484.418/1–2650: Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

confidential

59. Following article headlined “US Warned on Arms to Arabs” appeared in Palestine Post January 26.

“The far-reaching implications of the Dean Acheson letter to Mr. Javits1 are such as to cause the Government of Israel grave concern, an authoritative source said at Hakirya2 yesterday. The US Secretary of State had written to the New York Congressman asserting that British arms shipments to the Arab states were intended for ‘legitimate security requirements’. He also did not believe that ‘serious measures are being taken for a renewal of hostilities’. The Israel statement yesterday continued:

Mr. Acheson defends the shipment of British arms to the Arab states on the grounds that they are being supplied under treaty obligations and intended merely for the maintenance of internal law and order in those states and for meeting reasonable requirement of self-defense. This explanation is hardly borne out by the types of arms which have recently been supplied to the Arab states.

It is difficult to assert that for ‘purpose of maintaining internal law and order’, the Egyptian Government requires destroyers, submarines, dozens of Vampire and Meteor jet planes, large quantities of the heaviest types of tanks and artillery, as well as many tens of thousands of automatic rifles—much of this from American war surpluses in Europe.

Nor can the establishment of highly mobile mechanized formations of considerable striking power, or the purchase of large armaments plants from Germany, France, Sweden and Italy be motivated by considerations of internal order and security. These heavy armaments can clearly be intended only for use in external war.

It is equally evident on the other hand that in case of any attack by a major power, these arms would be entirely inadequate to defend Egypt. Thus, they are ruled out by the circumstances of the case from serving the two purposes indicated in Mr. Acheson’s statement.

As against this, possession of these comparatively large quantities of modern arms may clearly facilitate renewed aggression against Israel. This danger is all the greater in the light of the numerous statements which have appeared in the Egyptian and Arab press generally indicate a scarcely veiled intention of resuming hostilities against Israel whenever circumstances are favorable for that course.

Hardly a week passes without some new threat of the coming “second round” being uttered in the Arab press or radio, and these threats come from by no means negligible quarters. It requires little imagination to picture the effect which the arrival of these large consignments of modern arms must have on these hotheads. If, in addition, they now see the responsible head of American foreign policy giving his blessing [Page 706] to this large-scale armament, the consequences may be serious to a degree.

This seems hardly the way to prevent a renewal of hostilities between the Arab states and Israel, which Mr. Dean Acheson rightly declares would be tragic development.

For Israel, the statement of the American Secretary of State is fraught with grave consequences. He assures us, that should a resumption of hostilities be threatened, the US Government would use all its influence to prevent such a tragic eventuality. The experience of the Arab war of aggression against Israel offers conclusive evidence that Israel cannot rely for its defense on the moral influence of other powers. Indeed, conditions in this respect are liable to be even worse in future than they were then, because the ability of the US Government to exercise such moral pressure may have been gravely jeopardized by its having assented to the large-scale rearming of countries which make no secret of their intention to resume the fight.

The situation created by this statement is very unfortunate. The heavy rearmament of the Arab states will clearly leave Israel no choice but to increase its own defensive capacity to the maximum of its ability. One can only hope that the American Secretary of State may not have been fully aware of all the facts and implications of this matter and that further reconsideration may lead him to revise his attitude and to take action to prevent this calamitous arms race.”

Comment: MA’s and I believe above statement motivated by: (1) almost angry surprise at Department’s statement; (2) fear of being outdistanced in armaments race in preparation for “second round;” (3) desire of Army to secure public support for additional appropriations to expand defense forces. End comment.

Sent Department 59, repeated London 10, Paris 4, Baghdad 8, Beirut 7, Damascus 8, Jidda 7, Department pass Moscow 1, Cairo 14, Amman 7.

McDonald
  1. Dated January 12, p. 684.
  2. A collection of buildings at Tel Aviv in which the chief units of the Israeli Government were housed.