Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

IO Files: US/A/C.1/2116

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Wells Stabler of the United States Delegation Advisory Staff

confidential

[New York,] October 11, 1950.

Subject: Uniting For Peace

Participants:	Mr. Moshe Sharett,1 Israel Delegation
	Mr. Abba Eban,2 Israel Delegation
	Mr. John F. Dulles, United States Delegation
	Mr. Wells Stabler, United States Delegation

Mr. Sharett said that his Delegation would give careful consideration to our resolution and felt that as the Korean resolution had flowed from North Korean aggression, this resolution logically flowed from Soviet tactics in the Security Council. His Delegation had not resolved their doubts as to whether the resolution fell within the four walls of the Charter. However, he wished us to know that his Delegation fully approved its aims and objectives. This whole question of collective security was of vital importance to Israel and if it were really effective, could mean the salvation of small states like Israel.

Mr. Sharett stated that one of his principal concerns was what effect such a resolution would have on the USSR—would it bring the Soviets into line and consequently be conducive to peace, or would it force them out of the UN and give impetus to their present momentum?

Mr. Dulles reviewed our position and pointed out that it was very doubtful whether this or that resolution would have any real effect on the basic plans of the Soviet Union. Speculation on what the Soviets might do if the resolution were adopted was fruitless as it was impossible to foresee with any certainty what their exact plans are. However, it was quite clear in our mind what would happen if such a resolution were not passed. The UN must be prepared to act in cases of aggression and the member states must have a real feeling of responsibility in connection with collective security. The real question was whether member states were concerned with discharging these responsibilities, or whether they were merely “along for the ride” and expected the United States to come to their assistance if they were attacked. In the case of Korea, the United States, although not prepared, and although our action has meant a re-direction of our national economy, undertook the principal burden, and public opinion in this country accepted that. However, in a future case of aggression, public opinion would hardly understand if other countries of the world would not take their full share in combating such aggression.

Mr. Sharett said he fully understood these views and reiterated that an effective system of collective security was of utmost importance to his country. He then said that he felt that the resolutions as now drafted permitted the calling of a special session in the event of merely a threat to the peace. Such a possibility reinforced the feeling of many that this resolution had as its objective the complete by-passing on all matters of the Security Council.³ Mr. Dulles explained that certain of the sponsors had felt that the language in this section should follow the language of the Charter. He indicated that discussions were still continuing with respect to this section and he himself believed that the inclusion of “threat to the peace” should be deleted. Mr. Sharett stated that he fully agreed with this and that the deletion of this phrase would greatly strengthen the resolution as it would provide for this emergency action only in the event that the Security Council had failed to meet its responsibilities in connection with actual breaches of the peace. He expressed appreciation for the exposition of our views which Mr. Dulles had given him and reiterated his support for the principles and objectives of this resolution.

Wells Stabler

1. Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Israeli Delegation to the General Assembly.
2. Mr. Eban was Permanent Representative of Israel at the United Nations.
3. Sharett’s point of view was put somewhat more precisely, as reported in a memorandum of conversation by Mr. John C. Ross, Deputy United States Representative on the Security Council (IO Files, Doc. US/A/C.1/2147, October 12, 1950): “… he [Sharett] felt that the occasion for calling the General Assembly into session should be restricted to an actual breach of the peace or act of aggression and that the Assembly should not be called if there were merely an imagined threat to the peace.…”