IO Files

Draft of Position Paper From Background Book for Colonial Policy Discussions

confidential

Item III, A, 1, bThe Attitude To Be Adopted Toward the Special Committee on Information Transmitted Under Article 73(e)

background

The Charter1 makes no provision for a body to examine and make recommendations on the information which administering Members transmit on non-self-governing territories under Article 73(e).2 But by resolution the General Assembly in 1946 voted to establish a Committee for this purpose, composed of eight administering and eight elected Members, and in 1947 and again in 1948 voted to re-establish the Committee, for one year. In 1949 the Assembly established the Special Committee on Information Transmitted under Article 73(e) of the Charter for a three-year term and provided for the re-consideration of the future of the Special Committee and its terms of reference in 1952. (Text of resolution attached.) The United States initiated this proposal as a alternative to establishing a permanent Committee.3

When the Committee first met in 1947 it was governed by terms of reference which empowered it to examine the Secretary-General’s summaries and analyses of information transmitted, but to make, with respect to this information, recommendations only of a procedural character. The 1948 and 1949 sessions of the Special Committee, however, operated under new terms of reference which empowered the Committee to make, in addition to procedural recommendations, recommendations of substance provided these were limited to economic, social, and educational matters and were not directed to particular territories. Not until the 1949 session, however, did the Special Committee, or, indeed the General Assembly, venture to make substantive recommendations. In establishing the Committee in 1949 for [Page 447] a three-year term the General Assembly gave it substantially the same terms of reference as those enjoyed by the Committee of 1948 and 1949, maintaining the previous limited recommendations on substantive recommendations. However, the following underscored phrases in paragraph 3 of the resolution establishing the Committee for a threeyear period gave anxiety to some delegations as seeming to go further in the directing of international supervision than previous resolutions:

The General Assembly

Invites the Special Committee to examine in the spirit of paragraph 3 and 4 of Article I and of Article 55 of the Charter the summaries and analyses of information transmitted under Article 73(e) of the Charter on the economic, social, and educational conditions in the non-self-governing territories, including any papers prepared by the specialized agencies and any reports or information on measures taken in pursuance of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly concerning economic, social, and educational conditions in the non-self-governing territories.

Non-administering Members, who, in the General Assembly, out-number administering Members in a ratio of 51–8, have generally favored making the Special Committee a permanent organ. There have also been attempts on the part of some to give the Committee wider powers, including the right to receive petitions and send visiting missions to non-self-governing territories and generally to make the Special Committee as far as possible the counterpart of the Trusteeship Council.

anticipated position of the united kingdom, belgium and france

The attitude of the United Kingdom, Belgium, and France toward the Special Committee will probably be closely related to their general attitude on Chapter XI and to their belief that the United Nations through the Special Committee and the General Assembly is asserting a right to supervise their administration of their non-self-governing territories.

In the course of the discussion these Governments will presumably make the following points:

1.
Although they have regarded the Special Committee as illegal from the first, since it is not provided for in the Charter, they acquiesced in its work during 1947 and 1948 because in those years the Committee was established only on an ad hoc year-to-year basis and because it confined itself to procedural tasks—the improvement of the techniques for the transmission of the information required under the Article 73(e) and its channelling to the various United Nations organs;
2.
That again in 1949 they were ready to support the continuation of the Committee for one more year in order that the Standard Form, used by administering Members in preparing the information, might be revised;
3.
However, the Assembly’s action in establishing the Committee for a three-year period is tantamount to making it permanent;
4.
Moreover, in adopting at the last session certain general resolutions regarding education in non-self-governing territories the Special Committee encroached on the realm of policy and thus intervened in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of administering Members;
5.
While they voted in 1947 for terms of reference for the Special Committee which empowered it to make substantive recommendations relating to functional fields generally they only did so in order to defeat a more extreme proposal and have subsequently insisted that the proper functions of the Special Committee are procedural;
6.
Neither the Special Committee nor the General Assembly may properly make recommendations touching on policy to administering Members nor are these bodies equipped to do so;
7.
That, for all these reasons, they propose to maintain their reservations regarding the Special Committee and may not participate in future sessions because they feel that this is their last opportunity to take a firm stand against the Special Committee itself and against the pretensions of both the Special Committee and the General Assembly to make recommendations to them as to how they should administer their non-self-governing territories.

