IO Files: US/A/M (Chr)/148
Minutes of the Thirteenth Meeting of the United States Delegation New York, October 4, 1950, 9:15 a. m.
[Here follow list of persons present (50) and discussion of a prior agenda item.]
[Page 130]2. Appointment of the Secretary-General (SD/A/231)1
Mr. Hall explained that the term of the present Secretary-General, Mr. Lie, expired February 2. Under Article 97 of the Charter, both Security Council and Assembly action were required for his appointment, and the Council’s action was clearly subject to the veto. In the event the Security Council failed to recommend any candidate, it would be necessary to decide what position the United States should take. He reviewed the recommendations in the position paper, pointing out the two alternative courses: amendment of the 1946 resolution to extend Mr. Lie’s term, or a resolution continuing Mr. Lie in office until such time as formal action of appointment of his successor or renewal of his term became possible. Mr. Hall said that, while Lie was not entirely satisfactory since he was not as strong an administrator as we might wish, he had been generally sympathetic to our views, and his strong support for United Nations action in Korea had helped increase his personal stature.
Referring to the Security Council situation, Mr. Hall explained that there had been some preliminary informal discussions. Sir Gladwyn Jebb, in his capacity as Council President, had attempted to see Vishinsky, but the latter had not responded to his request for an appointment. The Chinese representative had publicly announced that he would oppose Mr. Lie’s appointment for more than one year.
The Secretary inquired what we would wish to do if there were no difficulty with the Soviets. Mr. Hall replied that Mr. Wilgress of Canada, possibly also Mr. Pearson would be suitable; Romulo was a candidate, and Spaak had been mentioned. However, it was unlikely that any of these would receive the Soviet vote. Mr. Hall believed that Wilgress, Pearson or Spaak would be stronger men, though Mr. Lie’s five years’ experience could not be overlooked. The Secretary doubted that either Pearson or Spaak would desire the post. Mr. Hall thought Wilgress the best possibility.
Mr. Dulles asked what we would do in the Security Council. Mr. Hall thought this depended upon what possibility there was of getting any kind of a recommendation from the Security Council. Ambassador Gross referred to Jebb’s failure to get an acknowledgement of his request for an interview from Vishinsky. The present question was whether Ambassador Austin, as Council President, should seek to see Vishinsky or discuss this subject with Malik. He had himself approached Malik who had said only that Mr. Vishinsky was dealing with this subject, and that there was no hurry. He thought it might be worthwhile to have one more talk with Malik before pressing ahead [Page 131] in the Council. If he persisted in his deliberately dilatory course, the subject could either be thrown directly into the Assembly, a procedure to which many members might object, or be taken up in a private meeting of the Security Council without further preliminary consultations. In such a meeting we could permit the deadlock of views to become apparent, and then get agreement on the necessity for Assembly action. Mr. Gross noted that Mr. Lie wanted this subject dealt with quickly—if possible, at the next series of plenaries—time now worked against him, and delegations were attempting to make deals with him based on the fact his term was expiring.
Mr. Cohen asked whether it was not possible legally, since it looked as if the only practical alternative was Lie, to bring about this result in the quickest way. If there were no express limitation on the original Council action nominating Lie, he proposed that we should say Lie had been nominated by the Council, the Assembly had provided the five-year contract, and the only problem now was to determine what further contract could be made by the Assembly with Mr. Lie. Ambassador Austin referred to the wording of the 1946 resolution to the effect that the original appointment was open for a further five-year term. Possibly that meant the Security Council did not need to act. It was pointed out, however, that the 1946 resolution referred to the necessity of both Council and Assembly action on this point. The Ambassador thought there was the additional practical fact that many members desired to give the Council an opportunity to consider the matter.
Mr. Cohen thought there might be a little psychological difference in the way in which the Council approached the problem. The question might be put in terms of whether Lie’s nomination should stand or another candidate be named. No formal action would be necessary if the Council simply permitted Lie’s designation to stand. All the Charter required was the setting of the term by the Assembly. No authority would be taken from the Council. He thought it would make a difference as to how the informal discussion in the Council were handled.
Ambassador Austin stated that, on the question of procedure, he had the feeling that he might be out of line with the Delegation. It was his judgment that we would gain nothing but a violent reaction by going to the Russians on such a political matter. They would discover how strongly we felt for the candidate and then become more active in their opposition. It was his feeling that a Security Council meeting should be called without first attempting to proselyte anybody, and the Council should start on the basis that no candidate was up for nomination. He thought a solution could be approached in that [Page 132] way more easily than by campaigning. The Secretary agreed that no campaigning should be done.
Mr. Dulles asked what action the Council had taken in London.2 Mr. Noyes replied that it passed on a one-line recommendation of Mr. Lie to the Assembly. Mr. Dulles questioned whether Security Council action was necessary. In his view, so long as the Assembly wanted to keep Lie on, it was free to go ahead; the Assembly should decide whether to continue Lie in office or to end his term; if the latter decision were made, then the matter should go back to the Security Council.
