Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V

784A.561/3–650

The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Department of State ¹

confidential
No. 126

Damascus, March 6, 1950.

Subject: Syrian Inquiry re Possibility of Obtaining Arms from the United States

Prime and Foreign Minister Khalid al ’Azm asked me to call today to discuss a number of matters, each treated in separate communications.

With respect to the above subject he referred to recent press reports that the U.S. is considering Israel’s request for arms and asked me to define U.S. Policy in that respect. I referred to Counselor Harrison’s Aide-Mémoireof February 28, 1950 (Ref. No. 1 above)² and reiterated what he had said. The Prime Minister commented that he was unable to understand how the U.S. could on one hand contend that it favors peace in the Middle East and on the other supply arms to the Zionists who, despite any peaceful professions on their part, had in the past demonstrated their militant aggressive designs. I recalled Secretary Acheson’s letter to Representative Javits,³ particularly the last paragraph thereof, and said that I felt sure we would not supply any one of the Middle Eastern states with arms beyond what we felt were necessary for the maintenance of internal order and national security. Khalid Bey replied that Israel already had more arms than necessary for both purposes and acquisition of more could mean only one thing, eventual resumption of hostilities against the Arabs. I assured him that we would deplore any breach of the current peace, however precarious it might be considered to be.

The Prime Minister then asked if the U.S. was prepared to sell arms to Syria. I said that I couldn’t myself answer affirmatively or negatively. I recalled that when he had made similar inquiry in January (Legtel 20, January 10⁴) I had not been optimistic because three military coups in the space of nine months not only indicated disturbing internal instability but might be interpreted by the United States as evidence that the Syrian Army is already too strong, especially as the traditional attitude in the U.S. is that the military establishment should be subordinate to civil authority. It didn’t seem to me that the situation had changed much since then so far as Syria is concerned, but if he wanted to have a more precise answer it could be gotten only from the United States Government itself. He then inquired whether he could seek an answer in principle or only by making a specific request for arms. I replied that the Department’s statement of policy following the raising of the arms embargo, to which Mr. Harrison had referred, might, I thought, be considered as stating the principle which applied to Syria as well as to other Middle Eastern States. I added that if he decided to seek arms, I felt there was more chance of a favorable response to any request he might make if his request were modest and represented only essential needs which could be readily substantiated. In the latter connection, I remarked that greater facilities to the Military Attaché to appraise Syria’s military situation would be helpful, referring to refusal of the Director General of Defense since the December 19 Coup to permit Colonel Mitchell to visit units in the field. Has Israel furnished such data and does Israel grant such facilities, asked the Prime Minister? I replied that I wasn’t aware what Israel’s practice is, but I knew from experience that the U.S. is not disposed to authorize the export of arms without full information concerning the need therefor and the peaceful purpose for which destined. I was merely trying to be helpful, I said, so that if such data were later requested, as I felt sure they would be if not furnished in the first place, he wouldn’t interpret a request therefor as a stalling tactic.

Rightly or wrongly, I gained the impression, as I did during the Prime Minister’s similar though less extended query of January 10 that in the light of the Syrian Army’s interference in politics within Syria he is personally not too keen about strengthening its ability thus to “maintain order”, but that his hand is being forced by the military authorities and that in the face of Israel’s démarche, and the publicity already given it, he can no longer refuse to seek similar aid.

I made it clear that the U.S. Government is not itself giving arms to Israel or even itself offering arms for sale to the Middle Eastern States but is concerned only in granting or withholding export licenses. The Prime Minister said he understood this, but the important consideration was that if the United States were permitting Israel to purchase arms in the United States, Syria had no choice but to try to follow suit. Unfortunately, Syria could, he said, ill afford the cost of arms competition with Israel which, he added, is able to divert funds to that purpose because of the substantial sums it receives for other purposes through so-called charitable contributions from the United States. At this point he digressed somewhat to point out that his Government is exerting its best efforts to develop Syria’s economy so as to raise the standard of living as a bulwark against communism, saying “arrests and other suppressive means serve only as propaganda for subversive agents.” The point I think he was here trying to make was that he regretted having to divert funds from such constructive ends to puerile arms competition.

I did not labor the issue with the Prime Minister but, as indicated in my Despatch No. 123 of March 6, 1950, I consider it most unfortunate that an arms race between Israel and the Arab States is apparently beginning. Whether one or the other desires to renew hostilities, such an eventuality becomes almost inevitable once each tries to outarm the other. It might be otherwise if arms were granted only after formal peace is established and then only by way of assuring arms equilibrium under a United Nations’ guarantee.⁵

James Hugh Keeley

1. This despatch was repeated to Arab capitals, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, and Ankara.
2. An enclosure to despatch 123, March 6, neither printed. The Aide-Mémoire quoted the extract from the Wireless Bulletin of February 27, p. 759, and stated that “Since the lifting of the United Nations embargo on the shipment of arms to Near Eastern states, the United States has indicated its willingness to consider the purchase of arms in the United States by those countries provided such purchases are limited to arms necessary for maintaining internal law and order by the governments concerned and for providing for reasonable requirements of self-defense.” It also asserted that there were no pending requests for the export of arms to Syria, inasmuch as the Syrian Legation at Washington had informed the State Department on January 18 that any applications for the export of arms before that date were not approved by the Syrian Government and no new applications had been filed since that date (784A.561/3–650).
3. Dated January 12, p. 684.
4. See p. 1203.

5. Despatch 123 concluded with the following paragraph: “To grant arms to either the Israelis or Arabs before real peace is achieved between them can well jeopardize the slim hope of achieving it and may well lead to an armament race which can be expected to have only one result: a renewal of hostilities. It is evident that if Israel is accommodated, even to a limited extent, such action will serve only to stimulate the desire of the Arabs to increase their armaments.” (784A.561/3–650)

   Embassy Cairo, on March 1, reported the alarm of the Egyptian Foreign Minister over press reports of Israeli requests to purchase American arms and his expression of hope that the requests would not be granted (telegram 203, 784A.56/3–150).