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Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. David H. Popper of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs
| Participants: | Madame Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Ambassador of India |
| Mr. John D. Hickerson, UNA | |
| Mr. William L. S. Williams, SOA | |
| Mr. David H. Popper, UNP |
The Indian Ambassador called at our request for a discussion of certain important matters which will arise at the forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly.
[Here follows brief general discussion in which Assistant Secretary of State Hickerson emphasized the desire of the Department to exchange information between the two Governments “in order to create the broadest possible atmosphere of understanding.”]
I thereupon explained in some detail our program of United Nations action against aggression,1 stressing that it represented a natural development from our experience with the Korean case and that it was of crucial importance for the United Nations to take steps of this nature if it was not to be condemned to frustration and popular discontent because of the obstructive tactics which the Soviets were now following and would continue to follow in the Security Council. I stressed the need for speedy action as the motivating factor behind our proposal for special emergency General Assembly sessions; the desirability of having a commission on the spot, through mechanisms acceptable to states like Yugoslavia, as a justification for our “roving commission” proposal; and the importance of avoiding improvisation in the case of future United Nations armed forces as a reason for our plan for United Nations units. I took pains to inform Madame Pandit at some length that our action was not motivated by a desire to drive the USSR out of the United Nations. I stated that we had no desire to influence the internal policies of the USSR, although we doubted they would stand up in the long run; but we were opposed to aggression from any quarter, and we felt that the United Nations must be built up to meet any such aggression at this time. Our [Page 335] plan, which was not yet finally adopted, was not provocative. We frankly did not think the USSR would go along with it, but we would certainly welcome them if they should wish to do so.
The Ambassador stated that without seeing the text of our proposals, she could of course make no considered comment. Nevertheless, she said that, speaking in a purely personal capacity and giving her offhand impression, she viewed the proposal with a “mixed reaction.” She agreed thoroughly with my statement that such proposals should not be provocative and appeared to feel that these proposals were not. She agreed that it was desirable to pave the way for immediate Assembly action if the Security Council could not function because of the veto. She expressed no objection to the roving commission idea as I had outlined it. With regard to the proposal on United Nations contingents, she said that everything depended on the actual drafting of our resolution. There was no objection in principle to the kind of thing the United Nations had done in Korea, but because of certain unfortunate aspects of the dual role of General MacArthur, it would be necessary to scrutinize carefully plans for United Nations military operations in the future. On the whole, her reaction appeared to be favorable rather than unfavorable.
[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]
- On instruction from the Department (telegram 341, September 6, 7 p. m., 320/9–650), the Ambassador in India (Henderson) had already informed the Indian Ministry of External Affairs of the United States three-part peace action proposals. On September 9 Ambassador Henderson reported to the Department the “tentative” and essentially negative views of the Indian Government as conveyed by Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, Secretary-General of the Ministry (New Delhi telegram 589, September 9, 8 a. m., 320/9–950).↩