684A.85/3–650: Telegram
The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State
niact
158. Morning March 6 Foreign Minister asked me his office and said substantially following:
Crisis in Amman is “more than local test strength between King and Opposition; it is clash between negative and affirmative forces. Now Amman is crossroads Middle East. Decision there will affect whole course of history for next few years. Both sides have strong Jordan support and from outside. Example latter is presence Amman Iraq Deputy Prime Minister Saleh Jaber. Abdullah does not need pressure but needs moral encouragement in his present ordeal.”
Foreign Minister stressed that Israel and King both favor accord though not yet agreed on exact provisions.
Sharett earnestly pleaded that US encourage King by official but secret assurance of US moral and economic support and hopes for his success.
Sharett added there is also practical problem. King’s willingness resume trade relations with Israel involves more than break with Arab boycott. It necessitates legislation to undo Jordan’s part in boycott. There is possibility Egypt and Iraq might cut off Jordan’s supplies as penalty. Abdullah would be reassured if US would suggest possibility American supplies of sugar and rice to replace those from Egypt, not as gifts but on commercial basis.
Sharett “ventured suggest that if Department agreed it would be most helpful if President Truman gave King personal encouraging message”.
[Page 782]In urging above Sharett was “acting solely on own initiative; King not involved”.
Answering my question if he is making same appeal to UK Foreign Office, Sharett said: “I am considering it.”
Comment: Sharett will probably appeal also to Britain. It is obvious that Israel attaches highest importance to success of King in present “tug of war”, because his success would “remove key log in whole jam which still prevents peace in Middle East”.
This may be overly optimistic but surely King as first Arab ruler to show courage to face realities does deserve US encouragement in this crisis. End comment.1
Sent niact Department 158; repeated Jerusalem 15; Department pass priority Amman 13, Cairo 46, priority Geneva for USPCC and USTC, London 37, Moscow 7, Paris 26, pouched other Arab capitals.
- Embassy London advised, on March 8, of a discussion with Mr. Furlonge concerning the McDonald-Sharett conversation of March 6. Mr. Furlonge stated that Mr. Sharett’s suggestion was predicated on the assumption that the King had not met with a decisive reverse in his differences with the Cabinet. The Foreign Office’s information was that the King’s reverse was complete and that Tewfik Pasha’s condition for withdrawing his resignation was that he not be required to resume the Israeli negotiations before the April elections. In view of these circumstances, Mr. Furlonge concluded, the Foreign Office was unable to see how encouragement given to the King would improve the situation (telegram 1311, 684A.85/3–850).↩