Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

330/9–850: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

secret   priority

Washington, September 8, 1950—7 p. m.

227. Fol are Dept further views on issues raised in urtels 399 Aug 30 and 466 Sept 6¹ and not covered in Deptel 224 Sept 7.

1. Re composition of the SC Commission to investigate Commie charges we are willing to follow majority preference and wld accept 11 SC members comm or eight-man comm suggested by Tsiang. We believe comm composed of six non-permanent SC members might be too weak. Consideration might be given to five-man comm composed of members outside of SC, e.g., Pakistan, Philippines, Brazil, Australia, and Belgium. While we appreciate Chi Govt’s concern about Sov membership on comm we wonder whether presence of one or two identified Russians wld create serious problems. (Urtel 398)²

2. With ref to Tsiang’s reported intention to veto comm. While we do not have any definite view on this matter at this time we believe real constitutional question arises as to whether US and Chi not required abstain from voting on the establishment of the Commission under the proviso of Art 27 Para 3. In the past we have consistently supported the principle underlying this proviso that party shld not be a judge in its own case. Decision to investigate in this case will be under Chapter VI and might be taken to involve US and Chi Natl Govt as parties. The fact that Commie charges against U.S, seem to allege situation under Chap VII is irrelevant for purposes of this decision. Obligatory abstention under proviso of Art 27(3) might make it politically easier for Tsiang to accept an 11 member comm, since he cld point out to his Govt that he had no choice and under the Charter had to abstain. These considerations emphasize importance of early indication whether seven members in addition to US will support comm and what Tsiang’s final position will be.

3. The basis of our position on Formosa item as given in Deptels 192³ and 224 is necessity for obtaining facts. If Tsiang shld find it necessary to oppose proposal for commission designed to obtain facts he might wash to weigh possible repercussions of his position particularly if he is joined by USSR in vetoing res appointing comm.

4. In the event of a veto of proposal for SC comm, since Sov condemnatory draft res (urtel 441)⁴ presumably will not receive seven votes and assuming that other proposals are not made in SC the proceeding in SC on this item wld come to an end.

5. Re possibility of Tsiang’s taking the view that proposal for inviting Chi Commies to SC is subject to a veto. We believe strongly such proposal is not vetoable under the Charter, San Francisco Statement (Part I Para 2)⁵ and ample precedents in SC practice. Since we ourselves will oppose such proposal we hope it will not receive required seven votes and thus double veto problem will be avoided at least at this stage.

6. You state in Para 4 of your ref tel 399 that it wld be most helpful in your consultations with other dels to have guidance on “basic US. objectives regarding UN handling of Formosa”.

As you know this question will be considered by the three FonMins next week and we do not believe it feasible to express specific views to other dels prior to FonMins mtg. You might, however, indicate in your discretion that we view the aspect of the Formosa problem now before the SC distinct from the question of ultimate status of Formosa. The Chi Commies charges before SC raise issues of neutralization of Formosa. We are studying the long-term aspects and are tentatively inclined to believe that they may best be handled through the GA. For your info only we are sending you by pouch a paper on Formosa resulting from preparatory Ambassadorial level discussions with Brit and French which reflects areas of agreement and sets forth questions raised for decision by FonMins at impending mtg.⁶

Acheson

1. Not printed. It reported that the Chinese Representative at the United Nations (Tsiang) had informed Mr. Gross that the Chinese Government for basic political reasons could not accept the establishment of an 11-member commission to investigate the Formosa question and had instructed him to oppose it (611.94A/9–650).
2. Dated August 30; not printed. It reported that Tsiang would vote against a fact-finding commission on Formosa which included a Soviet Representative, but was authorized to abstain on any vote establishing a commission composed of six nonpermanent Security Council members (794A.00/8–3050).
3. Not printed.
4. See footnote 2 to telegram 224, September 7, to New York, p. 490.
5. Text in Department of State Bulletin, June 10, 1945, p. 1047.
6. See the memorandum dated September 1, p. 477.