recommended united states position

It is recommended that in discussions with the representatives of the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium the United States representatives should make the following points:

1.
The United States earnestly hopes that all administering Members will find it possible to participate in the Special Committee when it convenes in August. Non-participation in United Nations bodies has hitherto been a technique resorted to mainly by the U.S.S.R. and its satellites. In view of Article 22 of the Charter, Rule 100 of the General Assembly’s Rules of Procedure and the precedent furnished by the Interim Committee it would be difficult for the United States to accept the view that the General Assembly is not entitled to establish a Special Committee to give initial consideration to the information transmitted under Article 73(e) of the Charter. It is, of course, obvious that non-participation by some administering Members will upset the balance of membership in the Committee and will make much more difficult the position of those administering Members, such as the United States, who are prepared to participate.
2.
The United States also earnestly hopes that those administering Members who have taken the position that neither the Special Committee nor the General Assembly may make any recommendations of substance in the economic, social, and educational fields covered by the information will find it possible to reconsider their position. Like other administering Members the United States attaches great importance to the Charter distinction between Trust and Non-Self-Governing [Page 449] Territories. This has been amply demonstrated in many ways but particularly in the insistence with which the United States has opposed efforts to give the Special Committee the right to examine petitions and other unofficial documents, to send missions to non-self-governing territories, and to make recommendations touching individual territories. Had the Special Committee in 1949 recommended, for example, that Belgium establish equality of educational opportunities in the Congo, the United States would have indicated that in its view such a resolution was beyond the powers of the Special Committee set forth in its terms of reference. So far as Article 2(7) of the Charter is concerned, it should be borne in mind that this Article was not regarded by most United Nations Members as preventing the Assembly from making a specific recommendation in the Soviet wives case. In any event the United States considers that it would be difficult to justify recourse to Article 2(7) in the case of recommendations which are addressed to administering Members generally, do not single out individual territories, are phrased as invitations and qualified by such expressions as “where practicable” and are limited to the economic, social, and educational fields mentioned in Article 73(e). The United States would furthermore be reluctant, as a matter of general policy, to invoke Article 2(7) with, respect to recommendations of this sort. Moreover, the United States considers that to restrict United Nations activities in colonial matters to purely procedural matters is, in effect, to render the United Nations practically impotent to make any real contribution to the welfare and development of colonial peoples. As a practical matter an insistence by the administering Members on this narrow view of the United Nations’ functions will create just that sense of impatience and frustration on the part of non-administering Members which is more likely to give rise to extreme proposals. Finally so far as the Special Committee is concerned, it is the United States understanding that all administering Members voted in 1947 for terms of reference for the Special Committee which gave it the right to make:

“… such substantive recommendations as it may deem desirable relating to functional fields generally, but not with respect to individual territories”.

The United States feels that the resolutions on education adopted by the Special Committee in 1949 were consistent with these terms of reference.
The United States considers, therefore, that the efforts of administering Members should be directed not at preventing any substantive resolutions, but at giving to the Special Committee the kind of leadership in this field which will have the result of improving the quality of the recommendations adopted. The United States considers that administering Members should not merely participate in the Committee but should participate actively and, if possible, come forward with useful suggestions as to matters on which the Special Committee might appropriately make general recommendations.
3.
United States policy in relation to the Special Committee during the last three years has been based on the premise that since the [Page 450] Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, where non-administering Members outnumber administering Members in a ratio of 51–8, will assert the right of Committee 4 under Article 10 of the Charter to discuss and make recommendations on the information transmitted, there is much advantage to administering Members in having this information considered initially by a balanced Special Committee. The United States has also proceeded on the assumption that the best security for administering Members against the extreme proposals of some Assembly Members lies, not in a narrowly legalistic interpretation of Chapter XI but, in a liberal and constructive position which will at once maintain the essential distinctions between trust and non-self-governing territories and command the support not only of a middle group of non-administering states in the General Assembly but of world opinion. The United States for its part has to consider not only domestic public opinion, but the desire of the people of its own territories that it take a liberal view in these fields. The United States feels that the developments of the last three years have to some extent vindicated the position taken by the United States. Proposals to make the Special Committee permanent, to alter its balanced membership, to remove the present restrictions on its power to make recommendations, to allow it to receive petitions or make visits to non-self-governing territories have been defeated year after year. The United States considers that had the United States not proposed in 1949 the establishment of the Committee for a three-year period, the Committee would almost certainly have been made permanent at the Fourth Session.
4.
The United States recognizes, of course, that some administering Members feel that concessions on their part have only led to further pressure from non-administering Members; that extreme proposals which have so far been defeated may carry in 1952 when the future of the Special Committee and its terms of reference come up for review; that if the Fourth Committee repeatedly amends out of all recognition the Special Committee’s recommendations, there is little advantage to the administering Members in retaining the Committee.
5.
The United States recognizes that these considerations are not without force and is not itself fully persuaded of the ultimate usefulness of the Special Committee. We propose to re-examine our whole attitude in 1952 on the basis of the record of the Committee during its next three years and the proposals as to its future terms of reference which may be made by Members at that time.
6.
If the United Kingdom, French, or Belgian representatives should ask the United States to take a position with reference to a proposal in the General Assembly which would in effect enlarge the terms of reference of the Special Committee, such as a proposal to permit the Special Committee to make recommendations with respect to specific territories, or to send visiting missions, or to receive petitions, the United States should reply that it is prepared, barring unforeseen circumstances, to oppose such proposals and other proposals enlarging the Committee’s terms of reference before 1952.
[Page 451]
[Attachment]

