714.00/5–1550
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs ( Mann )
| Participants: | Mr. Thomas Corcoran of the law firm Corcoran and Youngman, Washington, D.C.; |
| Mr. Thomas C. Mann, Director, MID |
Mr. Corcoran, who represents the United Fruit Company and other American clients with investments in Guatemala, called today at his request.
After discussing recent developments in Guatemala, he inquired whether the Department had any program for bringing about the election of a middle-of-the-road candidate in Guatemala. I said that we did not have and that any attempt by the Government to intervene would not only be counterproductive, but would meet with opposition in Guatemala, in the other American republics and in the United States itself. I said that I believed this would be true as long as there was any possibility of the Guatemalans working their problems out for themselves, although I would not like to try to guess what the policy in the future might be if it were definitely determined that the Guatemalan Government and people had fallen under the totalitarian control of Communist elements.
Mr. Corcoran said that he agreed that the United States Government could not take effective action at this time, but said he had been turning over in his mind the possibility that the American companies [Page 889] might agree between themselves on some method to bring moderate elements into power in Guatemala. He said that it was his opinion that the American companies should make concessions in the form of income taxes and other things, but that the die was already cast between the companies and the present Government and that his clients would never agree to making any concessions to those now in power. He went on to say that Arbenz, like Macbeth, could not last and that he considered that something ought to be done by the American companies to bring about a measure of political stability and social tranquility.
I said that I was obliged to disagree for the reason, among others, that an attempt by American companies to influence the electoral campaign would greatly weaken their position in Guatemala and only add to the present difficulties. I said that this was particularly true since it was idle to suppose that a plan of this kind could be kept secret and since, even if the plan were successful, they would have no assurance that the person selected by the American companies would not turn out to be a patriotic Guatemalan.
The conversation ended with Mr. Corcoran’s statement that he would not take any action along the line suggested without consulting with the Department.
In the course of the conversation he said that he believed it would become increasingly necessary for the U.S. to exercise a greater degree of control over Latin American and that there would be a growing demand in the U.S. for a Latin American policy which would open up the way for larger investments. I said that I would be surprised if a majority of the American public should wish to sacrifice hemisphere solidarity and the Inter-American system absent overriding military considerations which did not appear to exist at this time.
The conversation was entirely pleasant and I was left with the impression that perhaps Mr. Corcoran might wish to raise the subject again with the Department at some later date.