357.AB/11–1750
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
Subject: Kashmir Problem; Afghan-Pakistan Dispute; Nepal; Tibet; Korea.
| Participants: | Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan |
| The Secretary | |
| Mr. M. A. H. Ispahani, Ambassador of Pakistan | |
| Mr. Mohammed Ali, Secretary-General, Government of Pakistan | |
| NEA–George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary | |
| SOA—T.Eliot Weil |
Sir Zafrulla called at his request at 2:30 p. m. and remained for 90 minutes.
[Page 1436]Kashmir
Sir Zafrulla opened the conversation by remarking that the last time we had talked the appointment of Sir Owen Dixon as UN representative in the Kashmir case was under consideration. He said Sir Owen’s personal qualities had proved to be all that I had predicted, but that despite Sir Owen’s efforts the Kashmir case was again before the Security Council. Sir Zafrulla said he hoped we would back all efforts to reach a just settlement. He said the SC appeared reluctant to proceed; that Pakistan had refrained from pushing the case; that there must be something concrete to go before the SC.; and that aside from USSR and Yugoslavia, members of the SC were waiting for a move from the US and the UK.
Sir Zafrulla said an unfortunate development had been publication of the Reuters summary of the Dixon report in a form so garbled that undue emphasis was laid on Sir Owen’s observations that the incursion of tribesmen into Kashmir had been contrary to international law, or “aggression.” Sir Zafrulla said India was unwilling to agree to demilitarization of Kashmir and that so far as partition-plus-plebiscite in the Vale was concerned, Pakistan was reluctant to agree to such a procedure. Sir Zafrulla said he had learned that the UN Commission had at one time considered putting into its resolution, a provision that the Plebiscite Administrator would have broad powers if a plebiscite proved impracticable, Pakistan had pointed out to Sir Owen that a plebiscite had not proved impracticable but had been prevented by the unwillingness of India to agree to this procedure. Sir Zafrulla went on to say that Sir Owen had said to him: “You know my views on a free and impartial plebiscite and I will insist on their being observed in a partial plebiscite.” Sir Zafrulla said he told Sir Owen that if he was anxious to have a conference on the subject of a partial plebiscite and if he thought anything would come of it he would not object to Sir Owen’s approaching Nehru. Sir Owen sent the telegram to Delhi and the answer was “No.”
The situation in Pakistan, said Sir Zafrulla, was tense. People in the tribal areas were anxious to see the Kashmir problem solved, and the only thing to fall back on was the resolutions. Referring to Mr. McGhee’s remark of the previous day that the resolutions had been merely paper agreements which had not been carried out, Sir Zafrulla said any agreement had to be a paper agreement to begin with, and in a broad sense the two resolutions did provide a basis for further action. He pointed out that both India and Pakistan had agreed to the terms of these resolutions. He said it was not Pakistan’s views which had blocked settlement. He said he believed the SC should appoint a representative to examine the facts in the light of the two resolutions; [Page 1437] the representative should report his findings to the SC; and the SC should call upon the parties to carry out such recommendations as were accepted by the SC. Sir Zafrulla said the difficulty was that India insisted on conditions for a plebiscite which would give the vote to India. Sir Zafrulla said Sir Owen had realized that the Kashmiri were a timid people and pointed out that unless Indian troops were withdrawn and a UN administrator placed in charge of the area, a free and impartial plebiscite would not be possible. Sir Zafrulla then said he had come to me for advice and guidance.
I remarked that I thought I needed advice and guidance. I said we had been very discouraged over India’s attitude and had been trying through our Ambassador to make India see what should be done—with what success I did not know. I told Sir Zafrulla I gathered he had in mind a sort of master in chancery to investigate and to present specific proposals to the SC. The question would then arise as to what step to take if India disagreed with the recommendations of the SC. I said that nevertheless I could see great force in Sir Zafrulla’s suggestion, and I asked Mr. McGhee what he thought. Mr. McGhee said he thought. Sir Zafrulla’s proposal sounded logical. I remarked that logic was an outstanding characteristic of Sir Zafrulla.
Mr. McGhee observed that the basic question was whether the proposal would be productive. He said past efforts had failed because of the Indian attitude and that a new move could lead to an impasse between India and the SC which of course would not help. In this connection, Mr. McGhee remarked that the Kashmir case was not parallel to the Korean case.
