793B.00/9–1050: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

top secret

609. 1. Shakabpa, Tsechag Khenchung, and J. Taringqop Niloqti of Tibetan delegation called on us September 9 for discussion latest [Page 494] developments re military aid and their negotiations with Chinese Communists.

2. Shakabpa stated that Tibetan Government has taken firm decision to meet any Communist Chinese incursion with force. He said that his government wished him to express its deep appreciation of US offer of military assistance. As had been suggested, the Tibetan Government would approach the GOI to solicit its cooperation. A separate mission comprising Surkhang Depon and Khemchung Lobsang Tsewang had been dispatched from Lhasa and would arrive in New Delhi in a few days. To allay suspicion this mission had been designated as trade mission, but its real purpose was to bring full instructions from Lhasa Government and to conduct conversations re additional military aid with GOI. Detailed information re types and quantities of additional military equipment desired would presumably be supplied by new mission. As yet this question had not been raised with GOI by Shakabpa.

3. Re forthcoming negotiations Shakabpa stated delegation had called briefly on Chinese Chargé who had insisted that any conversations concerning future status of Tibet should take place in Peiping. He said no discussion of substantive nature had been had with Charge and he anticipated that Chinese Ambassador who was expected to arrive few days would also take position that delegation should proceed to Peiping. He stated that Communist Chargé had informed him that although British had refused visas for Hong Kong, he (Chargé) believed that if new application were made visas would now be issued. He did not indicate basis for this belief. Delegation had also called on MinExtAff and on UK DepHiCom. MEA offered no encouragement and advised Tibetans that decision re place of negotiations should be made by parties and that GOI was loath to intervene. Shakabpa said that his call on DepHiCom was purely formal and that substantive matters were not discussed.

4. Shakabpa confirmed that Tibetan Government had received information concerning concentration of Chinese Communist troops at various points along eastern border among which he mentioned Jyekundo, Nagchen, Degegonchen, and Batang. He stated no estimate concerning size of these forces available. He understands that General Liu Po-Chen is commanding part of forces from the district along eastern bank Yangtze River. Delegation has also heard reports of Chinese Communist military preparations in Sinkiang presumably directed against northwestern Tibet, but no official word has been received from Lhasa on subject. Mixed Chinese-Tibetan forces collected along eastern frontier would, in Shakabpa’s opinion, be able to operate without further acclimatization, and weather conditions during next five months would not prevent military operations.

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5. Shakabpa indicated disappointment at attitude of GOI which had reiterated view that it considered Tibet under Chinese suzerainty but with local autonomy. He said that under terms of British Tibet agreement signed immediately after failure of Chinese to ratify the Simla Convention of 1914, British Government had agreed to withdraw its recognition of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. Other provisions of this agreement, he intimated, obligated GOI—at least morally—(as successor of British) to participate in any negotiations on this question but he had no anticipation that they would do so. (British have of course repeatedly recognized Chinese suzerainty and Embassy finds nothing in secret detailed historical reviews of Tibetan-Chinese-British negotiations, which UKHC has given us copy, to warrant such interpretation.)

6. Shakabpa requested our opinion as to present attitude of GOI. He was informed that we believed GOI anxious that differences between Tibet and China be settled by peaceful means and that GOI has been urging Peiping Government to negotiate. We did not know how far GOI might be willing to go in giving further concrete aid to Tibet should military need or conflict develop. We suggested position of GOI would probably be clarified in forthcoming discussions re military aid.

7. In response to our questions concerning demands which Peiping Government has made upon Tibet, Shakabpa said no formal demands had been received; that information concerning intention of Communist China Government to “liberate” Tibet had been received chiefly from radio broadcasts and through private channels. He said these announcements included promises of non-interference with local administration and religion, but he was extremely vague and doubtful as to scope of local autonomy which he believed Peiping Government really intends. As regards the aims of the Tibetan Government in the forthcoming negotiations, he was at first reluctant to make positive statement, but finally stated that what Tibet wanted was independence. It seemed obvious that (a) Tibetans fear consequences outright claim or demand for independence, i.e., that it would provoke Chinese Communists and perhaps alienate GOI, but (b) they want to convey impression of their firm intention to achieve this goal, if necessary by fighting all perhaps in ultimate hope of preserving status quo.

Subsequently Embassy heard (from Roberts UKHC) that Tibetan delegation talked to Bajpai September 8 in terms of preserving autonomy but later same day saw Nehru and voiced desire for independence. Roberts indicated GOI would be happy see Tibet autonomy preserved but expressed uncertainty about extent GOI assistance to that end.

Henderson