Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

320/10–250: Telegram

The Acting Secretary, of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

confidential

Washington, October 2, 1950—1 p. m.

Gadel 19. Dept feels the election of Turkey to SC important. While avoiding invidious comparisons in the qualifications of Turkey and Lebanon, USDel shld point out to other dels that Turkey has in the past shown an unusual independence towards Sov Union; she has consistently resisted pressure from that direction and has manifested a strong will to resist. As with Yugo, membership on the SC, in the view of the Dept, will afford Turkey a greater sense of security. Moreover, her presence on SC for the next two years will contribute greatly to the efforts of the non-Communist world to halt Sov imperialism.

A second failure to elect Turkey to SC wld be a serious prestige blow to Turkey which considers that she has made effective contributions to internatl peace and security, and wld afford the Kremlin a propaganda weapon to undermine the Turkish Govt.

We feel that the SC seat from the MEA shld not be a monopoly of the Arab League.¹

Webb

1. After an inconclusive 13th ballot on the morning of October 7, and subsequent consultation on the part of the Arab Members, Lebanon at the same meeting withdrew its candidacy and Turkey was elected on the 14th ballot. Documentation in the IO files concerning conversations between U.S. officials and members of other delegations during this period is not printed. In a memorandum of October 6 describing a conversation between the U.S. Representative at the United Nations (Austin) and the Deputy U.S. Representative on the Security Council (Ross) on the one hand and the Lebanese Foreign Minister and Chairman of the Lebanese Delegation to the General Assembly, Philippe Takla, and Charles Malik, Lebanese Minister to the United States, Ross recorded the following:

   “… I had an opportunity (on authority received by telephone from Mr. Hickerson the day before) to raise specifically the possibility of an understanding being reached at this time analogous to the situation with regard to Turkey in 1948. I said that any understanding with regard to support for the election of The Lebanon in 1952 would not, of course, be in the nature of an understanding between the United States and The Lebanon but rather, as in the case of Turkey two years ago, an understanding broadly held throughout the Assembly.

   “I said that no firm and irrevocable commitment so far in advance of circumstances could ‘be undertaken by any government in its right mind. I said also that the development of such an understanding generally in the Assembly, and particularly so far as we were concerned, of course, presupposed that The Lebanon would be the candidate of the Arab group two years from now and that there would not be two competing Arab candidates between whom we would have to choose. I said also that I thought the possibility of developing any such understanding in the Assembly would depend very largely on a graceful gesture of withdrawal by The Lebanon.

   “Malik, interpreting my remarks, emphasized that I was making a very important suggestion.

   “Takla responding … then went on to say … that if on the next ballot Turkey had more votes than The Lebanon, The Lebanon would withdraw. He begged that we not divulge this confidence.…” (IO Files, memorandum of conversation by John C. Ross, October 6, 1950, document US/A/2660, or US/S/1465)