I said I gathered that Sir Zafrulla regarded the proposed procedure as a moving toward a goal and as putting pressure on India. Sir Zafrulla agreed. Mr. McGhee asked Sir Zafrulla whether he really thought the proposal would work. Sir Zafrulla asked Mr. McGhee what he expected to happen if India were not informed of what it was expected to do. He said it was a case of reminding India of what it had agreed to and that India would interpret the agreements as it pleased until the SC called on it to implement the agreements. He said the SC could place the case clearly before the world.
Mr. McGhee asked whether the Pakistan proposal really amounted to arbitration. Sir Zafrulla said it was really the same process but he had avoided use of the expression because the Indians had been opposed to arbitration. Mr. McGhee agreed there was probably no alternative. He said that in his talk with Sir Zafrulla the day before1 it [Page 1438] had been agreed that the obstacle to Sir Owen’s efforts at settlement was India’s objections to a plebiscite in the Vale. Sir Zafrulla Remarked that when Sir Owen proposed to the Pakistanis that they agree to consider partition-plus-plebiscite with no Indian troops in the Vale and a UN administrator, he was certain that Nehru would consider such a plan but he subsequently found this was not satisfactory to Nehru. Mr. McGhee suggested that further details of such a plan might have been explored. Sir Zafrulla said India would simply have procrastinated. Mr. Mohammed Ali pointed out that there was “no half-way house” between an arrangement providing a UN administrator and the present arrangements in the Vale. He said Nehru had flatly declared he would not agree to Sheikh Abdulla’s stepping down. Sir Zafrulla said another point to consider was that in any case Pakistan would start under a handicap because of the number of Muslims who would be excluded from voting for accession to Pakistan.
Mr. McGhee suggested it was too narrow a view to think that Sir Owen’s plan was the only course to follow. He said we wanted to focus our attention on India’s position. Mohammed Ali said Sir Owen’s plan—removal of Indian troops from the Vale and appointment of a UN administrator—was the absolute minimum which Pakistan would accept; that anything short of this would make a fair plebiscite impossible. I remarked: “I think Sir Zafrulla has something.”
Mr. McGhee assured Sir Zafrulla that our efforts were impartial.
Sir Zafrulla said the Indian attitude must be assessed. He pointed out that in February 1950 the Indians took the measure of the SC and that their attitude toward the McNaughton proposals had probably been no stiffer than it had toward details which had been discussed since then. He said that if a new approach meant whittling down Pakistan’s position, Pakistan could not accept it. He said he was not sure that Pakistan had not already risked too much. He said it had not been a question of whether the quantity X could be achieved by continuing negotiations but rather a case of agreeing to X minus Y or X minus Z each time negotiations were renewed.
Mr. McGhee said we had no particular line which we were pushing. Sir Zafrulla said “then what shall I say in the SC?” Mr. McGhee said: “We are not prepared to take the lead.” Sir Zafrulla said, however, that three efforts had been made. Mr. McGhee said we had no complaints against Pakistan’s efforts. Sir Zafrulla said he had told Ambassador Austin that he had never tried to buttonhole him, but he had recently asked Ambassador Austin to tell him where he had been wrong and Ambassador Austin had said there was nothing he could think of.
[Page 1439]I asked Sir Zafrulla whether Sir Owen would be a good master in chancery. Sir Zafrulla said he did not believe Sir Owen would accept the appointment. I said he had better go to work on the problem and that this might at least lead to some interpretations. Mr. McGhee remarked that there might be a chance of getting the Indians to adopt the Pakistan proposal as their own. Sir Zafrulla said it needn’t be regarded as a Pakistan proposal.
[Here follows discussion of the Afghan-Pakistan dispute (pages 1446 ff.) and discussion of developments in Nepal, Tibet, and Korea.]
- The memorandum of conversation dated November 16, covering a meeting of that date between Zafrulla Khan, Ispahani, Mohammed Ali, Mohamad Ayub of the Pakistani Ministry of Kashmir Affairs, McGhee, and Weil, not printed, is in Department of State file 357.AB/11–1650.↩