Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

IO Files: US/A/M (Chr)/144

Minutes of the Ninth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, New York, September 28, 1950, 9:15 a. m.

New York, September 28, 1950, 9:15 a.m.

secret

[Here follow list of persons present (46) and discussion of a prior agenda item.]

2. Uniting for Peace (US/A/C.1/1890/Rev. 2: Gadel 11)

It was noted that this matter had been returned to the Delegation in view of Senator Lodge’s request. The Senator said that he heartily approved most of the resolution. However, paragraph (8) in Section C on Page 3 was not entirely clear to him. The phrase “so trained and equipped” seemed to indicate that we would know what would be needed in advance; he assumed it probably meant enough basic training for use anywhere since we were certainly not clairvoyant so that we could know where action would take place. The Secretary thought this phrase meant that the forces should be trained as mobile units, similar to the marines—self-contained units which could be picked up and sent anywhere.

Senator Lodge asked whether this provision involved any added commitment for the United States. He assumed that if we were going to have a core of, say three divisions, it would mean an increase in our Army and Air Force, as well as some additional shipping. He wondered whether this added commitment involved a Congressional question which should be raised. He believed a strong case could be made for this kind of commitment. He assumed other members of the United Nations would also wish to know whether this involved an added commitment. While we could not determine in advance of every situation what was needed, the resolution did not make clear whether the forces contemplated were in addition to what we already had.

Mr. Dulles observed that this question had already come up in our consultations with the French and British, who were unhappy with this particular provision because they assumed it meant they would have to create additional forces. While the British were simply doubtful, the French had stated flatly that they could not provide additional forces since they were already committed to do all that they could. There was a further question as to whether this provision should read just as it did, so that it appeared special forces, earmarked for the United Nations, were to be created. If it meant that governments were to designate separate United Nations units, Mr. Dulles believed that neither the French nor British would support the proposal.

Ambassador Austin inquired whether the word “designate” had been used in its precise meaning. Mr. Dulles believed this point should be decided: he was not clear on it himself. Others had pointed out that if special units were designated, they might not be those closest at hand when an actual situation occurred. He illustrated this point by noting that such designated forces might not have been gotten to Korea in time; we would be most likely to use forces close by; our strength in Korea resulted from the fact that we had thrown everything we had in the area into the struggle. The potential aggressor might in other cases be influenced by the fact that designated United Nations forces were 7,000 miles away.

[Here follows discussion of a national security matter.]

Mr. Rusk suggested that we needed further advice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff at this stage as to the way in which implementation of this provision might be handled. He recalled that in the early days of the United Nations it had been assumed that, in the United Nations contingents, each country would not designate particular units but simply the type of units it offered. We might draw from our strategic reserve. He believed military thinking on this was now changed.

Senator Lodge believed the essence of the contemplated operation was to have forces available to move into a situation quickly. Either the purpose here was to bring the Latin American states and other … countries up to a minimum of military efficiency, or else it meant special forces would be set up, and if the latter were done, it could not be done within our present legislative framework.

The Secretary commented that two separate ideas were involved—one as regards ourselves and one for other people. As regards our own situation, he explained we were not considering an increase in our military establishment beyond that which had been begun before the Korean situation developed. One thing had become clear in discussions in Washington—that was that we could resist aggression in certain areas only by threatening to bring on total war. Therefore, in such cases, any local incident raised the question of total war. That put us in a dangerous and inflexible situation. Considerations against bringing on a general war were such that the possibility of local success in aggression became very great indeed. Some types of local aggression would inevitably lead to total war, such as an outbreak in Germany or Turkey. There might be other places, however, where that would not be true, particularly where a satellite was concerned. We felt that plans should be made for some additional means to deal with certain types of local aggression. The thought was that there should be taken into consideration by the Defense Department an additional element which could be used in this way. It was not anticipated that this should be one identifiable outfit in one place supposed to cover the world, but we would look at the points of difficulty around the world, and make plans to deal in each area with forces in a particular place. In that sense this program was additional, but it was not additional to what we were thinking about now.

Senator Lodge asked if such forces were not additional to the eighteen divisions we were to have by June 1951. The Secretary responded that it was not in addition to what we planned to have by 1954. Senator Lodge thought our plans provided very little to cover the Middle East.

Turning to the situation of other countries, the Secretary explained that when the Korean war had broken out, we were unable to get any assistance immediately from other governments. This was obviously a foolish way in which to have to proceed. The provision in this resolution, however, would put pressure on governments to establish some forces which could be ready in less than four months. On a limited basis, all governments could probably come into such a plan—even the French. We could get together forces in this way which would be useful in future situations. He suggested that perhaps the language of the draft resolution might be changed to clarify the situation. Senator Lodge agreed that the underlying purpose should be made clear.

The Senator went on to say it would be desirable if a military middle ground could be worked out. He was personally grateful that we had built up a strategic air force. He thought what was being attempted in this resolution was wonderful, and suggested it be clarified by rewriting paragraph 8.

The Secretary observed that, now that the purpose of this provision had been made clear, such redrafting should be easier. He reiterated that it was not thought that the provision added anything to present plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. Dulles asked whether this language required each government to notify the Secretary-General that certain named divisions were earmarked for the United Nations. The Secretary believed that went too far. Mr. Dulles thought better language could be found; in particular, the word “designate” was too explicit. Ambassador Austin asked what language was used in Article 43 of the Charter. It was found that “to make available” appeared there. Mr. Dulles believed that phrase might be used; the present language, he thought, went further than the language in either Article 43 or 45 of the Charter.