The Secretary wondered whether there might not be constitutional arguments against this course. It seemed to him there were two alternatives. One was to take the view that the original nomination held good for all time. The other was to make an attempt to arrive at a new nomination, and if that failed, it would be common sense to keep the incumbent in office by a simple resolution maintaining him until action could be taken. Mr. Cohen had no doubt that was correct. However, on the record, so far as the Security Council was concerned, Lie had been nominated and the Assembly might keep him on. It was noted that the resolution on the appointment of the Secretary-General had been adopted before Lie’s actual appointment. In this connection, Mr. Hall called the Delegation’s attention to paragraph (c) of the 1946 resolution, which required action from the Security Council in the first instance.
Mr. Dulles observed that the Assembly had the power to modify its own actions. In his opinion this resolution gave no vested rights to the Security Council.
Ambassador Austin asked whether anyone knew what Lie’s views were on extension of his term by the Assembly without Security Council action. The Secretary said he had lunched with Lie, and it seemed clear Lie was ready to accept this arrangement. Mr. Gross agreed.
Mr. Hall commented that General Counsel of the United Nations, Mr. Feller, agreed with Mr. Dulles’ theory that Lie could be appointed by the Assembly without Council action. Mr. Tate believed legal theory could go either way. It seemed to him preferable to go to the Security Council first and bring the matter to a vote and veto; otherwise the legal situation had not been created which justified the Assembly’s going ahead. Mr. Dulles thought it undesirable to subject Mr. Lie to a veto. Mr. Bancroft felt that this problem could be met by haying the Council President state that the discussion had disclosed [Page 133] that no recommendation was possible, and that it now seemed appropriate for the matter to be referred to the Assembly, with a notation of this fact. He agreed that the matter should not be permitted to come to a vote.
Mr. Cohen still believed a different approach in the Security Council was desirable. The question should be whether the present appointment should stand; if no move were made to propose another candidate, the matter should revert to the Assembly. Otherwise, the idea could arise that the office had been permitted to become vacant. Senator Cooper wondered whether, if there were any doubt as to this being the correct legal theory, we might not stand to lose by resorting to an expedient, even admitting the ‘practical results.
The Secretary asked how it would be to propose that the Assembly amend the resolution of January 24, 1946, by adding to paragraph (c) the following sentence: The incumbent Secretary-General shall hold office until his successor is elected, qualified and assumes office. Mr. Bancroft pointed out that this did not meet the problem of Security Council action. The Secretary thought such an amendment might be justified by indicating that it would save embarrassment of the incumbent. Ambassador Gross did not believe Lie would agree to such a procedure; He wanted firm tenure and would not consent to serve under an open-ended arrangement of any kind. From Lie’s point of view he would prefer to have us struggle through to get him as long a term up to five years as possible. Mr. Hall remarked upon the fact that administrative courage was also related to a definite term.
Mr. Cohen wondered if these different points might not be reconciled in a single resolution without Security Council action. Such a resolution might provide that, no recommendation having been received from the Security Council, the General Assembly repealed the appropriate part of paragraph 4(c) and requested Lie to continue in office for a term of blank years.
Senator Lodge wondered about the desirability of maintaining the same man in this post. Mr. Hall explained that the Preparatory Commission had taken the view that he could ‘be re-elected, but there was a general feeling that a ten-year period should be the maximum, though this was not now required. Senator Lodge thought such a limitation desirable.
Mr. Dulles believed that, from the practical point of view, it would be utterly impossible to agree on any candidate with the Soviets. They had not wanted Lie in 1946 at London, and that had been at a time when our relations with the Soviets were relatively amicable; today agreement would be impossible unless we were willing to accept a candidate they would nominate. Mrs. Roosevelt observed that the Soviets [Page 134] certainly could not get the candidate they wanted and considered it possible they might be willing to accept Lie for this reason.
The Secretary inquired whether the Delegation thought some action by the Security Council was necessary. Ambassador Gross replied that at least Council-consideration, though probably not action, would be appropriate. He could not quite see how the Assembly could say it had received no recommendation on a candidate if the matter had never been on the Council’s agenda. It would be better for us to let it be known that we were ready to take this up in the Assembly, and then if no Member of the Council had any affirmative suggestions, the Council meeting would be strictly perfunctory. Mr. Cohen saw no objection to raising in the Council the question whether it would be desirable for it to make any other recommendation. This would put the matter in such a way that it was indicated we did not believe a recommendation was necessary but were simply raising the question so that, if there were no agreement on another candidate, it would not be necessary to submit any names, and the old nomination of Lie would be permitted to stand. Ambassador Gross believed that our advance consultations with other delegations eliminated this possibility. In response to a question from the Secretary as to what consultations had been held, Mr. Gross indicated that the matter had been discussed informally with the French, British and Canadians.
The Secretary suggested that the staff prepare a paper with a summary of the alternative procedures which might be considered. After consultations on the basis of such a paper, we could suggest a private meeting of the Security Council at which we would raise the question whether the members could agree upon a nomination, and if this appeared impossible, we would put the matter directly into the Assembly, asking repeal of the last sentence of paragraph 4(c), and requesting the existing Secretary-General to serve for a period of blank years. This was agreed.