It is specifically recommended that you not mention in the tri-partite talks either of the two security arrangements referred to in Tab B and that these be the subject of conversation with Mr. Bevin alone. We believe that, in the first place, Mr. Schuman is primarily interested as regards the Far East in the situation in Indochina and, secondly, and more importantly, the Quai d’Orsay will in one way or the other, leak anything you say. Both from the point of view of leaks and because of U.S. Government indecision, it would be inadvisable in your discussions with Dominion Representatives to go any further that in your discussions with Mr. Schuman. Therefore, if these recommendations commend themselves to you, it will be necessary to enjoin upon Mr. Bevin the utmost secrecy with respect to these possible security arrangements.
In your discussions with Mr. Bevin, it should be stated that the United States Government has not yet arrived at a final determination concerning the security difficulties referred to in the informal memorandum of last December; that it is continuing intensively and urgently with the examination of the difficulties and possible means of coping with them; and that, for his confidential information, Secretary Johnson is planning a trip to Tokyo in June personally to obtain General MacArthur’s views, following which it is hoped that more definitive determinations can be made concerning the problems of a Japanese peace treaty.
You might indicate that notwithstanding the indefinite nature of any comments you might make concerning a peace treaty because of the above situation, it is your desire to inform Mr. Bevin in confidence as fully as possible concerning our thinking.
In your discussion of the nature of the peace treaty which this Government would wish to see concluded, we suggest that you use the Department of State draft referred to above (Tab B)4 as indicative of your thinking. However, on those points with respect to which a difference exists between the Departments of State and Defense, it seems advisable to be particularly careful in emphasizing the indeterminate nature of the thinking in Washington on these points, and it might be helpful to analyze for Mr. Bevin the difficulties which present themselves to our military authorities in reaching acceptable solutions of these complex security issues. On these and on other important issues in the Japanese peace treaty problem, it would be most helpful if you were able to obtain from Mr. Bevin the considered views of the British Government and its political and military analysis of the situation. Since the question of a Japanese peace treaty was discussed both at Colombo and, more recently, in the so-called Commonwealth [Page 1193] Working Group at London, he would also be in a position to supply you with the alignments of view among the Commonwealth countries.
It is suggested that you also describe briefly the two types of security arrangements referred to in Tab B, but with the emphasis upon the following points. Neither security arrangement represents in any way a firm view of this Government but together the two arrangements illustrate the nature of the problems we are thinking about and the types of solutions we are exploring. The collective security arrangement, Alternative I, is not in any sense a “Pacific Pact” analogous to the Atlantic Pact and this Government would not favorably regard a Pacific Pact of such a character. It should also be noted that the nature of the terms of a peace treaty would depend in large measure on the type of security arrangement which accompanied the treaty.
In the course of your discussion of the peace treaty and security arrangement you might wish to indicate the following basic difficulties with which the United States is concerned: security against the possible resurgence of aggression by Japan in concert with the USSR; security of Japan and of the Western Allies against possible Soviet-Communist aggression, whether direct or indirect; the importance of Japanese consent to any security arrangement; the importance of the attitudes of India and other non-Communist Asiatic countries toward a security arrangement having in mind their objectives of national independence for Japan and for themselves; the procedural and security difficulties involved in concluding a peace treaty without Soviet Russia and Communist China participation; the procedural difficulties involved in the extension of an invitation to China to attend the peace conference.
You might repeat the concern which you expressed to the British Ambassador in handing him the informal note of last December lest there be any publicity that would tend to cast the blame for failure to proceed at once with a peace conference upon the United States or its friendly Allies instead of upon the Soviet Union, which has borne this onus in the past.
Furthermore, this Government must continue in any public statements to favor an early conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan.
In the course of your discussions, questions might be raised, particularly by the Dominions, either directly with you or through Mr. Bevin, with respect to our view that the treaty should not authorize or prohibit the rearmament of Japan but merely take note of the relevant provisions of the Japanese Constitution, and that no post-treaty control machinery should be established. Our thinking is that whereas we do not wish to encourage the Japanese to change their constitutional prohibitions or in any way to stimulate them in the direction of creating an army, navy or air force, we believe it would be most undesirable to perpetuate such prohibitions in a treaty of [Page 1194] peace. All experience argues that once written into a peace treaty, they could not be overcome except by unilateral violation even though at some future time many of the governments concerned might find a change in their interest but would not be able publicly to support the change. It follows that if one is opposed to the inclusion of prohibitive provisions in the peace treaty, any control mechanism would lack terms of reference under which to operate. Three years ago our treaty draft envisaged as the mechanism of control the creation of a Council composed of the ambassadors accredited to the Japanese Government. Even at that time, the Department had grave doubts as to the efficacy or desirability of such a Council in which ambassadors assumed the incompatible role of police inspectors. Furthermore, the highly developed postwar system of export licensing would offer an adequate means of controlling Japan bereft of the raw materials of Manchuria, Korea and Formosa.