690D.91/9–2950: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
799. 1. While in Kashmir I had two secret discussions with Sheikh Abdullah, Prime Minister, at his request during course of which he discussed with apparent frankness some of his problems and views re future of Kashmir.
2. He denied with considerable emphasis stories to effect he was pro-Communist, pro-Soviet, anti-West, or anti-US. He admitted there were two Communists in his Cabinet. He said during elections which have just been held they had both been defeated and he had been [Page 1434] compelled to arrange other constituencies for them. He could not afford to have split with Communists and fellow-travelers at present juncture since they would turn on National Confederation in same way that Chinese Communists turned against Kuomintang. He had to get along with them as best he could so long as future Kashmir was undetermined. He was also compelled to take certain measures such as breaking up of large estates without compensations to landowners, nationalization of certain enterprises, etc. in order that National Confederation rather than Communists should get credit with people therefor. So long as there was possibility that there would be at some time popular vote as to future Kashmir, National Confederation must do as much for peasants and workers as Communists could reasonably promise to do. He was not unaware of dangers of communism but he was convinced his present course was best method meeting this danger.
3. Communists and fellow-travelers were carrying on extremely active campaign against US both within and outside National Confederation Party and were unceasingly endeavoring undermine himself, Bakshi, Deputy Prime Minister, and other non-Communists by intimating they were pro-Western and pro-US. Failure to deny it was [while?] negotiating with Pakistan for bases in Kashmir was being exploited by Communists as evidence truth their charges in this respect and was putting friends US on defensive. He personally had no hope for economic future of Kashmir regardless whether it went to India or Pakistan, or became independent unless it would have friendly interest and economic cooperation of US.
4. In discussing future Kashmir, Abdullah was vigorous in restating that in his opinion it should be independent; that overwhelming majority population desired this independence; and that he had reason believe that some Azad Kashmir leaders desired independence and would be willing cooperate with leaders National Confederation if there was reasonable chance such cooperation would result in independence. Kashmir people could not understand why UN consistently ignored independence as one of possible solutions for Kashmir. It had held special Assembly to deal with independence for Palestine which was smaller in area and population and less economically viable than Kashmir. Kashmir people had language and cultural background their own. Their Hindus by custom and tradition widely differed from Hindus India, and outlook and background their Moslems also quite different from Moslems Pakistan. Fact was that population Kashmir homogeneous in spite of presence of Hindu minority.
5. When I asked Abdullah if he thought Kashmir could remain stable independent country without friendly support India and [Page 1435] Pakistan he replied negative. In his opinion independent Kashmir could exist only in case it had friendship both of India and Pakistan; in case both these countries had friendly relations with each other; and in case US through UN or direct would enable it, by investments or other economic assistance, to develop its magnificent resources. Adherence Kashmir to India would not lead in foreseeable future to improving miserable economic lot of population. There were so many areas of India in urgent need of economic development he was convinced Kashmir would get relatively little attention. Nevertheless, it would be preferable for Kashmir to go to India than to Pakistan. It would be disastrous for Kashmiris to be brought under control of government with medieval Koranic outlook.
6. Abdullah insisted that partition plus plebiscite formula Dixon would be impractical. No method for partition could be devised which would not sever close blood, cultural and economic ties and which would not result in misery economically and otherwise and lasting bitterness. He promised supply me with map supporting his statement, but floods prevented his seeing me again.
7. Military observers and other foreigners in Kashmir with whom I talked seemed almost unanimous in their belief that if Vale should be given opportunity to vote freely it would prefer Pakistan to India. Most of them were also of opinion that population in general would prefer independence to any other solution.
Sent Department 799; repeated info Karachi unnumbered.