Secretary’s Memoranda: Lot 53 D 244: Box 419
Minutes of Meeting on President Truman’s Train, New York, October 24, 19501
Subject: Secretary-General
| Participants: | The President |
| The Secretary of State | |
| Assistant Secretary of State Miller2 | |
| AR—Mr. Dreier3 | |
| S—Mr. Battle4 | |
| Mr. CP. Noyes, United States Mission |
At the request of Ambassador Gross, I went to see the Secretary on the President’s train5 to clarify a point in our instructions. I told him that we had been informed definitely by the French on the basis of a telephone call to the Foreign Office that they would not vote in favor of Padilla Nervo. This had not been known to Ambassador Austin. Mr. Gross felt that this made it clear that there would be only six votes for Padilla Nervo. Under the circumstances it might not be necessary to threaten to use the veto in order to prevail upon the Latin Americans not to vote in favor of Padilla Nervo, or to prevail upon Padilla Nervo to withdraw.
Mr. Gross wanted me to ascertain whether our instructions required us to threaten to use the veto under these circumstances, or left it to our discretion to decide whether to use this threat. I indicated that Mr. Gross felt it would be wiser not to use this threat unless it was necessary. The French had indicated they would hold the information in confidence.
The Secretary made it entirely clear that he was not at all concerned whether the information with regard to our decision became public. The objective which had been agreed upon was that we must elect Mr. Lie. We were not going to permit the Russians’ maneuvers to succeed. The full weight of the United States was being placed behind [Page 159] our policy. He was perfectly clear that we should use whatever strength was necessary to produce the desired result. It was of course up to the Mission and the Delegation to decide the matter of tactics.
The Secretary said that he did not like the picture of a series of votes on a series of different candidates, with some candidates getting six votes; some getting five; some less. He would much prefer that we kill the whole thing off at one stroke by using the threat of the veto rather than to play the matter out cautiously as a result of not using that threat. He was perfectly clear that if we used the threat, it would not be necessary to use the veto.
Assistant Secretary Miller and Mr. Dreier then arrived. The Secretary briefly explained what he wanted done. It was agreed that our most immediate objective was to get Padilla Nervo to withdraw his candidacy. Mr. Miller expressed the view that it would be necessary to assure Padilla Nervo that no other candidate would be permitted to get the job, except Mr. Lie, if he withdrew. The Secretary agreed with this completely and said that in his view the cleanest way to handle the matter was to tell Padilla Nervo directly that we would use the veto if necessary to prevent any candidates, other than Mr. Lie, from being elected.
The Secretary made it clear that the Good Neighbor Policy should work two ways. He wanted it made clear to the Latin Americans that no Latin American candidate would be accepted by the United States and that if they continued to play this game, they would very seriously embarrass themselves by running up against a United States veto.
The Secretary reiterated that he was not concerned about publicity in regard to this question. We were taking a position on principle; we could not permit the Soviet Union to use its veto to punish Mr. Lie for his position on Korea. He stated that the President had pointed out that the Russians were for Mr. Lie on June 10 of this year and that the only reason for their change was the Korean question. He and the President were determined to prevent the Soviet Union from punishing Mr. Lie.
The President arrived in the car with Mr. Harriman.6 The Secretary said that those present were about to go off to carry out the President’s decision on the Secretary-General and he wanted them to have direct instructions from the President on the matter. He expressed the general lines of our instructions briefly. The President agreed and said we were prepared to make a real fight on this matter and that we would insist on the election of Mr. Lie. We were prepared to threaten to use the veto and to go further and use the veto itself if that became necessary.
- Drafted by Charles P. Noyes, Deputy United States Representative in the Interim Committee of the General Assembly.↩
- Edward G. Miller, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs.↩
- John C. Dreier, Director of the Office of Regional American Affairs.↩
- Lucius D. Battle, Executive Secretariat of the Department.↩
- President Truman was in New York to make an address to the General Assembly on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the United Nations. The speech was delivered shortly after 11:30 a. m. No information has been found to indicate when this train consultation took place, but evidence suggests that it was before the President detrained to proceed to Flushing Meadow, Queens, for the special General Assembly meeting. Immediately thereafter President Truman attended a birthday anniversary–presidential reception in the Delegates’ Lounge of the General Assembly building. Subsequently the President was driven to Forest Hills to attend a luncheon at the home of the Secretary-General.↩
- W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President.↩