835.10/2–950
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Economic and Finance Adviser of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (White)
Subject: Argentina.
| Participants: | Edward G. Miller, Assistant Secretary of State. |
| Mr. Gaston2 and other Board Members and Members of the Staff of the Eximbank. | |
| Mr. White, ARA/E |
Mr. Gaston said that the Bank had made a preliminary study of the Argentine situation as requested by the Department of State and that the point had now been reached where additional information was needed from the Argentines. Mr. Gaston added that it was the Bank’s view that, if it proved possible to extend any credit to Argentina, such credit should be first granted for the purpose of funding the commercial dollar arrears.
Mr. Sauer3 said that the Bank was thinking about a joint arrangement, possibly a fifty-fifty participation by the New York Commercial Banks and the Eximbank, or a one-third each proposition which would include Argentine participation.
Mr. Sauer then said that the staff of the Bank had held a conversation with officers of the Department of State in which the latter had indicated that the Bank had the “green light” to begin discussions with the Argentine Government; that although reference had been made at a previous board meeting to sending a representative to Buenos Aires, this was not the Bank’s intention and such discussions would be held with the Argentine Embassy in Washington for the time being. In view of the fact that there appeared to be some confusion in this matter, Mr. Miller was requested to clarify the situation regarding the steps to be taken.
[Page 692]Mr. Miller, in reply, made the following points:
- a)
- He confirmed that there was no political objection on the part of the Department of State to an Eximbank credit to Argentina, the term “political objection” meaning that the Perón Government was not on any departmental blacklist.
- b)
- Our policy towards Argentina had some of the characteristics of U.S. policy towards Spain. In reply to an observation by Mr. Gaston that the Department’s policy of no objection to a loan to Spain was subject to so many conditions regarding economic measures to be taken by that country that there was, in fact, no “green light” for the Bank to go ahead with Spain, Mr. Miller said that, aside from political considerations in the strict sense of the term, there were other aspects of our economic relationships with Argentina which required the consideration of the U.S. Government.
- c)
- As an example, Mr. Miller mentioned that the decision of the Argentine Government to expropriate important U.S. property in Argentina would create such a large additional dollar requirement as to substantially change the picture of Argentina’s credit standing.
- d)
- In Mr. Miller’s judgment, the economic relationships of the U.S. with a foreign country were indivisible and all factors had to be considered. Furthermore, the Argentine situation was such a special one that it was necessary to consider the leverage which a loan negotiation might have in obtaining a satisfactory solution to other economic problems.
- e)
- Mr. Miller said that in view of the complexity of U.S. economic relationships with Argentina he thought it advisable to consult with Ambassador Griffis4 during his forthcoming visit to Argentina before a decision was made to go ahead with direct conversations between the Eximbank and the Argentine Embassy.
Mr. Gaston concurred in the suggested approach and stated his view that the other questions of economic relationships should be discussed with the Argentine Government by the Department of State rather than by the Eximbank.
In summary, the conclusions reached were:
- a)
- That, subject to Ambassador Griffis’ concurrence, Mr. Miller, while in Buenos Aires, would suggest to Ambassador Remorino5 that the latter get in touch directly with Mr. Gaston.
- b)
- That, the Bank’s preliminary talks, to follow a) above, would be with the officers of the Argentine Embassy in Washington and that such talks would be limited to the obtention of additional information required by the Bank before it could make a definite decision regarding formal loan negotiations.
- c)
- That before a decision was made to go beyond the informational stage, there would be joint consultation between the Bank and the Department of State, such consultations to include the question of procedures to be followed in both loan discussions and discussions of other aspects of U.S.-Argentine economic relationships.