Basis for Discussion by the Secretary of State With the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom and Possibly France * Concerning a Peace Treaty With Japan
Current basic policy on timing and procedure with respect to a peace treaty with Japan is contained in paragraph 1 of NSC 13/3:
“1. Timing and Procedure. In view of the differences which have developed among the interested countries regarding the procedure and substance of a Japanese peace treaty and in view of the serious international situation created by the Soviet Union’s policy of aggressive Communist expansion, this Government should not press for a treaty of peace at this time. It should remain prepared to proceed with the negotiations, under some generally acceptable voting procedure, if the Allied Powers can agree among themselves on such a procedure. We should, before actually entering into a peace conference, seek through the diplomatic channel the concurrence of a majority of the participating countries in the principal points of content we desire to have in such a treaty. Meanwhile, we should concentrate our attention on the preparation of the Japanese for the eventual removal of the regime of control.”†
Pending a reassessment of U.S. policy toward Japan upon the return of the Secretary of Defense from his visit to Tokyo in June, the United States should not assent to the calling of a peace conference.
An early‡ peace treaty with Japan is politically desirable but must not, because of its terms or because of the circumstances under which it is concluded, endanger the security of the United States, its friendly Allies, or Japan.
A peace treaty, if one is to be concluded, should restore Japan to a sovereign status with a minimum of restrictions and special disabilities in such matters as trade, industry, and civil government. It should be of such a character as to appeal to the Japanese and thus continue the process of drawing Japan into friendly relations with the non-Communist nations.
The treaty should not authorize, nor should it prohibit, the rearmament of Japan. It should, however, permit the maintenance of adequately equipped and manned police force and coast guard to maintain internal security in Japan.
[Page 1190]No§ post-treaty control machinery should be established to supervise the execution of the treaty.
The United States and its friendly Allies must continue to be secured against the possible resurgence of Japanese aggression and Japan must continue to be secured against possible Soviet-Communist aggression.
The United States and its friendly Allies might, provided that there is a sufficient measure of agreement among them, have to proceed without the USSR and Communist China.║
There are two types of security arrangements which are receiving primary consideration at the moment within the United States Government. This Government, however, has not determined that either would provide an acceptable settlement. Any final determination would depend in part on the willingness of the Japanese to grant bases.
Alternative Security Arrangement I—Concurrently with the conclusion of a treaty of peace, a collective security arrangement consistent with the United Nations Charter would be concluded with Japan. The membership might include, initially, in addition to Japan, those participating FEC powers which would be interested in joining. The parties other than Japan would undertake to come to the assistance of any party which was the victim of an act of aggression committed by Japan. All the parties would undertake to assist in defending Japan in the event that an act of aggression were committed against Japan from any source. In connection with this latter undertaking, Japan would make available to the United States such bases in Japan as might be required for the purpose of securing Japan’s defense against aggression.
Alternative Security Arrangement II—An agreement would be entered into with Japan which would restore to Japan full sovereignty in matters relating to its internal government and to the conduct of its political and economic affairs with other nations. On the ground that they security objectives of the Potsdam Proclamation have not yet been achieved, the treaty would leave unchanged the existing legal authority furnished by Allied wartime agreements and the Instrument of Surrender for the occupation regime of control (including SCAP, [Page 1191] the FEC and occupation forces in Japan), although this authority would be closely restricted to matters of security and would not be exercised in the subject matters covered by the treaty except in case of a grave emergency.¶
- Defense representatives believe discussion of this subject with the French should be limited to a minimum and the Department of State staff concurs. [Footnote in source text.]↩
- Defense representatives believe this paragraph has been overtaken by events, but State Department view is that it continues to be the policy approved by the Praesident and has not been changed by him. [Footnote in source text.]↩
- Defense representatives would like to delete the word “early”. [Footnote in Source text.]↩
- Defense representatives suggest this read “a minimum of post-treaty control machinery” etc. [Footnote in source text.]↩
- Defense representatives propose in lieu of this paragraph: “The United States and its friendly Allies should not proceed with a peace treaty without the USSR and Communist China, but this question should again be considered later this year.” The President reviewed the history of the war against Japan and stated that the United States position in Japan was a partnership affair with Britain and China only, and that the United States, Britain and China could negotiate a peace treaty with Japan whether the Soviet Union participated or not. You will recall the President made this statement at an NSC meeting on Dec. 29, 1949. [Footnote in source text; see Mr. Rusk’s memorandum of January 24, page 1131.]↩
- Defense representatives do not wish to restrict the exercise of this authority to matters of security but wish to leave the way open to exercise it in all matters covered by the treaty which assume a character of the utmost importance and urgency. [Footnote in source text.]↩