Senator Lodge asked the Secretary what his answer would be before a Committee of Congress if the question were put to him whether this resolution meant more commitments for the United States. The Secretary replied that the answer would be no, although Congress would have to vote more for armaments, but not for this reason. Senator Lodge asked whether after June 30, 1951, the forces contemplated would develop into something definite which would be recognizable and which we would not have to have without this resolution. The Secretary said this provision did not do that. We had to do something of this kind under any circumstances; what we wanted was to get others to do it with us. Mr. Dulles agreed that the most important thing was to get the cooperation of other members in this regard.

Mr. Cohen had an observation to make with respect to our commitments. The lesson of Korea was such that we would have to organize somewhat more effectively mobile units to be available for action short of total war. This was a matter which, with or without this resolution, would present problems in regard to the organization of our armed forces, and which might and probably would require additional expenditures. This provision might help to keep the demands on the United States more moderate. Senator Lodge thought it could, not help but mean an increase for us. Mr. Cohen pointed out we faced such an increase with or without this resolution.

The Secretary emphasized that we just could not be ready to fight somebody in every part of the world at all times. There were many points where we could do nothing; there were other points where something could be done, and where it was important to do something. It was the latter situation which was involved here. Senator Lodge agreed that it was something we were going to have to do anyway.

Colonel Rodieck reported that members of the Military Staff Committee had met with their British opposites at their request on this subject. The British military staff had a number of recommendations for changes in the resolution. It was agreed that members of the Military Staff Committee would meet directly after the delegation meeting with Mr. Dulles, Senator Lodge and advisers to discuss these points.

Senator Austin suggested that Paragraph 8 might be changed to read: “… each Member maintain within its national armed forces units to be made available for prompt service on behalf of the United Nations.…” Senator Lodge believed this left out one important thing—that these groups should have enough basic training and equipment for them to be available for prompt service. Mr. Dulles suggested that reference to equipment might create the idea that the United States was in a position to supply others with equipment. Senator Lodge withdrew his point but believed the language should make clear that these troops had “sufficient basic training” for prompt service.

Mr. Dulles referred to Section A of the draft resolution which provided for special emergency sessions of the Assembly. The British and French would like to confine the right to call such sessions to seven members of the Security Council, on the premise that this provision is primarily designed to deal with a case where the Security Council is balked by a veto. They believed that if the Security Council had discussed the case, but taken no action because the majority does not feel action should be taken, the provision should not permit a special session to be called. In other words, any failure of the Security Council to act which was due to substantial disagreement should not result in throwing the case into the General Assembly. The British and French noted that the Assembly could always meet in special session on its own motion, and were insistent upon the point that this provision should meet only the case of the Security Council veto and not general disagreement. He asked for the Delegation’s reaction on this point.

The Secretary observed it sounded like a good logical French argument. Mr. Dulles said it was the British position as well. Mr. Cohen felt strongly opposed to accepting this position and pointed out that the Security Council situation depended upon the arbitrary circumstances of what states were represented on the Council. In Korea the Council had been able to act because the Indian representative had acted with dispatch. It seemed to him that in any case where action was needed there should be a means of promptly getting the Assembly together; the ability of the whole membership to bring the Assembly together should not be obstructed by the present rules of procedure. In the Korean case the Security Council situation had been more favorable to our position than it might be in later cases. The Secretary asked whether there was not the additional argument that the Interim Committee seemed about to go to pieces.

Mr. Bancroft stated that the really basic, underlying reasons for the British opposition to this provision was their feeling that the Assembly was a relatively irresponsible body, and they consequently did not wish to see any action taken which would encourage the Assembly. While they realized that a majority could call the Assembly into session, it would be thirteen days later under the present rules in such a case. Our philosophy, on the other hand, was to try to make the Assembly important and responsible. Mr. Bancroft opposed deleting this provision.

Ambassador Gross commented that the idea was to enable the Assembly to function continuously. He did not regard this provision as going very far. The rules of procedure could be amended in this way, and he considered our proposal a modest one. As he saw it, the British objection was based on the desire not to dramatize the General Assembly and to keep relative strength in the Security Council. Senator Lodge saw another attractive aspect of our suggestion in that it got around the veto. He asked what answer should be made to Senators following the Vandenberg resolution,¹ with respect to the elimination of the veto on procedural matters. Mr. Cohen replied that we could not make changes in the Charter without the consent of the permanent members; this resolution was a way within the framework of the Charter through which we could avoid the consequences of the veto; it indicated that we still hoped to work as far as possible through the Security Council but were faced with the fact that unless we reorganized without the Soviets, we could not change the veto provisions. Senator Lodge asked whether it was not worth putting this question up to the Soviets, but Mr. Cohen replied it had been done in the past without success.

Ambassador Austin referred to the scheme we had for over-ruling the double veto; it was very intricate and he did not recall the details. Mr. Cohen remembered the plan but the difficulty was that it only related to our differences as to what is procedure and what substance, and we could not blind ourselves to the fact that this was a fundamental problem.

The Secretary asked if it was not enough to say that from our national point of view we considered this provision desirable because in the immediate future the important thing was to get the entire United Nations machinery working on world problems and to face the Russians with such solid opinion that they would back away as they had in Korea. In Korea, if the United States had had to come in alone, there might have been trouble, but when everybody was against them, the Russians held off to take another look. Senator Lodge thought our Korean policy had been brilliantly managed in getting all the nations organized behind us. He thought a lot could be said for the argument that this provision would permit us to do a better job.

1. For text of United States Senate Resolution 239 of June 11, 1948, “Reaffirming the Policy of the United States in the United Nations” (the Vandenberg Resolution), see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. iii, p. 135. For documentation on the Security Council voting problem in the context of the discussion here, see ibid., vol. i, Part 1, pp. 205 ff., and ibid., 1949, vol. ii, pp. 310 ff.