Office of the Historian

396.1–NE/9–1150

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense 1

top secret
Washington, 8 September 1950.

Subject: Formosa.

1.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur generally with the recommendations set forth in the Department of State position paper dated 28 August 1950 (SFMD–7/2c) entitled “Formosa”.2
2.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, recommend that the following be incorporated in the position of the United States toward matters relating to the problem of Formosa:
a.
Any attack by Communist China upon any of its southern neighbors or upon the Republic of Korea would require the United States to reassess its objectives in Formosa and to reconsider its present prohibitions upon military activities of the Chinese Nationalists;
b.
Any political action taken in the United Nations with respect to Formosa should neither directly nor indirectly set up a requirement for the employment of United States military forces without preserving the right of United States decision in the light of the situation existing at the time;
c.
If the United Nations should call on the Chinese Communist Government and the Chinese Nationalist Government to desist from hostilities pending study of the problem of the disposition of Formosa and should request the United States to enforce the truce, the theater of the Unified Command under the Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE) should be extended to include the Formosan area. The Unified Command must not be restricted as to its actions in enforcing this truce; and
d.
The United States should not agree to any United Nations solution for Formosa which might enhance the military position of the USSR in the Far East. United States agreement to the appointment of a United Nations commission on Formosa might well be the initial step in such enhancement, since the commission must consider as one of its possible solutions the annexation of Formosa by the Chinese Communist Government. The strategic consequences of a communist-dominated Formosa would be so seriously detrimental to United States security that, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States should not permit the disposition of Formosa to be recommended in the first instance or decided by any commission or agency of the United Nations in which the United States has no voice.
3.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that all proposals set forth in SFM D–7/2c are tentative and do not constitute fixed or final positions. They would request that they be given further opportunity to comment, from the military point of view and in light of the then existing situation, on developments, as they may occur, in the finalization of the general and detailed United States position toward Formosa.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Omar N. Bradley

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
  1. This memorandum was conveyed to the Secretary of State on September 11 under cover of a note from the Secretary of Defense (not printed) wherein Mr. Johnson expressed his general concurrence in the comments set forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.↩
  2. Not printed. SFM D–7/2c was prepared for use in the preliminary talks for the Tripartite Foreign Ministers meeting. Its principal recommendation called for the establishment of a United Nations commission to investigate, the entire question of Formosa and report to the following General Assembly.↩