123 Clubb, Oliver Edmund
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Secretary of State
secret
[Washington,] April 17, 1950.
Subject: Message from Consul General Clubb at
Peiping
Reference is made to my memorandum of April 14, 1950 attaching a message
from Consul General Clubb at Peiping regarding his efforts to approach
the Chinese Communist authorities there.
Attached is a further telegram on this subject, sent by Mr. Clubb through
British facilities, handed to the Department by an officer of the
British Embassy today. It is believed that you will also wish to read
this telegram in full.1
[Page 329]
[Annex]
From U.S. Consul General, Peking
Begins.
April 11th, 4 p. m.
Secret
With reference to this Office’s telegram of April 9th, 12 Noon, I was
yesterday called to the Alien Affairs Office and with reference to
my request for an interview at the Foreign Office was asked topic of
proposed discussion. I informed them in brief, offered to supply a
more definite agenda if desired and the bureau asked that one be
sent that afternoon. Before this could be done I was told to call at
the Foreign Office. There I was again asked my business which I
introduced along lines suggested in Department’s March 23rd 7 p.
m.2 whereupon Foreign
Office official one Lin believed to be head of Australian American
Affairs Section asked me to define particular problems in point, I
gave a sketch of political field again along general line indicated
and asked whether Lin desired to undertake discussion or that I
define economic and social questions as well. I was told to
continue, again touched upon highlights giving a few examples of
outstanding questions at issue where clarification would seem
beneficial. At the end Lin said time was short, characterised what I
said as “worthless talk” said Smith Bender which I had used as an
example represented no failure on China’s part in respect to
international obligations (which I had not charged) but a failure of
the United States to respect China’s sovereignty, brought up Ward’s
case (which I had left unmentioned) and asked me to explain without
waiting for an answer and then said that for so long as United
States continued to support Chiang Kai Shek talk of working an
improvement in general situation was ridiculous.
The Foreign Office of course knew from the British side the general
direction of my aim but could hardly be sure that there was not some
concrete proposal in the offing when they got agenda in general
terms through Alien Affairs Office they presumably had enough on
which to base at least one of their several alternative replies. My
definition of terms was called for in the beginning and matter thus
made clear. The Chinese Communist policy as explained previously by
Wang Shun-Chih and seemingly confirmed by the present instance is
patently that if general problem of “support to Chiang Kai Shek” is
cleared up by recognition of Peking regime there might be approach
to solution of particular problems otherwise not. My own approach
was based upon concept that solution of particular problems might be
antecedent to an amelioration of the general situation. In the
circumstances there was no point of meeting. I did not at either
(Grp.Undec.) indicate that my approach had approval of the
Department.3 Clubb.
Ends.
