IO Files: US/A/2722
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edward P. Maffitt of the United States Delegation Advisory Staff
| Participants: | Ambassador Carlos Blanco—Cuban Delegation | ||
| Ambassador Warren R. Austin | } | —United States Delegation | |
| Edward P. Maffitt |
Dr. Blanco called at his request on Ambassador Austin this morning. He opened the conversation by saying that Cuba and Ecuador, as Latin American representatives on the Security Council, have a responsibility which places them in a delicate situation with regard to the Secretary-General matter. He said that among the Latin Americans there was a feeling that the Indian proposal offered a means of conciliation and should be followed up. Cuba’s instructions were clear and it would continue to support Lie. It also felt that nothing would come of the negotiations proposed by the Indians and that, therefore, in the end the result would be the same since the Council would come back to its position as set forth in its President’s letter of October 12 to the President of the General Assembly.
Ambassador Austin said that the question is not a purely administrative one, as it might appear on the surface, but has broad and deep political and moral implications. He said the present attempt at eliminating Lie—which obviously would be the first consequence of adoption of the Indian proposal—was an attack from the enemy of the UN, the Soviet Union, and, if successful, would have far-reaching effects, viz.: It would directly affect the morale in Korea since to change the Secretary-General at this time of approaching victory would be to abandon the man whose uncompromising stand against aggression had become a symbol. It would be a triumph for the Soviet Union, which had given at least moral support to the aggressors, over the Members of the United Nations which had made great sacrifices to arrest and repel the aggression. The soldiers themselves, and their families, would not understand the Security Council’s abandoning Lie after having apparently committed its support to him by an overwhelming majority. Furthermore, changing the Secretary-General at this point, when the UN is about to undertake a vast program of [Page 151] reconstruction and rehabilitation in Korea, would have unfortunate repercussions in the United States Congress which would not have the same confidence in an untried man. Since it is the United States that is furnishing a very heavy part of the men, money, materials, etc., for the UN Korea effort, any hesitation from the Congress to continue authorizing such sacrifices would be unfortunate. Dr. Blanco Should clearly understand that this was in no way a threat but simply an analysis of a situation with which Ambassador Austin, as a former Senator, was quite familiar. Finally, the questions of integrity and stability entered into it and exposed the countries who had voted for Lie to the accusation that they lacked these qualities.
For the above reasons the United States would face the risk of being accused of intransigence or high-handedness, as Soviet propaganda would be sure to do, and would vote against the Indian proposal.
Dr. Blanco said that his country was as firmly behind Lie as we, but, because of the feeling in the Latin bloc, felt that some gesture of conciliation was necessary. Could the United States accept an amendment to the Pau proposal which would exempt Lie and Modzielewski from the lists and thus leave Lie available should no other name be found to have no objection to it?
Ambassador Austin remarked that the word “conciliation” was sweet, but that in this case it was the sweetness of arsenic, which kills. The whole Soviet maneuver was a trick and a trap and we should not be blinded to its danger by words having a high appeal. The amendment would not be acceptable to the United States because it would not avoid the confusion which was obviously one of the Soviet’s aims in its attempt to get the Council to surrender after administering a sound defeat to the Soviets on the Lie matter.
[Here follows further discussion.]