Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V

USUN Files¹

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State²

confidential

[Washington,] March 28, 1950.

Subject: Palestine Situation.

Participants:	The Secretary
	Dr. Nahum Goldmann, American Section, The Jewish Agency for Palestine
	ANE—Mr. Rockwell

Discussion:

I received Dr. Goldmann at his request.

Dr. Goldmann began the conversation by saying that he thought the situation in the various American Jewish organizations was now well in hand. Dr. Silver³ was out of the picture and likely to continue so. Dr. Goldmann thought he could, therefore, devote more time to relations between the American Jewish community and the State Department. He said that in the past he had been successful in stopping pressure on the Department by various Jewish organizations concerned over developments affecting the Palestine situation. He believed that he could be useful in conveying to the Department the feelings of the American Jewish community, and in transmitting to American Jews the thinking of Departmental officials. Dr. Goldmann said that he thought that it was a waste of time for delegations to call upon the Department, and that perhaps individuals could be much more useful. He inquired whether I thought it might be helpful if he were to keep in regular touch with the Department’s Near Eastern experts.

I said that I knew Dr. Goldmann had always been discreet in the past and that I would be delighted to have him keep in touch with the Near Eastern Division.

Dr. Goldmann then took up the question of the Near Eastern armaments situation. He said that he had had a long talk recently with British officials, particularly with Hector McNeil.⁴ He understood the British treaty obligations to Iraq, Jordan and Egypt, and that also it was not entirely logical to insist that the US Government request the British Government to cease arms shipments to the Arabs. On the other hand, there was in both Israel and the Arab states a genuine fear of aggression. Dr. Goldmann did not think Egypt would attack Israel in the near future, but who knew what might happen later? The Israelis were naturally nervous and felt it their duty to rearm. The feeling of insecurity in Israel was now greater than it was six months ago.

Under the circumstances, Dr. Goldmann wondered whether there was any way for the Great Powers to allay these fears by making some kind of a declaration concerning the territorial integrity of the Near Eastern states. He understood that the US could not guarantee frontiers, but perhaps there was some other approach which might be effective.

I said that I was surprised to hear that the sense of insecurity was growing in Israel, and asked Mr. Rockwell if reports we had received gave the impression of impending trouble. Mr. Rockwell stated that, on the contrary, we thought that the trend was away from war toward peace. He mentioned the Israel-Jordan talks, and the Israeli-Egyptian agreement over the “no man’s land” areas near Gaza.⁵ He emphasized the relatively little time which had passed since the end of the war, and said that a number of arrangements had been reached between the Arabs and Israelis which no one would have thought possible a year ago.

Mr. Rockwell then mentioned the statement which the United States Government had already made to the effect that should it receive reliable information that any party to the Palestine dispute were preparing to renew hostilities, it would take appropriate action both within the United Nations and outside to attempt to prevent such an occurrence. He added that of course the UN was the logical guarantor of the territorial integrity of nations.

Dr. Goldmann said that he had been thinking of what the United States Government had already said, and wondered whether it might not be possible for the Department to go a little further in secret conversations with representatives of the Arab states and Israel. Specifically, could the United States not say exactly what concrete steps it would take if any party resorted to aggression?

I said that I would be happy to consider Dr. Goldmann’s suggestion.

Dr. Goldmann then took up the question of the status of the Jerusalem question in the Trusteeship Council. He understood that the Council had adopted the Belgian suggestion that the Jerusalem statute was to come in force at a date to be determined by the Council. He mentioned that the British delegate had recently made an energetic declaration reiterating the UK belief that the statute was utterly unworkable. Dr. Goldmann thought that it would be very helpful if the US delegation would make a similar statement in order to avoid giving the impression that the US was determined to see the statute put into effect.

I asked Mr. Rockwell what the situation concerning this was, and he replied that we had made no recent declaration of our position in the Trusteeship Council but that we planned to explain our vote when the statute came up for final approval. Dr. Goldmann was interested to learn this.

Dean Acheson

1. Files of the United States Mission to the United Nations.
2. Drafted by Mr. Rockwell.
3. Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, prominent American Zionist leader.
4. British Minister of State.
5. This agreement was in the form of a modus vivendi to the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement and was signed at El-Auja on February 22, 1950, by Lt.-Col. Mahmoud Riad Mohamed and Lt.-Col. Kalman Keet on behalf of the Egyptian and Israeli Governments and by Georges Bossavy, Chairman of the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Commission. The Security Council released the text of the agreement, including appropriate maps, as S/1471 on March 17.