Attached is a copy of a telegram (Tab A) sent by Consul General Clubb in
Peiping through British facilities handed to the Department today by an
officer of the British Embassy.
This telegram discusses the efforts of Mr. Clubb to get in touch with
Chinese Communist officials at Peiping prior to his departure as had
been authorized by the Department in its telegram no. 253 of March 22,
1950 (Tab B).2 It is believed that you will wish to read the
telegram in full.3
[Annex]
Please pass the following to the State Department from the U.S.A.
Consul General, Peking.
Begins:
April 9th 12 noon.4
Secret
In the discussion of 1st April regarding the possibility my
contacting high Communist leaders for an informal discussion of
outstanding Sino-American problems Chang Tung-Sun5 doubted strongly that the
Communists would see me, thought that such contacts would be
fruitless in any event and said that he himself nowadays never
sought out Communists and was without contacts with them except when
they looked him up. Exploratory contacts earlier with Wang Shun-Chih
[undeciphered groups] uneasiness on the part of democratic
personalities with whom he purports to be in contact as regards any
discussion on their own part of the problems of international
relations.
Initial approaches seeming infeasible and in any event probably
ineffectual I requested the British Embassy to take up the matter
incidentally with the Foreign Office in the course of some visit,
emphasizing the informal character of that approach noting that the
proposal was that such a meeting be arranged if the Communists were
willing for the simple purpose of discussing certain aspects of
Sino-American relations with the idea of obtaining some
clarification of the subject and this was done on 6th April. The
Foreign Office contact said that the matter would be referred higher
up for consideration. It is of course doubtful whether the
Communists side will consent to
[Page 328]
any such interview. I believe however that any
refusal on their part would now be more from fear of committing
themselves on questions of high policy than from basic hostility.
Both the above informants admitted the gravity of China’s present
economic situation find Wang stressed the following factors
dominating political scene:
The Chinese concern with face, the slow tempo of administration in a
system where personnel are both ignorant and afraid to take
responsibility, the desire to get rid of foreign influence and even
foreigners despite the conflict of this desire with China’s economic
aspiration. Wang thinks China will shift to a more amenable position
but that no right angle turn is probable and the shift would take at
least 6 months to one year. Chang opined that Mao and his party as
members of the Communist Church fear excommunication and are unable
to take a neutral position respecting Soviet Union, that relaxation
of Sino-American relations can come only from either amelioration of
American-Soviet relations or American victory in war, for economic
competence will not be permitted to overweigh the political for
Communists. Mao, he said, could not be expected to make any
pronounced shift in less than two years. (Mao and company quite
possibly are guided in their tactics by expectation of a new world
war).
If the above estimates are even nearly accurate, the Chinese
Communist regime cannot be expected to adopt a substantially more
conciliatory attitude for some time to come. That the harshness of
both facts of country’s economic position and experience of
political intimacy with Soviet Union will particularly affect the
overall situation in China no doubt seems logically to be
anticipated. Clubb.
Foreign Office please pass Washington as my telegram No.6
