Office of the Historian

357.AB/2–1150: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India 1

secret
Washington, February 11, 1950—4 p. m.

139. US position in current phase Kashmir case summarized in Deptel 138, Feb 11,2 arrived at after complete reexamination of dispute from inception.

[Here follows a summary of the information supplied in the eight numbered paragraphs of Conclusions in the memorandum of February 6, page 1378.]

Foregoing answers questions posed Embtel 68, Jan 16. Additional comments re numbered questions follow:

1. Dept remains convinced that UN or US assessment relative blame in dispute wld not contribute settlement.

2 and 3. These questions do not seem to take sufficiently into account fact, admitted by India, that peoples of area under Pakistan and Azad control are already and probably irrevocably oriented to Pakistan.

4 and 5. Dept not wedded to overall plebiscite. It has been and is prepared support any settlement acceptable to both India and Pakistan, including partition with plebiscite in Vale. It is not prepared to advance this proposal itself at this time. Moreover, Dept foresees almost as many difficulties in this course as in overall plebiscite unless India drops rigid insistence on its “rights” and agrees to establishment conditions in Vale which wld permit impartial plebiscite.

Dept gratified ur helpful exchange views with Nehru reported Embtel 186, Feb 9.3 Desires you continue utilize every available opportunity impress on Nehru and other GOI officials that US not attempting exhort or bring pressure. Our analysis Kashmir problem leads us to honest differences of opinion with India. We feel that in discussing problem with GOI officials we must be frank in making our views known.4

As regards numerous indications GOI has received that prolongation India Pakistan disputes is damaging to India, this is inherent in situation and expression such views requires no inspiration by State Dept or other US official sources. In fact many non-official groups and individuals in this country take much more serious view as regards imminent possibility India Pakistan war than does State Dept.

Acheson
  1. Repeated to London 665, Karachi 91, USUN 67.↩
  2. Printed as telegram 664 to London, supra.↩
  3. Not printed.↩
  4. Telegram 143 to New Delhi, February 13, not printed, informed the Embassy that it should not infer from this sentence that it should apprise the GOI and GOP of the U.S. position taken in Department telegrams 138 and 139 (357.AB/2–1350).↩