Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

714.562/12–2950

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Officer in Charge of Central America and Panama Affairs (Siracusa)

secret

[Washington,] December 29, 1950.

Subject: Arms for Guatemala

Participants:	Colonel Oscar Morales López, Guatemalan Representative, Inter-American Defense Board
	Colonel Mara, White House Staff
	ARA—Mr. Mann
	MID—Mr. Siracusa

The meeting was suggested by Colonel Mara who, apparently at the instance of General Vaughan,¹ wished the Department to discuss further with Colonel Morales López the matter of arms for Guatemala. Mr. Mann had previously informed Colonel Mara that he preferred to conduct any talks with Colonel Morales López in the presence of the Guatemalan Ambassador. At Colonel Mara’s request,² however, he agreed to hear Morales López’ views.

During the course of the conversation, Guatemala’s request for aircraft³ was again discussed. Mr. Mann emphasized the fact that the desired aircraft are not available for sale and that, should they become available, the matter of Guatemala’s eligibility to purchase them from official sources, within the terms of the MDAP, would have to be determined.⁴ Also, the general question of developments in Guatemala and the U.S. policy towards them was discussed. This has been the subject of numerous conversations and memoranda; it need not be repeated here.

The only new development was a suggestion by Morales López that a new Guatemalan Military Mission headed by the Sub-Minister of Defense should come to the U.S. to seek favorable action on the desired aircraft. Mr. Mann did not encourage this proposal. Since the aircraft are, in fact, not available there is nothing which such a Mission could accomplish at this time.

Morales López then brought up the subject of requests for other types of arms which allegedly had been turned down by the Department. Mr. Mann said we would be glad to review any such cases that he might wish to bring to his attention. He reiterated, however, that anything from official sources would fall under the same eligibility limitations regarding the MDAP as would aircraft.

The important points to be made about this meeting are the following:

(a) Colonel Morales López’ action is a further indication of an attitude of impatience with the civilian authority of Guatemala which is developing in the Guatemalan Army, or at least in part of the Guatemalan Army.

(b) There seems to be some move within the Guatemalan Army (possibly with the blessing of Arbenz, even though it is difficult to see what he has to gain by rocking the boat at the present time) to circumvent the presently constituted civilian authority. A number of ill-concealed allusions were made by Morales López during the course of this extended conversation which seemed to indicate that he wanted to discuss with Mr. Mann and obtain from him an indication of Departmental sympathy with and support for some vague sort of action in Guatemala, presumably by the armed forces or some faction within them. At no time—and this is the essential matter of record of this memorandum—did Mr. Mann allow himself to be drawn into such discussion nor did he encourage, tacitly or by implication, any acknowledgment of or support for the overtures which Colonel Morales López apparently intended.

Colonel Morales López spoke rather scornfully of civilian authority in Guatemala and insisted that the Guatemalan Army needs arms in order to control the Communist threat. The Department has asked from U.S. sources for an authoritative report on whether or not there is any potential force in Guatemala which could seriously contest the Army if it should be united.) It may be observed that Morales López is not too clear on just who the Communists are. At one point in the conversation, although personalities were not discussed, he described Victor Manuel Gutiérrez as a friend of the U.S. and not a Communist. This, in spite of the fact that Gutiérrez—if any one in Guatemala—is an admitted Communist.

Comment:

The Department, in all its dealings with Guatemala, has been careful to avoid any action which might be construed as intervention into the internal affairs of that country. In the past year, the Department has followed a policy of patience in its dealings with Guatemala, recognizing the political exigencies of the elections year and the possibility that a new administration in Guatemala might provide the change needed to face up squarely to the Communist problem. Such a new administration will shortly be inaugurated and, although it is openly committed to continue present policies, there is at least some reason to believe that it may take steps to end Guatemala’s procrastination on the Communist question. If it does not, a re-consideration of Guatemalan policy in the light of world events will be in order. At this date, no Guatemalan who is genuinely interested can have any doubt of the U.S.’s attitude toward international Communism and its manifestations in that country. The next move and the concrete action remains to be taken by Guatemala, and the Department should, from now until the inauguration, avoid receiving or conversing with anyone on this subject unless they come through strictly correct and official channels.

Today, aside from the moral issues involved, there would appear to be nothing to gain from risking improper identification, even by implication, with any movements in Guatemala which seek United States favor by professing to be prepared to do something about the Communists there. Furthermore, the less contact the Department has now with supposed Army or Arbenz representatives, the less likelihood will there be that the Communists might become alarmed into provoking some action; and the less chance there will be that some ill-fated venture could conceivably be linked to the United States by reason of the fact that one or more of its participants had sometime talked with Departmental officers. The Department should therefore make every effort to avoid implication in any such ventures.

If the Arbenz administration fails to take a positive stand, public opinion in the United States and elsewhere in the Hemisphere would probably support a more direct approach to the problem, even though in less critical times it might be willing to see a revolution such as that in Guatemala run its course of radicalism over a more extended period of time. Unless the Department manages the situation in Guatemala skillfully and well (possibly with consultation of leading American republics), real damage can be done within the Inter-American System and to hemispheric solidarity. Even though Latin American states might feel a deep concern with developments in Guatemala, there would doubtless be many which would censure any United States act or policy which was or appeared to be interventionist.

1. Maj. Gen. Harry H. Vaughan, Military Aide to the President.
2. In the original, “request” is handwritten over the typed word “insistence.”
3. The planes in question were F–51’s.

4. Information on the requirements that were necessary to qualify the American Republics for arms aid under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program is scheduled for publication in volume I.

   In a memorandum of a conversation held December 15, 1950, between himself, Ambassador Goubaud, Colonel Girón (Chief of the Guatemalan Air Force), and Mr. Mann, Mr. Siracusa reported in part: “[Mr. Mann] also indicated that, should [planes] become available, … the United States would have to consider the question of Guatemala’s eligibility, … in accordance with the terms of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act and the fact that Guatemala’s ratification of the Rio Treaty was not yet complete due to its reservation on the Belize question.” (714.56/12–1550)