694.001/5–1150

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

top secret

Memorandum of Conversation Between the Secretary and Mr. Bevin, with only Sir William Strang, Mr. Dening, and Mr. Merchant Present.

Immediately following the conclusion of the US–UK bilateral conference at the Foreign Office on the afternoon of May 101 I met with the Foreign Secretary and the above-named participants in his office to give him such information as I could concerning the status of the Japanese Peace Treaty. When Mr. Bevin had raised this subject earlier I had stated that I preferred to discuss it in a restricted meeting.

Mr. Bevin opened the conversation by stating that he was placed in a position of extreme difficulty by lack of information regarding United States plans for a Treaty. He was anxious to know if I could tell him anything at this time. He went on to say that he was under pressure in the House and from the public generally, as well as by the Board of Trade and the Lancashire interests. All he has been able to say so far was that they were working closely with the United States, but I must recognize that he was placed in an extremely awkward position. Mr. Bevin said he was most anxious to keep their course of action with respect to Japan and the Treaty in conformity with ours. He had, of course, been continuing to say publicly that the Soviets were holding up the question of a Treaty with Japan as they were in the case of Austria, but that he was increasingly fearful that the Soviets might take the initiative and propose a conference to write a Peace Treaty. Mr. Bevin went on to say that he had been in really great difficulty in Colombo. The Asiatic Dominions were really annoyed at his inability to talk at all on the [Page 1199] subject, and he had been forced to invent on the spot a suggestion that a committee of the Commonwealth meet in London to exchange views among themselves and with the United Kingdom. India and Pakistan, he mentioned, were particularly pressing him for action on an early Treaty.

In reply to Mr. Bevin I stated that unfortunately I was not in a position to tell him anything more than I had in my Christmas Eve conversation with Sir Oliver Franks on the subject. I stated that the difficulty resided in the matter of the security arrangements which would accompany a Treaty. I said we were working urgently on the matter with our military authorities, who pointed out that in their view we were faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, if a Treaty were written in which the Soviets and Communist China participated, then no security provisions would be possible, and I pointed out that I regarded security as comprehending both aggression by and against Japan. The other horn of the dilemma, I said, was that if we negotiate a Treaty without Soviet or Communist China’s participation, that very act may stimulate Soviet action.

I then informed Mr. Bevin, emphasizing that this particular point as well as everything I said was given to him in strictest confidence, that Secretary Johnson and General Bradley were planning to leave for Japan the end of this month to exchange views on the subject with General MacArthur. They planned to return about the 12th of June, and further discussions with the military authorities will ensue.2

I then promised Mr. Bevin that I would inform him as soon as I was in a position to give him any further development of our views. I reiterated the necessity for guarding with the utmost care the fact that the United States Government had not yet formulated its views on the matter of the Peace Treaty, since I also recognized the extreme difficulty in which we would be placed were the Russians to sense this fact and seize the initiative by calling for a Peace Conference. I also told him that in all public statements I would naturally continue to state that I regarded the question of the Treaty as a matter of urgency.

Mr. Bevin was obviously disappointed that there had been no progress in the development of our position since last September, but assured me that they would naturally make no difficulty for us.

I then asked Mr. Bevin if he could tell me anything of the results so far of the discussions between the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth representatives on this subject. Mr. Bevin replied that he didn’t think much had come out of it so far, but Mr. Dening spoke up to say that there had been a most interesting discussion that very [Page 1200] morning. He said that their talk had revolved on the security issue and that they had concentrated on two alternative solutions. The first one would involve a genuine effort to bring Peking and Moscow into the conference with the recognition that progress would be impossible and the conference would break up. They thought the Western powers should then write the Treaty without Russia or China, with a concurrent agreement under which the signatory powers would agree to defend Japan against attack and probably (although India, Pakistan, and Ceylon did not like the thought) a base agreement between the United States and Japan. The alternative which this committee considered was a limited Peace Treaty which would retain the legal basis for the occupation and control powers of SCAP, but with these powers reserved and not exercised except in case of emergency. There was a general dislike, Dening said, for this second approach to the problem. In the first place, they felt that the Japanese would dislike it and be restive under such an arrangement. Secondly, they felt that it would provide the Russians with excellent material for propaganda. Finally, they felt that all of them would be in an ambiguous position vis-à-vis the Japanese Government and SCAP.

I thanked Mr. Bevin for this information, but did not otherwise comment on it.

Mr. Bevin then asked me how I saw the position of the Communists in Japan.

I replied that it was my impression that Moscow was purging the Party down to the hard core, and that the test had been the call for the trial of the Emperor.3 I said I did not believe that in popular support Communism was at the present time making any great headway and noted that the majority of the returned prisoners of war have not in fact been effectively indoctrinated.

As I left, Mr. Bevin reverted to the risk of the Soviets calling for an immediate Peace Conference, or possibly merely inviting the FEC countries to Moscow to discuss in preliminary fashion the question of a Peace Treaty.

I agreed that the risk existed and that in fact it would be a smart trick for the Russians who, by reason of their geography needing no bases in Japan, could place themselves in a position of bidding against us with the Japanese.

  1. For a summary of the second part of the fourth session of the bilateral ministerial conversations, see Secto 217 from London, May 10, scheduled for publication in volume iii.
  2. Secretary Johnson and General Bradley were in Japan from June 17 to June 23.
  3. On February 1, 1950, Alexander S. Panyushkin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States, handed the Secretary a note, not printed, proposing the trial as war criminals of the Emperor of Japan and several former Japanese generals. The Department’s press release of February 3 commenting on the proposal is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, February 13, 1950, p. 244.