357.AC/6–2250: Telegram
The Acting United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Barco) to the Secretary of State
766. Palun 365. USDel cannot agree with reasoning contained paragraph one Tel Aviv’s 465, June 20 in support charge PCC has failed. Certainly a and b are not “reasons” for failure, while c, in light real reasons for PCC present failure, with which Department officers working with Palestine case are thoroughly acquainted, would, if true, be little more than contributory cause. USDel does not, moreover, believe c to be true as far as Boisanger and Azcarate are concerned. Peculiarities of Palestine question in recent months and close observation Azcarate’s work and his full understanding of American policy have convinced us Azcarate has been well suited for his position. Boisanger has cooperated fully with USDel at least as far back as drafting of PCC statute on Jerusalem, which was essentially American draft, even despite his honest preference for other courses. Main responsibility as far as PCC activities are concerned has always rested with USDel and ultimately, of course, with US Government, and this has been recognized throughout by Boisanger, Yalcin and Azcarate. However, in our opinion, while there is some substance to b and c of paragraph II, Tel Aviv’s 465, real reason behind Arab attitude is their conviction, which Israel has done little to counteract despite [Page 939] USDel’s frequent efforts to convince them of necessity, that negotiations with Israel would gain Arabs absolutely nothing. Much of PCC inactivity has been in deference to Israeli wish to pursue own course. When within last two weeks Israel had opportunity to make statement aimed at counteracting Arab feeling of futility, as suggested by USDel and Department (Palun 358, June 5 and Unpal 253, June 6),1 Israel failed to do so, while official Israel utterances and actions have consistently confirmed Arabs in their belief Israel not prepared negotiate in true sense. USDel sincerely regrets Israel has not seen own best interests in different light, but it is this failure on their part that is primarily responsible for PCC failure.
As for paragraph VI of Tel Aviv’s 465, USDel recognized merit such suggestion when first advocated by Eban and Rafael, but genuinely doubts one man conciliator can accomplish more than PCC without substantial change in attitude of one or both of parties. We doubt such change can be effected by conciliator alone or by commission, without renewed efforts US Government.
USDel’s comment on paragraph VII (a) is that recent actions Israel (Palun 363, June 202 and Palun 364, June 21) make even Jordan–Israel negotiations extremely difficult. USDel and PCC as whole recognize that taking up compensation question (paragraph VII(b) Tel Aviv’s 465) may not be fruitful. We have, however, been guided by Department policy this respect (Unpal 245, February 7). Moreover, PCC, having specific instructions from GA this question, cannot ignore it, while Clapp mission recommendations on compensation are likewise still on the record.
Finally, USDel believes PCC position on the whole has been correct and appropriate in circumstances. We doubt if Israel itself can successfully contend otherwise, in view of its representations to US from time to time. Fact remains, however, that in absence negotiations Israel-Jordan, a change of direction has become necessary, either by persuading Israel accept something like Shukairi formula (Palun 362, June 20), new directives from GA to PCC, or entirely new instrument. Ultimate consideration in mind USDel is, of course, what is best from standpoint overall US policy.3