Text of General Assembly Resolution 332 (IV), Providing for the Establishment of a Special Committee on Information Transmitted Under Article 73 (e) of the Charter

The General Assembly,

Having considered the work of the Special Committee on Information transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter which was constituted by resolution 219 (III) adopted by the General Assembly on 3 November 1948, and

Taking into account the possibilities of further constructive work by such a Committee,

1.
Decides to constitute a Special Committee for a three-year period;
2.
Considers that the Special Committee should be composed of those Members of the United Nations transmitting information in accordance with Article 73 e of the Charter and of an equal number of non-administering Members elected by the Fourth Committee on behalf of the General Assembly, on as wide a geographical basis as possible. The non-administering Members of the Special Committee shall be elected for a term of three years. At the first election, however, two Members shall be elected for a term of two years, and two for a term of one year only. A separate vote shall be taken for each election;
3.
Invites the Special Committee to examine, in the spirit of paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 1 and of Article 55 of the Charter, the summaries and analyses of information transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter on the economic, social and educational conditions in the Non-Self-Governing Territories, including any papers prepared by the specialized agencies and any reports or information on measures taken in pursuance of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly concerning economic, social and educational conditions in the Non-Self-Governing Territories;
4.
Considers that the Special Committee should meet in 1950, 1951, and 1952 before the opening of the regular sessions of the General Assembly, at places and dates to be determined by the Secretary-General, in order that it should conclude its work not later than one week before the opening of each session;
5.
Invites the Special Committee to submit to the regular session of the General Assembly in 1950, 1951 and 1952 reports containing such procedural recommendations as it may deem fit and such substantive recommendations as it may deem desirable relating to functional fields generally but not with respect to individual territories;
6.
Decides that at its regular sessions in 1950 and 1951 the General Assembly will proceed to any new elections for the Special Committee that may be necessary, and examine in 1952 the question whether the Special Committee should be renewed for a further period, together with the questions of the composition and terms of reference of any such future Special Committee.
[Page 452]

Present Membership of the Special Committee:

Administering Members:

Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America,

Elected Members:

Brazil, Egypt, India, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for a term of three years;

Mexico, the Philippines for a term of two years;

Sweden, Venezuela for a term of one year.

  1. The Charter of the United Nations was signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945; for text, see 59 Stat. 1031 or Department of State Treaty Series No. 993.
  2. There were eight administering Members at this time. Six were administering trust territories for the United Nations, as follows: Australia (Nauru, also for New Zealand and the United Kingdom; New Guinea), Belgium (Ruanda-Urundi), France (under French administration: the Cameroons, Togoland), New Zealand (Western Samoa), the United Kingdom (under British administration: the Cameroons, Togoland; Tanganyika), and the United States (Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands). The other administering states were Denmark and the Netherlands.
  3. Documentation on the Special Committee as appropriate to an exposition of United States policy relating thereto is found in volume i of Foreign Relations for the years 19461948 and in volume ii of the 1949 series.