Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

IO Files: US/A/M (Chr)/142

Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of the United States Delegation¹ to the General Assembly, New York, September 26, 1950, 9:15 a. m.

New York, September 26, 1950, 9:15 a.m.

secret

[Here follow list of persons present (46) and brief discussion of miscellaneous matters not on the agenda.]

1. United Action for Peace

Mr. Bancroft called attention to the new title, “Uniting for Peace”² and explained that the resolution as a whole had been redrafted, though the substance was not materially altered. He noted specific changes.

Mr. Dulles had met with Mr. Younger of the British Delegation last night and consulted in some detail. The British were worried about the resolution obtaining maximum support, and in addition to their legal worries, already known to the Delegation,³ were concerned that some safeguard against irresponsible Assembly action be provided. There was a question also as to the course of action to be followed in a case where the Council might fail and yet the Assembly would be unwilling to act. As regards the legal situation, the British relied upon Article 11(2) of the Charter which provided that any question relating to the maintenance of international peace and security upon which recommendations were made by the Assembly and “on which action is necessary” should be referred “to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion.” They feared this language might provide a convenient legal handle for the opposition and might create difficulty if the question of Assembly authority to act in this way were referred to the International Court, which might not see fit to uphold the plan. Mr. Younger had said, however, that if the United Kingdom decided to support this resolution, it would have to decide its legal theory was wrong. On the provision for designating United Nations forces, Mr. Younger had said that the British were in a unique position because their forces were so scattered that it would be impossible for them to know which could be designated as a United Nations unit. The British were also concerned at the provision for appointment of a United Nations Military Adviser, since this might be construed in such a way that, if a UK or US national were chosen, it could appear that the United States and United Kingdom were attempting to utilize world forces in their own interests. As an alternative, Mr. Dulles had suggested the use of an advisory military group, acting as a committee.

The Secretary asked whether we could go ahead with our draft. Mr. Bancroft said that the question of sponsorship remained; we had asked the British if they wished to be co-sponsors and they had desired to think it over, agreeing, however, that it would be wise to have broad sponsorship, including India. He believed we should carry on our consultations with other delegations, using this draft as the basis for our conversations.

The Secretary was not much impressed by the British arguments on the proposed military adviser. He preferred going ahead with the present text. After all, the military adviser did not have to be American or British. Mr. Dulles thought that, in order to get Indian support and possibly that of the Arabs, it might turn out to be necessary to make it clear this was not a scheme to get an American to run armed units throughout the world; however, he saw no reason to change our position at the moment. The British were simply guessing at the reactions of other countries to this idea. Mr. Rusk suggested that it might be helpful if our own military people were to draw up a list of eligible candidates. The Secretary agreed and believed it would be wise to include names of non-Americans which we could rattle off at the appropriate moment.

Mr. Popper believed that the area advisers could use the present draft as a basis for discussion with other delegations and wondered whether the actual text could be given out. Mr. Dulles said he would like to have India’s reaction before using the text in such a way it would inevitably find its way into the newspapers. Mr. Raynor asked whether the text could not be given to Canada. This was agreed. The Secretary stated that Mr. Dulles would be in charge of the consultations.

[Here follows discussion of another subject.]

1. For information regarding the composition and organization of the United States Delegation to the fifth regular session of the General Assembly, see p. 24.
2. The Delegation obviously had on hand the draft text of September 25 (Doc. US/A/C.1/1890/Rev. 2), although it is not so stated in the minutes. At its first inconclusive discussion of the matter on September 22, the Delegation had used the draft of September 12 (Doc. US/A/C.1/1890).
3. See paraphrase of British Foreign Office message handed to the United States Delegation on September 23, p. 838. The views incorporated therein had been orally communicated to the Americans in a late evening conversation between Parrott and Raynor of the British and American Delegations respectively, on September 20. At the time Raynor assured Parrott that the United States would not table any resolution until further consultations with the British and other delegations. (Raynor memorandum of conversation, September 21, IO Files, Doc. US/A/2545).