Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V

480.008/6–2350: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

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Washington, June 24, 1950.

3095. Dept does not like suggested answer your 3595 Jun 23¹ for fol reasons:

1. It seems to imply that the three powers are able veto plans any one of three may have for NE arms exports, while in reality situation is that US–UK–Fr each estab own export policies which are limited only by necessity of being based on principles contained in tripartite declaration.

2. It implies existence of established machinery for prior US–UK–Fr consultation re NE arms exports, while such consultation is actually on post facto basis.

3. There wld certainly be very unfavorable reaction in US to info that US and UK were consulting with each other re arms shipments to Israel. FYI only Dept wld not like to see UK, when pressed re UK arms shipments to Israel, attempt place upon US some responsibility for decision on this difficult question.

4. Dept believes answer of this type wld certainly give rise to speculation and uncertainty in NE. This wld be particularly unfortunate after generally favorable Arab League commentary on tripartite declaration.

Dept suggests ans along fol lines:

“HMG have military situation in NE under constant review and are giving full consideration to the practical steps to be taken in light of para one of tripartite statement. I hope to make a further statement in due course”.

Brit Emb here believes statement along above lines shld be acceptable to Foreign Office. In any event, Dept desires Emb make absolutely clear to Foreign Office that US does not desire answer to state, directly or by implication, that US–UK consultation is taking place re arms shipments to Israel.²

Acheson

1. Not printed; it described a request from the British Foreign Office asking for Department of State approval of a proposed statement which it hoped to give in the House of Commons when the question of arms shipments to Israel arose. The proposed statement read as follows: “HMG are in consultation with US and French Governments regarding the practical steps to be taken in the light of paragraph 1 of the tripartite statement. I hope to make a further statement on the subject in due course.” (480.008/6–2350)
2. In reply, on June 26, Embassy London advised of Mr. Furlonge’s disappointment at reason 2 and gave his understanding that the Department of State welcomed British initiative in consulting with the United States regarding arms shipments to the Near East. The Embassy replied that “our interpretation Reason 2 was that Department wishes avoid giving mistaken public impression three power declaration established formal machinery for prior consultation; but that we felt sure this did not mean Department would not continue welcome informal and confidential consultation on this and other subjects of mutual interest within general framework US–UK cooperation in area.” (Telegram 3611, 480.008/6–2650) The Department, on June 28, confirmed the Embassy’s interpretation and requested it to assure Mr. Furlonge to that effect (telegram 3159 to London, 480.008/6–2650).